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INTRODUCTION

The classical double taxation system applicable to corporations has been
flawed for decades. It has introduced serious allocative distortions into the
economy. Its effect on the distributive justice of the tax burden is most
charitably described as uncertain, but might also be described as arbitrary and
capricious. Significant remediation of this regime arrived recently in the form
of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (2003 Tax Act),'
but from the perspective of the tax integration agenda, it too is flawed. While
qualified dividend income is to be taxed at capital gains rates rather than
ordinary income rates,2 and that change has the effect of mitigating the excess

1. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752.
2. Id. § 302, 117 Stat. at 760-64.
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burden of double taxation, it does not eliminate it. Moreover, even that

mitigation is scheduled to expire at the end of 2008. 3
The double tax regime and its remediation are both flawed, but so is every
other tax regime. The decision to tax income, or any other measure defined by
economics, is itself an exercise in resolving a "second best" problem.4 One
might like to distribute tax burdens in relation to ability to pay, the benefits
received from the state, or a principle ofjust redistribution of society's wealth,
but none of these is susceptible of direct measurement or definition and one
must revert to a definable measure that correlates strongly with the chosen
norm of tax justice.5 Hence the taxation of income; but the taxation of income
is not an end in itself. To the extent that the pure definition of economic income

diverges from ability to pay6 or some alternative norm of tax justice, the
selection of income as the tax base produces maldistribution of the tax burden.
On the other hand, an economically pure definition of income would
subject all income to like tax treatment without regard to the manner of its

generation. It would entail, therefore, no discrepancies in the treatment of
various economic activities, thereby avoiding the allocative inefficiencies
resulting from the imposition of tax burdens that discriminate among economic
activities. 7 The actual measure of taxable income, however, must diverge in

3. Id. § 303, 117 Stat. at 764.
4. Briefly stated, the theory of the second-best instructs that, if at least one market is
prevented from reaching its efficient equilibrium, it is not clear that the welfare maximizing
program will be to achieve efficient equilibria in the remaining markets. It is possible that creating
distortions in some markets will allow a more than offsetting reduction in distortions in other
markets. Therefore, if some allocative biases are unavoidable, economic welfare is generally not
maximized by eliminating all other distortions relative to optimal conditions. See generally R.
G. Lipsey & R. Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11
(1956) (explaining the theory of the second-best); see also Edward Foster Hugo Sonnenschein,
PriceDistortionandEconomic Welfare, 38 ECONOMETRICA 281 (1970); Kunio Kawamata, Price
Distortion and Potential Welfare, 42 ECONOMETRICA 435 (1974) (stating elegantly the second
best proposition). For a general discussion of the theory of the second best, see P.R.G. LAYARD
& A.A. WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 180-88 (1978).

5. See Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions:Debt and Equity Classificationin CorporateTax
Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 762-66 (1998); Anthony P. Polito, The Role of Prescriptionin the
Interpretive Problem ofBasis Determination,53 TAx LAW. 615, 621-25 (2000).
6. Ability to pay is probably the most commonly asserted norm of tax justice, especially
within the realm of politicians. See, e.g., Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243,
243 (1946).
7. Because a pure-form income tax cannot impose an equivalent tax on the value of leisure
time, even it distorts the decision between work and leisure; the price of leisure-the after-tax
wage-is affected by the unbalanced tax treatment. In theory, the effect of changing taxes on
wages is ambiguous. An incremental tax cut increases the individual's marginal cost of leisure,
thereby inducing an increase in labor at the expense of leisure, but it simultaneously makes the
individual richer, thereby inducing an increased consumption of leisure at the expense of labor.
These are termed the "substitution effect" and the "income effect," respectively. It is commonly
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some measure from the pure definition of economic income.8 As such, it does
entail discrepancies in tax treatment and does bias at least some economic
decisions.
In an idealized income tax regime, individual participants of various
business enterprises would bear tax liability without regard to the form of those
business enterprises. The existing double tax regime for corporate enterprises
departs seriously from that ideal, generating allocative and distributive

distortions. As a practical matter, however, the idealized alternative to the
double tax system, an integrated income tax, is no more attainable than is the
idealized income tax as a whole. Conventional wisdom has always held that
anything approaching the integrationist ideal would entail prohibitive
administrative burdens, and its comprehensive adoption by a sweeping piece
of legislation is politically unlikely even under the best of circumstances. Even
the George W. Bush Administration, which originally proposed a very far
reaching tax integration scheme, 9 settled for no more than partial temporary

dividend relief." The Bush Administration has assembled legislative majorities
for two tax cut acts, 1 each of which reduces revenues by hundreds of billions

thought that the substitution effect dominates over some range of after-tax wages but that the
income effect comes to dominate at higher after-tax wages. As such, in practice the net effect of
the tax-induced price of leisure distortion is uncertain. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 145-46, 341-42 (3d ed. 1992).
8. In principle, a comprehensive mark-to-market income tax regime would tax the full
measure of each taxpayer's economic income in any period. For a thorough discussion of
mark-to-market taxation, see David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor
Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986). In practice, however, the assertion that
mark-to-market accounting leads to the taxation of all economic income is something of an
exaggeration. No proposed tax regime would include in taxable income the full value of
consumption occurring outside of market transactions, such as the imputed rental value of
consuming one's own property, the imputed value of one's own services performed for one's self,
and the value of consuming leisure time. In theory, a mark-to-market regime could capture
imputed rental income by marking consumption assets to market and treating the decrease in value
as amounts of consumption to be included in income. In the alternative, it might treat the full cost
of consumption assets as taxable in the year of acquisition, but this might be unpalatable in the
case of durable goods consumed over long periods of time, such as homes and cars. Even this
regime would not tax the value of self-performed services and leisure time. In the context of
transactionalist income taxation, the most aggressive proposals have called only for the inclusion
of the rental value of owner-occupied housing in taxable income. See Boris I. Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 947-48
(1967). As such, the existence of some distortions of economic decision making is unavoidable.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 11-22 (2003).
10. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
11. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752.
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of dollars over its life, but the proposal for a nearly comprehensive integration
proposal was eclipsed by other tax cutting priorities.
At the same time that the double tax regime seems unlikely to yield to a
single comprehensive solution, it is leaky, and increasingly so. Taxpayers avail
themselves of a plethora of opportunities to avoid double taxation. Policymakers have created some of those opportunities quite intentionally, while
others arise out of the exploitation of the unavoidable interstices that exist in
the tax law as much as in any other area of law. The existence of these leaks
has, at least in the past, led the Treasury and Congress to attempt to minimize
the taxpayer-driven evisceration of the double tax regime. That effort has
produced legal complexity and administrative burdens for both tax collectors
and taxpayers.
The advancement of corporate tax integration via this Article's LaissezFaire Approach is premised on the coexistence of these two truths. Unlike other
integration proposals, this approach is not a prescription for a comprehensive
integration scheme to be implemented with significant administrative burden
and through the adoption of significant new legal regimes to further complicate
the existing tax law. The Laissez Faire Approach proposes an alternative that
accepts the flawed nature of all tax systems and attempts to put taxpayers'
native desire to escape double taxation to good use.
There are numerous points in the existing tax regime in which taxpayers'
successful attempts to avoid taxation would have the effect of mitigating or
nearly eliminating the excess tax burden of the double tax regime. In as much
as taxpayers seek to avoid double taxation, the Laissez-Faire Approach
counsels acquiescence and even affirmative steps to facilitate that self-help
mitigation ofthe excess burden of double taxation. The Laissez-Faire Approach
further seeks to advance the integrationist ideal without incurring the burden
of actively pursuing that unattainable ideal. At the same time, it spares the tax
system of the administrative cost generated by defending the integrity of a
double tax regime that ought, in any case, to be eliminated. The resulting
regime will be flawed, as compared either to a pure double taxation system or
to an idealized integrated system. Nevertheless, it has the virtue of advancing
the integrationist agenda in a manner that is practicable and sustainable.
This Article sets out the Laissez-Faire Approach in the following manner.
Part II lays out the case for an integrationist norm. It advances the thesis that
the case against the double tax regime is sufficiently strong that integrationism
should be regarded as normative even in the absence of a comprehensive
integration program. Part III lays out the conditions for judging a proposal to
be consistent with the Laissez-Faire Approach. First, elements in the LaissezFaire Approach are designed to avoid, to the extent possible, the need to
fashion new legal or enforcement regimes. Instead, the elements of the LaissezFaire Approach are principally designed to eliminate or disregard existing legal
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and enforcement regimes. The regimes marked for removal or disregard are
those that serve to defend the double-tax anti-ideal. Second, the Laissez-Faire
Approach is not a program to facilitate avoidance of income taxation entirely.
It avoids mechanisms that would allow income to escape the equivalent of the
full burden of the individual tax. In essence, the Laissez-Faire Approach
facilitates corporate escape from double taxation, so long as doing so preserves
at least one level of taxation. Parts IV through XI outline a series of initiatives
that would have the effect of advancing the integrationist agenda consistent
with those conditions. It is important to bear in mind that these initiatives are
not so much a comprehensive program as an orientation for policy actions.
Many of them are no doubt susceptible of further refinement, and other
elements that would promote the integrationist agenda could no doubt be
added. The Laissez-Faire Approach is just that-an approach. Any policy or
practice consistent with its conditions is a candidate for inclusion.
II. THE

CASE FOR AN INTEGRATIONIST

NORM

Examinations of the adverse effects of the double tax regime can be found
in a significant body of economic and legal scholarship. 2 It is, nevertheless,
useful to examine the issues of that analysis here. To some extent, this
discussion is presented to motivate the general desirability of some program of
corporate tax integration and, in part, for the convenience of the reader. More
important than these considerations, however, is that the Laissez-Faire
Approach advances the integrationist agenda solely through adjustments at the
margins of the existing tax regime. Its motivation is that the case against the
double tax regime is sufficiently strong that integrationism should be seen as
normative even in the absence of comprehensive reform of corporate taxation.
Therefore, the analysis of the flaws of double taxation serves to legitimate
integrationism as the normative baseline against which even the existing
corporate tax regime is to be examined.

12. Two important studies of the problem of integration have been conducted under the
auspices of the American Law Institute and the Treasury Department, respectively. See ALVIN C.
WARREN, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES; REPORTER'S

STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (The American Law Institute ed., 1993) [hereinafter
ALI STUDY]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
TAX SYSTEMS, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY STUDY]. A large

number of articles have been written on the problem of corporate tax integration and it is
unrealistic to list them all here. Many are noted in the bibliographies of the ALI STUDY and the
TREASURY STUDY.
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Allocative Efficiency

The analysis begins with the four senses in which the double tax system
distorts economic decision making. 3 First, it biases the decision whether to
distribute corporate earnings. Second, it creates a bias against equity
capitalization. Third, it creates a bias against investment in corporate capital.
Fourth, it compounds the income tax's general bias against capital formation. 4
First is the double tax system's distortion in corporate policy with regard
to the distribution of earnings. 5 A policy of retaining earnings generally
reduces the effective rate of shareholder-level tax in two ways. Corporate
earnings are generally not subject to shareholder-level taxation until distributed
or reflected in gain on the sale of corporate stock. 6 That deferral effectively

13. The income tax law has mechanisms that allow taxpayers to mitigate the deleterious
effects of the double tax system, but they operate largely by allowing taxpayers to escape double
taxation. This part focuses on the misallocations that arise out of an undiminished double taxation
regime.
14. The behavioral biases of these distortions serve to shift the incidence of the tax. See
infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
15. It is somewhat conventional to treat the bias against corporate capital as the first
distortion of the double tax. Because the extent of the bias in capitalization and corporate form
depends in part upon how taxation interacts with dividend policy, the dividend distortion is
examined first.
16. Shareholders generally do not account for corporate earnings until they receive them as
dividend distributions, I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (West 2003), or as gain upon the sale of shares, Id.
§ 61 (a)(3). As such, shareholders' taxable income does not necessarily fully reflect income
realized for their benefit within the corporate form. See also RICHARD GOODE, THE
CORPORATION INCOME TAX 198-200 (1951) (discussing the lack of integration of corporate and
individual taxes); Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesisof SubchapterC: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 100-04 (1977) (explaining the distribution principle);
George K. Yin, A Different Approach to the Taxation of CorporateDistributions: Theory and
Implementation ofa Uniform Corporate-LevelDistributionsTax, 78 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1841 (1990)
(comparing dividend distribution with retained corporate earnings). The ability to use corporations
to minimize tax burdens through the retention of earnings faces an outer limit, in the form of the
accumulated earnings tax, I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 2003). See generally, BORIS I. BITTKER &
7.01JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOMETAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
7.09 (6th ed. 1998) (summarizing the accumulated earnings tax). With proper planning, however,
corporations are generally able to accumulate substantial earnings as working capital. See, e.g.,
Fred B. Davenport, Jr., Effective Use of Working CapitalFormula Can Avoid Accumulated
Earnings Tax, 35 TAX'N AccT. 248 (1985). Other devices designed to minimize the benefits of
deferral are the personal holding company provisions, I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (West 2003); BITTKER
7.20-7.24, and the collapsible corporation rules, I.R.C. § 341 (West
& EUSTICE, supra, at
10.60-10.66.
2003); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra, at
In a similar vein, earnings retained in a foreign corporation not subject to United States
corporate income taxation and subject to relatively low tax rates abroad are effectively subject to
a lower tax burden than are similar earnings of corporations subject to the United States corporate
income tax. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of InternationalTaxation: A Proposalfor
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reduces the shareholder-level tax. t7 In addition, to the extent that the earnings

have until now been taxed not as dividend but as capital gains on the
disposition of the equity, they have been generally subject to a preferred tax
rate. 8 At the same time, to the extent that the personal tax rate differs from the
corporate tax rate, the after-tax return to investments of distributed earnings
may be greater or less than the after-tax return to investments of retained
earnings. The bias, therefore, is not necessarily one against distribution, and

the direction of the bias depends upon the relationship among the corporate tax
rate, the normal shareholder-level tax rate, and the effective capital gains tax
rate (taking deferral into account).

9

Nevertheless, useful generalizations are

possible.
To the extent that corporate earnings are eventually to be distributed in a

manner that will subject them to the ordinary shareholder-level tax and will not
be implicitly taxed as capital gains in the interim, the bias is clearly against
distribution. The bias can be demonstrated by examining the after-tax value,
over any given time horizon of y years, for an amount of corporate earnings

either (i) retained for corporate investment at a rate of return r and distributed
as a dividend at the end of the period or (ii) distributed as earned to
shareholders, subject to ordinary taxation, and invested at the same rate of
return. In particular, retention is preferred if:

(1 - d)E[1 + r(1 - c)] y > (1 - d)E[1 + r(1 - p)]Y
where E is the amount of corporate earnings, c is the corporate tax rate, d is the
tax rate applicable to dividend distributions, andp is the ordinary personal tax

rate applicable to individual taxpayers' ordinary nondividend income." Under
these conditions, the corporate tax creates a bias against distribution so long as

Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1324 (1996). A number of provisions serve to reduce the
efficacyof this form of deferral. See I.R.C. §§ 551-558 (foreign personal holding companyrules);
Id. §§ 951-964 (controlled foreign corporation rules); Id. § 1248 (disposition of stock in certain
foreign corporations); Id. §§ 1291-298 (passive foreign investment company rules). See also,
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra, at
15.40-15.65 (explaining the mentioned I.R.C. sections).
17. See Anthony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of CapitalConventions, and the Structure
of the Income Tax: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation,17 VA. TAX REV. 467, 472 n.9 (1998)

(calculating the time period in which tax deferral effectively pays for itself through the
opportunity to invest the deferred tax without accounting for the time value of money).
18. I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2003). Gain may escape taxation entirely if taxpayers receive

appreciated stock at the death of its previous holder. Id. § 1014.
19. See ALl STUDY, supra note 12, at 28-33.
20. This comparison appears to be the pertinent one to the extent that the so-called "new
view" of dividend policy is correct, see discussion infra, because the new view assumes that
corporations are not able, as a practical matter, to convert distributions to capital gains by means
of stock redemptions.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss1/4

8

to Corporate
Tax Integration:
A Laissez-Faire Approach
TAX INTEGRATION
TO CORPORATE
ADVANCING
2003]Polito: Advancing

the corporate tax rate is lower than the shareholder tax rate, because the
retention subjects future earnings, with respect to the amount retained, to a
lower tax rate than applicable to earnings distributed and invested at the
shareholder-level. 2
The maximum corporate tax rate has been lower than the maximum
shareholder tax rate for most of the history of the income tax.22 The terms of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (2001 Tax Act),
as well as those of the 2003 Tax Act, mitigate this form of the bias against
dividends, because the new maximum individual tax rate matches the maximum
corporate tax rate of 35%. This reform, however, does not eliminate the bias
against dividends with respect to corporations subject to less than maximum tax
rates. 24
In the alternative, assume that retained earnings are always removed from
corporate solution via a transaction subject to capital gains rates.2" The nominal
capital gains tax rate is lower than the historically "normal" ordinary
shareholder-level tax rate.26 So long as the shareholder-level tax rate is higher
than the corporate tax rate, retention is always preferred. 2' Even for corporate
rates in excess of shareholder rates, retention is preferable if the capital gains

21. ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 30.
22. See JAMES S. EUSTICE ET AL., THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 2.02[1][c] (1987);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(a), § 13221(a), 107
Stat. 312, 457-59, 477; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 11101(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-403, 04.
23. Under the terms of the 2001 Tax Act, the maximum stated personal tax rate was
scheduled to be reduced to 35% by 2010. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41-42. The 2001 Tax Act has also scheduled
the repeal of deduction phase-outs that will be fully effective in 2010. Id. §§ 102-103, 115 Stat.
at 44-45. Those phase-outs currently increase many taxpayers' effective tax rates above the stated
rates. The 2003 Tax Act accelerated the tax rate reduction. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 105, 117 Stat. 752, 755.
24. See infra Part III. Note that reducing the dividend tax rate, d, without reducing the tax
rates applicable to nondividend ordinary income, has no effect on this bias. Whether earnings are
retained or distributed immediately, d applies once, and the pertinent comparison is whether the
taxation of reinvested earnings over the subsequent y years is greater in corporate solution or
outside of corporate solution. As such, the 2003 Tax Act does not affect this particular
comparison.
25. This can be accomplished in many cases by means ofrepurchasing corporate shares, see
I.R.C. § 302 (West 2003), especially via open-market repurchases. Given the anonymity of
modem public markets, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish open-market sales in which
the purchaser is the issuer from those in which the purchaser is a third party. As such, applying
the statutory tests for the dividend equivalence is not practicable, and these transactions are
undoubtedly treated as capital gains transactions.
26. Id. § 1.
27. In addition, this effect creates a bias in favor of using nondividend methods to remove
earnings from corporate form. See ALl STUDY, supra note 12, at 39-40.
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rate is sufficiently below the ordinary shareholder-level tax rate. 28 The
comparison of after-tax values above is slightly modified to indicate that
retention is preferred if:
(1 - k)E[1 + r(1 - c)] y > (1 - d)E[1 + r(1 -p)]Y
where k is the nominal capital gains tax rate. 29 Given k < d, this expression
holds for all values where c s-p and for some values of c > p. Given historic
practice of setting d = p and a historic tendency to set maximum corporate tax
rates at no more than the maximum individual income tax rates,30 the corporate
tax biases the decision whether to distribute earnings, and likely has created a
bias against the distribution of earnings. The 2003 Tax Act temporarily sets d
= k,3' and ensures a bias for all c < p, but it temporarily eliminates the bias to
32
the extent that c = p.
The significance of the bias that the double tax regime imposes on dividend
policy depends in large measure upon the relative descriptive powers of
economic theories commonly referred to as the "new view" and the "traditional
view" of corporate dividend policy. The new view's necessary predicates are
as follows: (1) except for taxes and transaction costs, investors view dividend
distributions and capital gains as perfect substitutes, and (2) as a practical
matter, corporations have no alternative to cash dividends for distributing
earnings to shareholders. Given a higher effective tax burden on distributed
earnings than on retained earnings, the new view suggests that a corporation
should satisfy its entire need for equity capital out of retained earnings, rather
than the issuance of new stock. A corporation will distribute earnings,
according to this view, only to the extent that it lacks investment opportunities
whose returns would cover the opportunity cost of capital.
If true, then, at the time the double tax is imposed, dividend payout policy
is permanently adjusted to minimize the excess tax burden on distributed
earnings over retained earnings. For existing companies, the excess tax burden
on dividends has been capitalized into the value of shares, reducing their value.
The reduction in value, however, is a pure transfer from shareholders to the fisc

28. See id. at 32.
29. This appears to be an appropriate comparison to the extent that the so-called "traditional
view" of dividend policy, see discussion infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text, is thought
accurate, and corporations seek to minimize the excess tax burden on distributions by converting
them into capital gains.
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64.
32. For a discussion of the circumstances under which the corporate tax would create a bias
in favor of distribution, see ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 28-39.
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that causes no net reduction in the pre-tax value of the corporate enterprise. The

excess tax burden on dividends is a lump-sum tax. Eliminating it generates a
windfall to shareholders without any meaningful improvement of allocative
efficiency.

In contrast, the traditional view is that a corporation experiences real
nontax benefits to the payment of dividends. A variety of possible explanations
have been advanced as to why investors prefer stocks that pay regular

dividends. A commonly advanced thesis is that given asymmetric information
about a corporation's profitability, dividends serve to signal profitability to
capital markets. Earnings distributions serve as effective signals because, the
less profitable a corporation is, the greater the finance cost it must incur to
replace the capital lost through distribution. A sufficiently profitable
corporation has no need to replace the amounts of distributions. Hence, the
dividend distribution is less costly for profitable enterprises than for
unprofitable enterprises. 3

Another view is that dividend distributions serve to limit the agency costs
associated with the ownership-control separation of the "Berle-Means
corporation."34 As Professor Michael Jensen observed:
Managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow

beyond the optimal size. Growth increases managers' power
by increasing the resources under their control. It is also

associated with increases in managers'

compensation,

33. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle, 22 RAND J. ECON. 455
(1991); Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the
Hand" Fallacy, 10 BELL J. ECON. 259 (1979); Kose John & Joseph Williams, Dividends,
Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 1053 (1985); Merton H. Miller &
Kevin Rock, DividendPolicy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985). See also
Gustavo Grullon, The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs (Jan. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the South Carolina Law Review) (finding that share
repurchases may convey information that share prices are undervalued); Oded Sarig, A
Longitudinal Analysis of Corporate Payout Policies (Oct. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the South CarolinaLaw Review) (finding that "unexpected increases in corporate payout are
associated with long-term subsequent increases in profitability"). Professor Grullon finds that
firms in his sample experienced a decline in return on assets during the three years following a
share repurchase. He suggests that this evidence indicates firms decide to repurchase shares when
they face a reduction in their investment opportunity sets. Such a motivation is consistent with
an agency-cost reduction motivation for corporate distributions. See infra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
34. The term "Berle-Means corporation" refers to a corporation whose stock is subject to
widely dispersed public shareholding, resulting in ownership-control separation. See ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 354-56
(1933); see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separationof Ownershipand Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the ownership-control separation within corporations).
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because changes in compensation are positively related to the
growth in sales. The tendency of firns to reward middle
managers through promotion rather than year-to-year bonuses
also creates a strong organizational bias toward growth to
supply the new positions that such promotion-based reward
systems require.
...Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to
fund all projects that have positive net present values when
discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Conflicts of interest
between shareholders and managers over payout policies are
especially severe when the organization generates substantial
free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to
disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of
capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies.3 5
The distribution of such free cash flows may serve as an effective signal of
corporate management's commitment to reduce agency costs.36

A third possibility is that shareholders may not view the sale of shares as
a perfect substitute for dividends, notwithstanding that finance theory indicates
that they should be perfect substitutes. There are various possible explanations
for such a phenomenon. Individuals may use strict rules as means of limiting
their own behavior. Therefore, they may refuse to sell any stock for current
consumption because they fear that, once begun, they will not be able to limit
themselves. They prefer stock with predictable dividends as a means of
disciplining their own selection between current consumption and capital
accumulation. Alternatively, over some ranges of outcomes, individuals may
fail to integrate the component parts of risky activity, viewing the dividend
distribution as "safe" income whose distribution is unconnected to changes in
the underlying share's value. Last, individuals may experience a greater degree

35. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323 (1986) (citations omitted).
36. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Jensen, supranote
35, at 324. Professor Gustavo Grullon found that the announcement of open-market share
repurchase programs conveys significant information about managers' commitment to reducing
agency costs. As evidence of a desire to reduce agency costs associated with free cash flow, he
found (1) "a significant decline in profitability, systematic risk, and capital expenditures after
share repurchase[s]," and (2) "that the market reaction to share repurchase announcement is
negatively related to the firm's marginal return on investment." Grullon, supra note 33, at 2.
These indicate that share repurchases arise from a reduction in a firm's investment opportunity
set, in which case distribution of earnings insures against the agency cost ofsub-optimal corporate
investment. Id.
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of "regret" from the foregone possibility of share appreciation attendant with
a stock sale than from the same forgone possibility attendant with failure to
reinvest cash dividends.37
As a result, ceteris paribus,shareholders require a lower after-tax rate of

return with respect to stock that pays regular dividends than for stock that does
not pay dividends. As such, a corporation should attempt to match distributions
to its optimal dividend payout ratio, at which the value of the corporate
enterprise is maximized.38 If this view is correct, corporations will pay

dividends up to a level at which the marginal net nontax benefit of dividend
payout is equal to the marginal tax detriment, measured in terms of the excess
tax burden on dividends. To the extent the excess tax burden causes

corporations to reduce their dividend payout ratios, it increases their cost of
capital and results in a real decrease in corporate investment.
Note that a tax-induced reduction in dividend payout ratios is equally
consistent with both views. There are, however, a number of indicators that

suggest the rejection of the new view, or at least that the new view describes
only a fraction of corporate dividend policies. The new view implies that
corporations would not pay dividends if they could repurchase shares instead.
Nevertheless, corporations can, and increasingly do, distribute earnings through
39
share repurchases, while at the same time paying dividends. "The new view

is also inconsistent with the stability of dividend" distributions, notwithstanding
dramatic changes over the last several decades in the tax rates applicable to

dividends." A further piece of empirical evidence is the practice of
corporations paying dividends even as they issue new stock.41 If the new view
37. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preferencefor Cash
Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (1984). See also Sarig, supra note 33 (finding that the
information content of an unexpected increase in dividends is stronger than an equal-size
unexpected increase in share repurchases).
38. The optimal dividend payout ratio is presumably not 100% of earnings, because, at the
margin, an increase in the dividend payout ratio also increases offsetting non-tax costs to the
corporation. Notably, increased payment of dividends requires the satisfaction of the corporation's
capital needs at the margin by the issuance of new debt or equity securities which increases
transaction costs.
39. JANEG. GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 87-88 (1994).
Professor Grullon has observed the increasing use of share repurchases and the declining fraction
of total earnings distributed as dividends. Nevertheless, his data shows large scale simultaneous
use of both. Grullon, supranote 33, at 31 (citing COMPUSTAT, the Standard & Poor's database
service, at http://www.compustat.com).
40. GRAVELLE, supra note 39 at 88; see also JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J.
MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 18-19 (1997) (observing the stable pattern of
corporations paying out roughly half of earnings as dividends, despite their taxability to individual
recipients).
41. Jane G. Gravelle, The CorporateIncome Tax: Economic Issues and Policy Options, in
TAX POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD 15, 20 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1999).
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were correct, this practice would be a sheer waste because it incurs an
unnecessary excess tax burden on the distribution, and unnecessary transaction
costs on the issuance of new stock. As such, it seems likely that the existence
of the double tax regime does generate real distortions in economic decision

making.
Another bias is the one the corporate tax creates in favor of debt
capitalization, as opposed to the issuance of new equity. Because interest is
deductible,4" debt capitalization effectively eliminates the corporate-level tax
with respect to a portion of the corporate earnings stream. 43 The bias in favor

of debt financing increases the risk of corporate bankruptcies. The increased
risk of consequent bankruptcy transitions in ownership of corporate assets
imposes very real net costs. The costs of bankruptcy are threefold. First,

42. I.R.C. § 163 (West 2003).
43. See ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 25-28; TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 6, 115;
see also Polito, UsefulFictions,supra note 5, at 773-77 (discussing the effects of debt and equity
financing on taxes). The ALI Study also observes that the corporate tax creates a similar bias in
favor of financing via retained earnings as against the issuance of new equity. Whether financing
by retention or by the issuance of new debt is preferable depends upon exact tax rates. See ALI
STUDY, supra note 12, at 25-28. Because debtholders pay tax on interest or original issue
discount as it accrues, and stockholder taxation can be deferred by retention, it is possible for a
corporation to experience a tax benefit from capitalization with equity rather than debt. The aftertax rate of return for corporate equities of a corporation retaining earnings may be stated as
follows:
RR = r(I - c)(I - z)

where RR is the after-tax rate of return of equity of a corporation that retains earnings, ris the pretax rate of return, c is the corporate tax rate, and z is the effective shareholder-level tax rate taking
into account deferral and the preferential tax rates with respect to capital gains. Id. at 23-24. The
after-tax rate of return for corporate debt may be stated as follows:
RD= r(1 -p)

wherep is the personal income tax rate. Given tax rates c and z sufficiently belowp a corporation
that retains earnings may have a lower effective tax on equity than on debt if:
(1 - C)(l - z) > (I - p)
Id. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 11 (1991) (estimating that the difference between the total effective tax rates
on debt and equity is about 50%). See also Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261,26668 (1977) (re-examining the tax advantages of debt financing). To the extent that the old view of
dividend distributions is accurate and dividends are taxed at the ordinary rate p, it necessarily
drives up the effective shareholder-level tax on equity, and shifts the equilibrium of tax rates to
favor debt capitalization. Even the taxation of dividends at capital gains rates, as temporarily
imposed by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§§ 302-303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64, does not eliminate the bias unless, at the margin, c is
significantly lower than p. For a tax rate of 35% for interest income, and a 15% tax rate for
dividends, equity is favored only for corporate tax rates below approximately 23.5%. Even for a
tax rate of 40% for interest income, equity is favored only for corporate tax rates below about
29.4%. For most publicly traded corporations, the marginal corporate tax rate is 34%. I.R.C.
§ 11 (b) (West 2003).
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bankruptcy commonly involves the raising of new capital, which may be senior

to the preexisting debt and equity. The risk of this subordination in bankruptcy
reduces the value of corporate securities ex ante, and therefore raises the cost

of capital to the corporation." Second, there are the direct costs of bankruptcy:
administrative expenses (legal fees, trustees' fees, et cetera) and time lost by
corporate officers in litigation."5
Perhaps the most important cost of bankruptcy
proceedings is the negative effect that financial
embarrassment may have on the stream of net operating

earnings of the business firm. The firm may find it very
difficult to obtain trade credit, customers may question its
reliability and permanence as a source of supply and may
choose to deal elsewhere. Questionable financial condition
may be equivalent to negative publicity about the integrity of
the firm.46
Because "bankruptcy involves substantial administrative expenses and other

costs, and causes a significant decline in the sales and earnings of the firm in
receivership, the total value of the levered firm can be expected to be less than

that of the all-equity company."47 Therefore, the tax law's bias in favor of

48
leverage reduces the value of corporate enterprises. The Treasury's study of
corporate tax integration concluded that corporate debt levels have grown
significantly since the end of the Second World War, and particularly quickly
during the 1980s.49

The third bias, commonly seen as the most obvious bias, of the double tax

0
regime is its bias against investment in corporate capital." Because the return

44. See Nevins D. Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital,22 J. FIN. 395,
398 (1967).

45. Id.
46. Id. at 399.
47. Id. at 397.
48. Focusing solely on the bankruptcy costs of debt would lead to the conclusion that, in the
absence of corporate taxes, corporations would use no debt financing at all. Given that this has
never been the historic practice, it must be that debt financing generates other nontax benefits as
well. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
479-97(5th ed. 1996); HAROLD BIERMAN, JR., STRATEGIC FINANCIAL PLANNING: A MANAGER'S
GUIDE TO IMPROVING PROFIT PERFORMANCE 45-51 (1980). Nevertheless, it is clear that the
presence of the double tax does increase the bias in favor of debt financing.
49. TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 7.
50. For the earliest studies of this effect, see Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the
CorporationIncome Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962); Arnold C. Harberger, Efficiency Effects
of Taxes on Incomefrom Capital,in EFFECTS OF CORPORATION INCOME TAx (Marian Krzyzaniak
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to investments in corporate form bears a higher tax burden than does
investment in noncorporate form, the cost of capital for corporate form
investment is, ceteris paribus, higher than the costs of capital for other

sectors. 5 This distortion in relative capital costs biases capital flows against

ed., 1966).
51. The cost of capital is calculated in terms of before-tax rates of return that yield the aftertax rates of return that the market demands of an investment. Consider two projects, one in
corporate form and the other in noncorporate form, of which the financial market demands an
equal after-tax rate of return, which is denoted here at r. Let p be the effective rate of personal
income taxation, c be the effective rate of corporate income taxation, R. the required before-tax
rate of return for noncorporate investment, and R, the required before-tax rate of return for
corporate investment. If the corporation distributes all of its earnings as earned, the required
before-tax rates of return may be determined as follows:
R = r/(1 - p)
Rc = r/(1 - c)(1- p)
resolving the equations against one another yields R. in terms of R.:
Rc = R,/( - c)
The corporate cost of capital is higher than the noncorporate cost of capital for all positive
corporate tax rates. According to a 1991 Congressional Research Service study, the effective
combined federal tax rate (including both corporate and personal tax) on corporate equity was
48%, compared with 28% for noncorporate equity. See GRAVELLE, supra note 43, at 11. These
estimates allow one to calculate the relative costs of capital. The estimates of the tax rates tell us
that:
(I - c)(I -p) = (I - .4 8) = .52
(I - p) = (I - .28) = .72
Resolving these two equations against one another yields (1 - c) =. 72. Therefore, R c R,/.72; Rc
= 1.38 • Rn. As of the 1991 study, the corporate cost of equity capital was roughly 138% of the
noncorporate cost of equity capital.
One indication of the effect of this bias is to compare the spread on pretax rates of return on
corporate investments and the cost of funds in the United States and other countries. A 1991
OECD study compared this "tax wedge" in the United States and five other industrialized
democracies for manufacturing investments.
Country
Corporate Tax Wedge (measured in basis
point)
Canada

120

France

40

Germany

60

Japan

140

United Kingdom

90

United States

80

See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 6.
Open economy models raise a serious question of whether the burden of the tax is shifted
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The extent in practice to which the double tax regime biases the market

against corporate capital, however, depends in part upon the degree of
descriptive validity that attaches to the so-called "new view" or "traditional
view" of dividend policy. Because the new view holds that there is no benefit

in the financial market for distributing dividends, it suggests that corporations
mitigate the double tax by retaining earnings except to the extent they lack

investment opportunities that are justified by the opportunity cost of capital.
As such, the excess tax burden on distributed earnings over retained earnings

is a pure transfer from shareholders to the fisc, with no real effect on corporate
investments. As such, policy discussion should focus on the double taxation
of retained earnings. Because the effective tax rate on capital gains is quite

low, the extent of the allocative bias is reduced. In fact, if this view is correct,
the very existence of a double tax burden in practice depends upon whether the
effective combined corporate tax and shareholder capital gains tax is greater
52
than a single level of tax imposed on noncorporate capital.

away from capital. In a small open economy in which capital is perfectly mobile and goods in
international trade are perfect substitutes for one another, the burden of the tax is shifted to
immovable factors of production; for example, to labor. In such an economy, the price of goods
is fixed in the international market and capital migrates abroad to the extent necessary to raise the
domestic after-tax rate of return to capital to that available in international markets. Therefore,
after-tax labor wages must fall to clear the market. If, however, goods are not perfect substitutes
and capital is not perfectly mobile, as seems a more accurate description of reality, at least a
portion of the tax burden does fall on capital. See Jane G. Gravelle, CorporateTax Incidence in
an Open Economy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION
173 (Frederick D. Stocker ed., 1994); GRAVELLE, supra note 39, at 232.
52. The after-tax rate of return for corporate equities of a corporation distributing its
earnings annually as earned may be stated as follows:
R = r(1 - c)(1 -d)
where r is the pre-tax rate of return, c is the corporate tax rate, and d is the tax rate applicable to
dividends. The after-tax rate of return for corporate equities of a corporation retaining earnings
may be stated as follows:
RR = r(l - c)(1 - z)
where RR is the after-tax rate of return of equity of a corporation that retains earnings, and z is the
effective shareholder-level tax rate taking into account deferral and the preferential tax rates with
respect to capital gains. With effective deferral, z < d even if d is set equal to the nominal capital
gains tax rate. ALL STUDY, supra note 12, at 23-24. The non-corporate after-tax rate of return
may be stated as follows:
RN = r(1 - p)
Given tax rates c and z sufficiently below p, a corporation retaining earnings may create a bias
in favor of its equity as against noncorporate equity if:
(1 - c)(1 - z) > ( - p)
Id. For purposes of illustration, set c equal to 35% andp equal to 40%. See I.R.C. § I(a), § I I(b)
(West 2003) (listing personal and corporate tax rates based on taxable income). The effective
combined tax on non distributing corporate equities is less than the effective tax on noncorporate
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In contrast, the traditional view holds that there is a real nontax benefit to
the distribution of dividends. Because shareholders require a lower rate of
return from equities on which dividends are regularly paid, corporations are
able to reduce their cost of capital by regular dividend distributions.53 If this
view is correct, corporations will pay dividends up to a level at which the
marginal benefit of dividend payout, in terms of reducing the cost of capital, is
equal to marginal detriment, in terms of the excess tax burden on dividends.5 4
As such, corporations do not escape the excess tax burden on distributed
earnings to the same degree as if the new view is accurate. To the extent this
causes corporations to reduce their dividend payout ratios, it increases their cost
of capital and results in a real decrease in corporate investment.
It may be that mature firms are able to fund capital needs through debt and
retention of earnings, but new and rapidly growing firms are commonly
constrained to raise capital through the issuance of new equity." It seems clear
that the corporate income tax does make the cost of equity capital higher than
the cost of other forms of capital.5 6 Therefore, the corporate tax does create a
real bias against corporate enterprise, and it is one that falls particularly upon
growing firms.
Any such distortion would be trivial, however, if capital could migrate
costlessly from corporate form to some other form of business organization.
That corporate form continues to thrive for publicly traded enterprises57 in the
face of the double tax, and that those corporations continue successfully to
issue new corporate equities in the public market suggests there are real
advantages to corporate form that cannot be replicated in some other form.
Equivalently, the costs of abandoning corporate form must exceed the excess
burden of the double tax regime.

equities if z is less than 8%. For most taxpayers, the maximum capital gains tax rate has been
20%, I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2003), and the 2003 Tax Act temporarily reduces the maximum capital
gains rate to 15%, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§ 301, 117 Stat. 752, 758. Z is dependent upon the length of deferral and the discount rate at
which deferral is valued. See supra note 43.

53. See supranotes 33-38 and accompanying text.
54. Even taxing dividends at nominal capital gains rates does not eliminate the excess tax
burden on corporate equity relative to noncorporate investment unless the corporate tax rate is

significantly below the individual ordinary tax rate. See supra note 43.
55. GRAVELLE, supra note 39, at 87; Peter Birch Sorensen, Changing Views of the
CorporateIncome Tax, in TAX POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD 27, 31 (Joel Slemrod ed. 1999).
56. Alan J. Auerbach, Taxes, FirmFinancialPolicy and the Cost of Capital: An Empirical
Analysis, 23 J. PuB. ECON. 27 (1984).
57. Closely held businesses are largely able to gain whatever nontax advantages accrue to
them from corporate form, and also to avoid the excess tax burden of the double tax regime. See
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).
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Several explanations have been advanced for this failure of capital to
migrate away from corporate form. Size allows for economies of scale, and
widely dispersed ownership may facilitate assembling the capital necessary to
achieve those scale economies.
But given that some enterprises are large, why should
they have more than a very small number of owners? The
answer here appears to involve a number of factors:
diversification of risk, the desire to limit liability, information
costs of becoming fully informed about all the activities of a
large enterprise, and liquidity. These reasons for multiple
owners are interrelated. For example, it may be very difficult
for any one owner to become fully informed about a large
firm's activities, but the lack of full information may make
investing in a large firm riskier. The limits on full information
provide investors with a further interest in reducing their
exposure in a particular firm, including limiting their
liability.5"
The corporate characteristics-limited liability, free transferability of interests,
centralized management, and continuity of existence-no doubt facilitate the
dispersed capital ownership structure 9 of the so-called Berle-Means
corporation.6"
A slightly different explanation for why the size of a corporation may be
important is the possibility that, even within the same industry, consumers may
not regard the goods produced by large businesses as fully equivalent to those
produced by small businesses. A large business's goods and services may have
the advantage of uniformity and reliability, while small businesses may have

58. Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Incidence and Efficiency Costs of
Corporate Taxation When Corporateand NoncorporateFirms Producethe Same Good, 97 J.
POL. ECON. 749, 757 (1989).
59. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) ("These four characteristics all serve
the positive functions of greatly facilitating the efficient aggregation of very large amounts of
capital from numerous investors and the efficient operation of a very large business with

numerous owners and employees.").
60. See supranote 34. While these characteristics may be necessary to effect the separation
of ownership and control, they may not be sufficient. Professor Roe has hypothesized that the
dominance of the Berle-Means corporation in the United States is unsupportable in a social

democracy in which government social policy serves to magnify, rather than reduce, the difficulty
of aligning managerial interests with shareholder interests. See Mark J. Roe, Political
Preconditionsto SeparatingOwnershipfrom CorporateControl,53 STAN. L. REv. 539 (2000).
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greater flexibility in adapting goods and services to local tastes.61 A third
possibility is that corporate and noncorporate securities are imperfect
substitutes in investment portfolios.62
The rise in the 1980s of the master limited partnership issuing publicly
traded limited partner "units"63 underscores the real economic costs incurred by
the loss of corporate form. The master limited partnership represented an
attempt to capture functionally all of the economic benefits64 of a widely held

61. See DON FULLERTON & DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN?
50 (1993); Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, CorporateTax Incidence and Inefficiency
when Corporateand NoncorporateGoods are Close Substitutes, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 501, 504
(1993).
62. See Jane G. Gravelle & James B. Mackie III, The Real and FinancialEfficiency Gains
from CorporateTax Integration:Results from Three SimulationModels, in PROCEEDINGS OFTHE
EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 140, 142 (1992).
63. See William M. Gentry, Taxes andOrganizationalForm: The Rise and FallofPublicly
Traded Partnerships,in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
TAXATION, 30 (1992); Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate,
44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 502-03 (1995).
64. Formally, a master limited partnership would have no more than two of the four
corporate characteristics, thereby achieving partnership classification under the predecessor to the
check-the-box regulations. In practice, however, the deviation from true corporate structure did
not bear anything like the economic impact that the paradigmatic partnership characteristics
suggest. Formally speaking, such master limited partnerships normally lacked limited liability and
continuity of life. Lack of limited liability was achieved by the introduction of a corporate general
partner bearing unlimited liability that satisfied the then-applicable standards of an adequately
capitalized corporate general partner. The I.R.S. was willing to issue an advance ruling on lack
of limited liability if the general partner's net worth was at least 10% of the capital contributed
to the master limited partnership. But much of the tax bar was willing to opine favorably on the
absence of limited liability so long as the general partner had "substantial assets" unrelated to the
master limited partnership. Lack of continuity of life was achieved by causing the bankruptcy of
the corporate general partner to trigger the dissolution of the entity under state law. Given an
adequately capitalized corporate partner, this formal lack of these two corporate characteristics
did not bear anything like the economic bite of the paradigmatic unlimited liability and lack of
continuity of life of the partnership model of business organization. Some such master limited
partnerships also asserted lack of free transferability on the premise that transfers required the
consent of the corporate general partner. Nevertheless, the public trading of their limited
partnership "units" generally ensured that they had the corporate characteristic of freely
transferable interests. All such master limited partnerships had the corporate characteristic of
centralized management. See R. Donald Turlington & Reba A. Beeson, Master Limited
PartnershipsCurrentIssues, Techniques and Strategies, in PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 1988: AN
ADVANCED PROGRAM, 211, 228-30 (1988). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. TAXATION, 100TH
CONG., TAX TREATMENT OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 28 (1987) ("Those who support
proposals to change the classification of MLPs argue that publicly traded limited partnerships
resemble publicly traded corporations in their business functions and in the way their interests are
marketed, and limited partners as a practical matter resemble corporate shareholders in that they
have limited liability, may freely transfer their interests, generally do not participate in
management, and expect continuity of life of the entity.").
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corporation in a legal package that the tax law would exclude from the double
tax regime. The addition of section 7704 to the Internal Revenue Code, which
treats publicly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes, served to
arrest this development. 65 To the extent that section 7704 is effective, 66 it
ensures that capital migration from corporate legal form is pointless, because
any business form that is functionally substitutable for the widely held
corporation is a widely held corporation for tax purposes.
The last bias of the double tax regime is the extent to which it increases the
income tax's overall bias against capital formation. The income tax generally
creates a bias against capital formation because it distorts the time value of
money. 67 To the extent that the excess tax burden of the double tax regime falls
on the return to capital, it increases the distortion in the after-tax time value of
money. The degree of the distortion in capital formation depends both on the
spread between before-tax and after-tax rates of return ("spread") and on the
sensitivity of savings to changes in the after-tax rate of return. Although the
spread is well documented, the responsiveness of savings to rate of return
distortions has not been conclusively established. 6' Therefore, the extent of the
distortion in savings rates is unclear.
The extent of the harm arising from these distortions is an empirical
question. It is always possible for some economic distortions to mitigate
others. 69 The bias in favor of debt financing, and in the corporate decision to
distribute dividends, partially mitigates the bias against corporate form.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that some net distortion remains.
The Treasury Study published in 1992 estimated that even its partial
integration proposals would increase national economic welfare between $2.5
billion and $25 billion per year.70 An earlier study estimated efficiency gains
of full integration on both annual and long-term present value bases.
Expansion of national income for a single year might be as much as $11 billion
65. See Hobbs, supra note 63, at 508-9.
66. A significant limitation on its effectiveness is the exception for publicly traded partnerships whose gross income is at least 90% "qualifying income," I.R.C. § 7704(c) (West 2003),
which includes not only passive investment income, but also income from real estate dealings and
natural resource related activities, Id. § 7704(d). In addition, grandfathered publicly traded
partnerships continue to avoid the full effect of corporate tax classification by subritting to an
annual tax of 3.5% of gross income. Id. § 7704(g).
67. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much CapitalIncome Taxed Under an Income Tax is
Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAxL. REV. 1 (1996).
68. See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 11-12, 118.
69. See supra note 4.
70. TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 111, 129-41. Presumably this estimate is made in
terms of 1992 dollars. In 2000 dollar equivalents, these figures are approximately $2.9 billion to
$29 billion. These inflation-adjusted figures are based on the gross domestic product (GDP)
implicit price deflator. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 278 (2001).
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(1973 dollars). The present value of the increased future stream of national

income might be as much as $551 billion (1973 dollars), compared to an
estimated $49 trillion (1973 dollars) present value of the future income stream
of the U.S. economy. These figures contained some sensitivity to the manner
in which government revenue losses from tax integration are replaced.7
Dr. Jane Gravelle, a senior specialist in economic policy for the
Congressional Research Service, estimated the incremental welfare distortions
of the various biases induced by the excess-burden of the double tax as a
percentage of annual domestic consumption.72 The bias against corporate
capital generates annual welfare losses of 0.9% of consumption, dividend bias
generates losses of 0.2%, and debt-equitybias generates losses of 0.17%, which

sum to 1.27%. 7 Based on contemporary consumption figures, this amounts to
roughly $82 billion.74 For comparison, she estimates that the total incremental
tax revenue of the double tax regime over a fully integrated regime amounts to
only 1.38% of consumption, only slightly greater than the welfare loss
generated by the tax, which makes the double tax regime a fairly inefficient
source of government revenue at the margin.75

71. Don Fullerton et al., Corporate Tax Integration in the United States: A General
EquilibriumApproach, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 677, 686-88 (1981). Adjusted to 2000 dollars, these
figures for efficiency gains are $35 billion dollars on an annual basis and $1.8 trillion in present
value terms. The latter would be compared to $158 trillion present value of the overall future
income stream. These inflation-adjusted figures are based on the GDP implicit price deflator. See
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 278 (2001). Of course, after thirty years these estimates
should not receive excessive reliance, given that they may be dependent upon assumptions that
were validly descriptive of the economy at the time but are no longer.
72. GRAVELLE, supra note 39, at 89-90.
73. Id. at 75-90. Dr. Gravelle also estimated that a switchto full partnership method taxation
of corporations would reduce welfare losses by another 0.06% of consumption via a reduction in
the lock-in effect. Such an effect is the result of pass-through taxation increasing the basis in
shares, and therefore reducing the lock-in effect of taxpayers declining to sell shares to avoid
capital gains taxation. Id. at 89.
74. This figure is based on annual consumption of $6,443.9 billion, which reflects
consumption for the third quarter of 2001 annualized to full year figures. See ECONOMIC REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 322 (2002).
75. GRAVELLE, supra note 39, at 81. Professor David Weisbach has proposed a useful
practical step of comparing tax rules in terms of their marginal efficiency cost of funds (MECF).
The MECF of any tax rule would be the deadweight loss per marginal dollar of revenue. Under
his analysis, a tax rule would be rejected if its MECF was greater than the existing average MECF.
The result would be a tendency to accept rules that reduce the average MECF and reject those that
would increase it. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine,and Efficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 1627,1665-75 (1999). In terms of MECF, the double tax regime does
not appear to be a strong candidate for survival.
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B. DistributiveEquity

The double tax regime can also be faulted for its distributional effect, in
terms of both vertical equity and horizontal equity.76 The existence and nature
of its distributional effect, however, depends not only upon the acceptance of
value judgments that are not susceptible of proof, but also the determination of
the actual incidence of the excess tax burden associated with the double tax
regime. In the end, the greatest distributional fault of the double tax regime is

that the indeterminacy of its incidence renders any judgment about
distributional effects unjustifiable guesswork.
Consider first the vertical equity analysis. In the short-term, the imposition

of the corporate income tax was most likely borne by the holders of corporate
equity.77 To the extent that equity ownership is positively correlated with some
measure of economic well-being,7" one might regard this short-term effect as
a benign increase in the progressivity of the income tax regime. The

distribution of beneficial ownership of corporate shares is far from clear,79

76. Horizontal equity is the requirement that equals be treated alike. Vertical equity is the
requirement of an appropriate pattern of differentiation among unequals. See Louis Kaplow,
HorizontalEquity: Measures in Search of a Principle,42 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 140-41 (1989);
Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 113 (1990).
Professor Kaplow has argued that horizontal equity has no independent significance apart from
vertical equity, in that any regime that makes only appropriate distinctions among unequals will
also necessarily treat equals alike. Kaplow, supra, at 141. This issue has been the subject of
ongoing analysis. See Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontaland Vertical Equity:
The Musgrave/KaplowExchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993).
77. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAXES:
1975-1990 22 (1987).
78. See Polito, Useful Fictions,supra note 5, at 767-68.
79. A high percentage of shares are held by institutional investors such as pension funds,
insurance companies (including mutual insurance companies), mutual funds, and charitable
organizations. By 1990, institutional investors held 53% of all corporate equity. See Robert S.
Frenchman, The Recent Revisions to FederalProxy Regulations: Lifting the Ban on Shareholder
Communications,68 TUL. L. REV. 161, 175 (1993) (citing COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
PROJECT, CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 1991) (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law 1991). A breakdown by type of institution is as
follows:
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however, and the assumption that the double tax regime increases progressivity
is far from established (even in the short-term). In the long-term, it seems clear
that at least some of the double tax regime's burden shifts to capital other than
corporate equity, or labor, or both." The more widely dispersed the economic

Equity Holdings
(In billions)

Percentage of
U.S. Equity Market

$679.3
282.5

19.9%
8.3%

961.8

28.2%

Mutual Funds

$245.8

7.2%

Insurers (Life and Casualty)

$235.7

6.9%

Bank Trusts

$314.0

9.2%

$61.7

1.8%

Institution Type
Pension Funds:
Private
Public (state and local)
Total Pension Funds

Foundations / Endowments
(Colleges and Universities)

53.3%
$1819.00
John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the InstitutionalInvestor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 837, 848 (1994). These organizations invest for the benefit of a large number of
individuals who are not necessarily in the highest income tax brackets.
80. The assumptions one makes as to capital mobility are crucial for predictions of the
corporate income tax's incidence. If the supply of savings is unaffected by the imposition of that
tax:
The corporationincome tax depresses rates of return in the corporate
sector when it is imposed, but this encourages some capital to move to the
noncorporate sector, where rates of return after tax are initially higher. As
the supply of capital in the non-corporate sector increases, rates of return
decline there, and this continues until net returns after tax are the same in
both sectors. Thus the after-tax earnings of all capital are reduced even
though the corporation income tax is imposed only on capital employed in
the corporate sector. Furthermore, assuming that the total supply of saving
is fixed, the earnings of labor remain unchanged, and capital bears the entire
tax.
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN & BENJAMIN A. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 31 (1974) (footnote

omitted). On the other hand:
If savings decline in the face of a corporate tax, some of the burden may fall
on workers through lower wages. This occurs because as savings decline
there is less new investment. The stock of capital grows more slowly and
productivity declines because workers must use older, fewer, and less
technologically advanced tools and machines. Because wages are linked to
productivity, labor income bears some of the corporate tax burden.
Even if there is no decline in savings, workers may bear some of the
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incidence of the tax is, the weaker the assertion that the double tax regime

increases the progressivity of the tax burden, and the weaker the assertion that
it improves the vertical equity of the tax system."
Next, consider horizontal equity. All assertions about horizontal equity
have a conclusory nature to them, because, as Professor Westen observed:
The formula "people who are alike should be treated alike"

involves two components: (1) a determination that two
people are alike; and (2) a moral judgment that they ought to
be treated alike. The determinative component is the first.

Once one determines that two people are alike for purposes
of the equality
principle, one knows how they ought to be
82
treated.

Notwithstanding this conclusory nature, one might attempt reasonably to justify
the double tax regime's horizontal equity implications. The proffered
justifications are premised on the view that participants in corporate and
noncorporate enterprise are not equals-presumably because legal structures
confer some form of subsidy on corporations subject to the double tax
regime-and that the excess burden of the double tax appropriately adjusts the
tax burden for that inequality. This last proposition, however, is highly
contestable.
Traditionally, the excess burden of the double tax regime could be seen as
an appropriate charge for the benefits of corporate characteristics, especially
limited liability. A horizontal equity case premised on the conferral of corporate
characteristics via the corporate charter is subject to arguments that the

burden of the corporate income tax if the tax leads to a reduction in
domestic investment. Because capital is thought to be mobile
internationally, high corporate taxes could cause investors to take their
money overseas (or, alternatively, discourage foreign investment in this
country). But workers would not bear the full burden unless international
capital markets were free and open and there were no offsetting changes in
taxes on investment in foreign countries.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 77, at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
81. Reference to the double tax increasing or decreasing the progressivity of the income tax
begs the question of what degree of progressivity is desirable. It also begs the question of what
is the appropriate index-for example, income, consumption, or wealth-against which to
measure that progressivity. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 76, at 613 ("[T]here is no
independent content to V[ertical] E[quity] and resort must be had to economic assumptions and
a theory ofjustice to provide that content .. "). Those issues, however, are beyond the scope of
this article. See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953).
82. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 543 (1982).
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government does not confer on corporations a subsidy relative to other forms
of business enterprise." To that extent, the excess burden of the double tax
regime definitionally violates the principle of horizontal equity. Moreover,
given the large number of business entities that enjoy all of the characteristics

83. The corporate form confers the following four attributes: centralized management, free
transferability of interests, legal personality, and limited liability. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (analyzing
the governance of a corporation as a contract among its investors and managers). The first three
attributes can all be seen as reflecting a contract that investors would draft among themselves,
were it not for the high bargaining costs among members of a dispersed group. See id. As such,
corporate form represents not a subsidy, but a facilitation of the result that would occur in a
frictionless market. See id.; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateGovernance Movement,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-62 (1982) (discussing the logical formation of "the firm"); Jensen
& Meckling, supra note 36, at 311 (discussing contractual relationships of a firm). Shareholders
could achieve much the same result without the aid of the legislature by contracting to govern their
relations according to the Model Business Corporations Act.
Limited liability may also be viewed as the welfare maximizing contractual term all market
participants would accept if they were able to negotiate frictionlessly. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra, at 40-62.
Because limited liability increases the probability that there will be
insufficient assets to pay creditors' claims, shareholders of a firm reap all
of the benefits of risky activities but do not bear all of the costs. These are
borne in part by creditors. Critics of limited liability have focused on this
moral hazard-the incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost
ofrisky activities to creditors-as ajusti fication for substantial modification
of the doctrine....
The implications of this point, however, are unclear, both because
modifying limited liability has its costs and because moral hazard would
exist without limited liability. The social loss from reducing investment in
certain types of projects-a consequence of seriously modifying limited
liability-might far exceed the gains from reducing moral hazard. Too, even
the abolition of limited liability would not eliminate the moral hazard
problem. The incentive to engage in over risky activities exists whenever a
person or firm has insufficient assets to cover its expected liabilities.
Although the problem of moral hazard may be more severe under limited
liability, it exists under any rule ....
• . .At all events, the magnitude of the externality under limited liability
has been exaggerated. As Richard Posner has demonstrated, there is no
externality with respect to voluntary creditors. In addition, firms have
incentives to insure for amounts greater than their existing capital. The
insurance company becomes a contract creditor, reducing the externality.
Id. at 49-50 (footnotes omitted). Limited liability makes possible the large assemblages of capital
upon which industrial capitalism depends for economies of scale. These scale economies may
sufficiently increase economic welfare that, in a frictionless bargain, all would accept the
possibility of limited recovery in exchange.
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of corporate form but are not subject to the double tax regime,"' it is not
possible to conclude that capturing the benefits of corporate characteristics is
the justification for the existing double tax regime in terms of horizontal equity
or otherwise.85
An alternative justification is to premise the double tax as compensating for
the government's role, chiefly through securities regulation, in maintaining the
confidence and stability of public equity markets. It does seem at least
plausible that the government's securities market regulatory role, in facilitating
access to public sources of equity, is valuable to publicly traded corporate
enterprises.86 It is important to note, however, that this increased value should
ultimately reflect itself in increased taxable income for investors in the
corporate enterprise. A fully integrated income tax would capture at least a
portion of that benefit. It is true that the excess burden of the double tax regime
may serve to capture a portion of that benefit not otherwise captured by an
integrated income tax. On the other hand, the increased income reflecting other
government benefits is also captured only in part by income taxation.
Capturing a further portion of the benefit of liquid equity markets through a
second tax, but not doing likewise for other government provided benefits,
makes a fairly weak horizontal equity case.
Even an inquiry confined to the benefit of securities markets makes a weak
horizontal equity case. As Professor Schlunk has pointed out, there are a
substantial number of firms that access the public equity markets without being
subject to double taxation, and no double tax is imposed for access to the public
debt markets.87 The selective application of the existing double tax regime

means that its horizontal equity cannot be justified in terms of capturing the
benefits of public markets.
Professor Schlunk advances an additional justification for an entity tax,
which he would structure quite differently from the existing double tax regime,

84. See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praisethe CorporateIncome Tax, But to
Save It, 56 TAx L. REv. 329, 341-42 (2003).
86. See, e.g., LouIsLoss &JOELSELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 217-18 (3d ed. 1998)

("[I]ncreasing investor confidence.. . may have important economic consequences. By reducing
the perceived risk of corporate securities, compulsory disclosure would tend to reduce the risk
premia that issuers ... would have to pay, thus increasing the funds available for economic
growth."); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,658 (1997) ("[I]nvestors likelywould hesitate

to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information
is unchecked by law."); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY

OFTHE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 561-62 (rev. ed.
1995); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of FederalSecurities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115-20 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Schlunk, supra note 85, at 345-47.
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premised on the theory of the firm. He argues that, to the extent individuals
choose to conduct business within the form of an entity rather than as a series
of separately negotiated contracts, there must be some incremental benefit to
the existence of a firm, as such.88 He proposes an entity-level tax that is
designed to capture the benefit of conducting business as an entity.89 He
identifies an entity with its capital investors, including investors of human
capital, for purposes of constructing the entity's taxable income.90
It seems very likely that the benefits of conducting enterprises as firms fall
to far more individuals than the capital participants of those firms. Net
efficiency gains may be shared as increased wages or reduced prices for goods.
From the perspective of horizontal equity, an entity tax that captures a portion
of that benefit from some beneficiaries, but not others, is problematic.
Moreover, if the benefits of conducting enterprises as firms are distributed far
more broadly than to the enterprise's capital participants, the horizontal equity
justification for capturing a portion of those benefits through taxation for
redistribution through government action, as opposed to accepting the broad
distribution of those benefits through market operations, is far from obvious.
Professor Schlunk recognizes this possibly broader definition of participation
in business entities, but sets it aside based on administrative concerns and his
view that these benefits are only incidental.91
Regardless of how one defines the beneficiaries of the existence of firms,
from the perspective of horizontal equity analysis, this benefit theory of a
double tax regime faces a problem that confronts the justification premised on
access to public equity markets. Even if the operation of a business in an entity
is a government conferred benefit, that benefit should reflect itself in the
incomes ofthe individual participants. As in the justification of double taxation
premised on access to public equity markets, a fully integrated income tax
would capture at least a portion of that benefit. Here again, capturing a further
portion of the benefit through a second tax, but not doing likewise for other
government provided benefits, makes a fairly weak horizontal equity case. In
any case, Professor Schlunk does not advance this theory to justify the existing
double tax regime, but rather to create a rational basis for a quite different
double tax regime.
In the case of the existing double tax regime, the entire issue of equity is
further complicated because the question of whether the actual incidence of the
excess burden of the double tax regime is on equity investors cannot be

88.
(1987).
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 359-62 (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
See, e.g., id. 363-64.
Id. at 367-82.
Id. at 367-70.
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92
answered with any degree of reliability. In terms of vertical equity, uncertain
tax incidence makes it impossible to judge the actual progressivity of the
overall combination of tax regimes in use. Moreover, indeterminate incidence
further eviscerates the reliability of even the contestable case of a horizontal
equity justification. Without knowing who bears the excess burden of the
double tax, one cannot judge whether it mitigates or exacerbates the disparity
of treatment of equals. The uncertainty of incidence confuses the very process
of tax policy making. Because the incidence of the corporate tax is uncertain,
policy makers are unable to judge the incidence of changes in the corporate
income tax with any degree of certainty. That uncertainty hampers the
necessary inquiry into the relative distributional effect of any given package of
93
corporate and individual tax law changes.

III. PREMISES AND CONDITIONS OF THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH
94
Given the economic distortions of the classical tax system, the relatively
high marginal efficiency cost of funds of the incremental revenue generated by
the excess tax burden on corporate earnings," and the tenuous case for classical
96
taxation based on distributive equity concerns, an idealized income tax would
exactly eliminate the excess tax burden by treating all business entities as
fiscally transparent. The contribution of the Laissez Faire Approach to this
discourse is to advance the integrationist agenda while working within the
existing tax law, without creating significant new tax regimes or significantly
reworking existing regimes. The premises that justify the Laissez Faire
Approach, and the conditions for its implementation, are described briefly.

A.

Idealized Tax Integration is Not Attainable in Reality

An idealized integrationist paradigm of taxation would fully eliminate the
disparities of double taxation. Such an idealized tax paradigm would eliminate
the disparate tax treatments between (1) corporate and noncorporate form, (2)
debt and equity, (3) distributed earnings and retained earnings, and (4)
realizations as distributions and as dispositions. Under such an idealized
regime, all income would be imputed to individuals connected with the

92.
93.
(1995).
94.
95.
96.

See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking,95 COLUM. L. REV. 609,640-47
See supra Part 1I,section A.
See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I, section B.
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corporate enterprise-as shareholders or otherwise-as earned, and all income
would be taxed at the individual rate schedules.
In principle, the nearest one might come to such a perfect regime is the
fiscal transparency of a full pass-through regime. Under such a tax regime,
there would be no corporate-level tax. Instead, all of the revenue of the
corporation would be taxed as income of some individual. The nearest analog
is the tax treatment of partnerships."
As a practical matter, the full realization of that paradigm is not feasible
because of a number of serious practical issues. How is the pool of
undistributed corporate earnings, against which no shareholders have
specifically enforceable legal claims, to be allocated among individual
investors? As a practical matter, how are corporations accurately to allocate
undistributed earnings to individual shareholders if the shares change hands
frequently on public markets? How are earnings to be allocated among
multiple classes of stock? Is it possible to allocate earnings through multiple
tiers of corporations to the ultimate individual shareholders in a manner that is
sufficiently timely to allow the filing of annual returns? Who will bear the costs
of corporate-level audit adjustments when the beneficial ownership of the stock
may have changed many times in the interim?98 This list is formidable, and it
does not even address questions common to all integration programs.99
The Bush Administration's original proposal,"'0 while not a full passthrough model, would have entailed many of the complications of the fullpartnership paradigm. The Bush Administration hoped to avoid not only double
taxation of distributed earnings, but also a second tax to the extent that the sales
price of corporate stock reflects retained earnings previously taxed at the
corporate level. As such, that proposal, like a partnership model, would have
required the allocation of undistributed earnings among shareholders for tax
purposes, which would have required the resolution of all of the subsidiary
questions that entails. Even given the possibility of administratively feasible
compromises, the prevailing view appears to be that the cost in legal

97. See I.R.C. § § 701-777, 6221-6234 (West 2003). In practice, fiscal transparency cannot
be effected in a manner that fully eliminates all distinctions between a business conducted directly

as an individual's sole proprietorship and an enterprise conducted through a legal structure. See
& NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K (2d ed. 2000).

LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM

Nevertheless, the partnership paradigm appears to be the nearest alternative possible to the
integrationist ideal.

98. Each of these concerns demands some deviation from the full integration ideal in order
to make the system administrable in any sense. See Anthony P. Polito, A Proposalfor an
IntegratedIncome Tax, 12 HARv. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 1009 (1989).
99. See, e.g., TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 61-92.
100. DEP'TOFTHETREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 11-22 (2003).
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complexity and administrative and compliance burdens make a fully integrated

system impracticable at best.''
In the alternative, some simple responses to the integration problem are
available, but they are dismissed so easily that they might be regarded as

trivially wrong. The first easily dismissed proposal is the abolition of the
corporate-level tax with no changes to the shareholder-level tax. This step
would certainly eliminate the excess burden of the double tax regime. The

simple elimination of the corporate-level tax, however, would press the inside
shelter to its ultimate form. There would be no tax at all on corporate earnings
until distributed as dividends or realized as gain on share dispositions. The
2
consequences of this are clear: the bias against dividend distributions" would
be greatly exaggerated. Debt securities, which are subject to current economic

03
accrual under the original issue discount rules," would not create the same

deferral benefit available to equity holders, and equity capitalization's lack of
interest deductions'0 " would be costless to nontaxable corporations. As such,

bias against equity capitalization would be replaced by a bias in favor of equity
capitalization. 0 5
On the other hand, in the absence of a truly effective regime to compel the

distribution of earnings,0 6 the mitigation of capital taxation through the
101. See, e.g., TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 17.
102. See supra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
103. I.R.C. §§ 1272-1275A (West 2003).
104. Id. § 163.

105. Leverage can have the beneficial effect of imposing discipline on corporate management, see example in Jensen, supranote 35, at 323 (citations omitted), and of signaling firm value
to the equity market, see Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partela, ValuationEffects ofSecurity
Offerings and the IssuanceProcess, 15 J. FIN. EcON. 31 (1986). As such, leverage levels below

a firm's optimal level of leverage can themselves be harmful.
106. Existing tax law does contain mechanisms designed to place an outer limit on the use
of corporations to minimize shareholder tax burdens through the retention of earnings. Even under
the existing regime, however, they are not as fully effective in enforcing the shareholder-level tax
as might appear from a superficial examination. In a regime without a corporate-level tax, the
enforcement stress they would bear would be far greater.
At present, the accumulated earnings tax is the primary mechanism to minimize this form
of shareholder-level tax avoidance. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 2003). See generally BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS §§ 7.01-7.09 (7th ed. 2000 (with updates through 2002)) (discussing a
corporation's potential for tax avoidance). With proper planning, however, corporations are
generally able to accumulate substantial earnings as working capital. See, e.g., Davenport, supra
note 16. Other devices designed to minimize the benefits of deferral are the personal holding
company provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (West 2003); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra,
§§ 7.20-7.24, and the collapsible corporation rules, see I.R.C. § 341 (West 2003); BITTKER &
EUSTICE, supra, §§ 10.60-10.66.
In a similar vein, earnings retained in a foreign corporation not subject to United States
corporate income taxation and subject to relatively low tax rates abroad are effectively subject to

Published by Scholar Commons, 2003

31

South Carolina
LawCAROLINA
Review, Vol.
55, REVIEW
Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 4 [Vol. 55: 1
SOUTH
LAW

indefinite deferral of the single-level shareholder tax would move the existing
tax regime much closer to a consumption based tax regime, in which taxation
of capital income is deferred until consumed. 7 Notwithstanding the many
serious arguments in favor of a consumption tax paradigm,"0 ' this incremental
step in that direction is not necessarily advisable taken in isolation. In the
absence of a broader consumption tax program, the benefits of such a partial
move toward consumption taxation would need to be balanced carefully against

the distortions it would generate. There are mechanisms available for advancing
the consumption tax agenda without exacerbating the distortions ofthe classical
tax regime.' 0 9 Whatever benefits would accrue in terms of the consumption tax

agenda, this Article addresses only the issues raised by the unintegrated
classical tax regime compared to an integrated income tax regime. Moreover,

in the absence of the political resolve to reconcile systematically tax policy to
a consumption tax norm, this large-scale increase of inside shelter is unlikely
to come to pass.

The second easily dismissed proposal is the full abolition of the
shareholder-level tax. If taken literally, that is, the exemption from taxation of
both dividends and gain from share disposition, it would be difficult to prevent
such a program from largely repealing the tax on asset sales. Taxpayers could
easily place assets into corporate solution and recognize their full economic
value by the tax-free disposition of the holding corporation's shares. Even if
the abolition were accompanied by an aggressive regime to police for uses of

corporate form motivated primarily by avoidance of the capital gains tax, many
asset dispositions would avoid tax entirely. In many cases, assets could be sold

to fund consumption expenditures and not bear any tax burden, a result not
contemplated by either an "accretionist income tax"" ° or a consumption tax.

a lower tax burden than are similar earnings of corporations subject to the United States corporate
income tax. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1324-25. A number of provisions serve to reduce
the efficacy of this form of deferral. See I.R.C. §§ 551-558 (West 2003) (foreign personal holding
company rules), Id. §§ 951-964 (controlled foreign corporation rules); Id. § 1248 (disposition of
stock in certain foreign corporations); Id. §§ 1291-1297 (passive foreign investment company
rules). See also BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra, §§ 15.40-15.65 (discussing these provisions).
107. Shareholders could further defer the day of tax reckoning by funding consumption
expenditures through borrowing against appreciated share values. Taxpayers already have the
ability to leverage their way to liquidity, but, under the existing regime, to the extent that leverage
is supported by corporate stock, it is supported by earnings that have already been subject to the
corporate level tax regime. As such, eliminating the corporate level tax further expands
shareholders' ability to defer taxation of appreciated value beyond the time of its consumption.
108. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
110. The term "accretionist income tax" refers to a regime with a tax base identical to the
Haig-Simons definition of income, which is "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
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As a practical matter, a simple program of abolishing the shareholder-level
tax would be confined to exempting dividends from shareholder-level taxation.
Even if implemented in this simple fashion, this step would effect only partial
integration because it would not eliminate the double taxation of retained
earnings, and distributed earnings would necessarily be taxed at the corporate

tax rates rather than at the marginal rates of the shareholders to whom
distributed. The taxation of dividends at capital gains rates under the 2003 Tax

Act can be seen as a partial and temporary dividends exclusion regime."' That
dividends exclusion is only partial integration does not necessarily counsel
rejection of the dividend exclusion model of integration if no other model
proves viable."

2

It is important, however, to recognize its limitations as a

partial integration program.
Any number of such partial integration programs have been advanced. In
13
addition to the full-partnership imputation paradigm. and the dividends
14
exclusion model' previously noted, possible tax integration programs include:

(i) An imputation-credit regime under which dividends are
"grossed-up" to include a corresponding portion of taxes
paid by the corporation, and shareholders are
simultaneously permitted a refundable credit for the
corporate taxes imputed to them;"'

(ii) A dividend deduction regime under which a corporation
would be permitted a deduction for dividends to the
extent traced to taxable earnings; 1 6 and

the beginning and end of the period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938); see also Robert Murray Haig, The Concept ofIncome-Economic and Legal
Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) ("Income is the
money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points of time.").
11. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64.
112. As the discussion below will illustrate, all of the likely practicable alternative forms
of integration share the limitations of being partial integration regimes and of generating their own
sets of secondary issues requiring resolution.
113. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
115. See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 93-106; ALl STUDY, supra note 12.
116. See ALl STUDY, supra note 12, at 52-54. In a slight variation, corporations would be
permitted to deduct dividends on new equity investments. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C, REPORTER'S PROPOSALS ON INCOME TAX
TREATMENT OF CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 356-99 (1982); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT, REPORTER'S STUDYDRAFT 97-101 (1989).
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(iii) A mark-to-market regime under which shareholders
would be taxed on the annual change in the value of their
7
shares as a substitute for the existing corporate tax." 1
Each of these alternatives has merit and several characteristics in common.
First, each is a form of partial integration rather than thorough integration.
Second, each requires a significant reworking of the existing tax regime. Some
of them replace old legal structures with new legal structures, while others add
significant new legal structures to the existing regime.
Last, each program faces political complications because implementation
is possible only by a comprehensive act of Congress. A plethora of potential
reforms and adjustments to the Internal Revenue Code persistently face
Congress. Legislative action comprehensive enough to effect corporate tax
integration is likely only if its supporters can avoid its displacement by other
items on the tax legislation agenda. That in turn requires a concentrated and
organized constituency that will make its passage a priority.
Corporate shareholders have an obvious interest in advancing the
integrationist agenda, but shareholders of publicly held corporations suffer in
this context from the same collective action problems that pose the well-known
variety of corporate governance issues arising in any Berle-Means
corporation."' Shareholders of closely held enterprises do not face the same
collective action problems, and the result is clear. Closely held enterprise
investors have received a more favorable result than tax integration; they are
able, as a class, to elect between functional tax integration and inside shelter."9
Shareholders of publicly traded corporations would need a well-organized
ally to lobby for comprehensive corporate tax integration. Corporate managers,
as a class, are the most likely ally, but as Professors Arlen and Weiss have
observed:
[S]hareholders and managers will often have divergent views
on tax policy.... Shareholders invariably favor policies that
increase the return to existing capital; they sometimes, but not
always, support policies that stimulate investment. In contrast,
managers are primarily concerned with stimulating new
investment. They have little interest in increasing the return

117. See Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through CorporateShareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAx L. REv. 265 (1995); Anthony P. Polito, DualApproach Tax Integration: Issuesfor Discussion, 73 TAx NOTES 1213, 1217-19 (1996).
118. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A PoliticalTheory of Corporate Taxation, 105

YALE L.J. 325, 363-65 (1995).
119. See infra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
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to existing capital, though they do not actively oppose
measures that do this. Managers therefore attach a low
priority to integration, which provides [what some regard as]
a large windfall to existing capital, and only a small stimulus
to new investment. Managers prefer to lobby for other tax
measures, such as ACRS [(accelerated cost recovery system)]
and ITCs [(investment tax credits)], that may be less
advantageous to shareholders but are more cost-effective in
stimulating investment. 2

Managers prefer tax legislative agendas that will simultaneously reduce the tax
burden of capital and justify the continued retention of corporate earnings for
new investment projects.
Most managers support integration but have not lobbied
on behalf of it....
...

Retained earnings are accompanied by less moni-

toring than other forms of finance,

and managers

consequently prefer them to other sources of capital.

Shareholders, in turn, dislike retained earnings financing
precisely because it insulates managers from scrutiny. 121
Managerial acquiescence plays a large part in persistence of the double-tax

regime. 2' As Professor Banks observed, "it is not surprising that managers
have not been very inclined to actively lobby for the passage
of one of the many
1 23
integration proposals that have arisen over the years."

120. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 118, at 336.
121. Id. at 348.
122. Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the CorporateIncome Tax,
43 WM. &MARYL. REv. 447, 534-35 (2001); John K. McNulty, Reform ofthe IndividualIncome
Tax by Integration of the CorporateIncome Tax, 46 TAX NOTES 1445, 1446 (1990); James R.
Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholderlnterests,19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 697, 716 (1997); James R. Repetti, CorporateGovernanceand Stockholder Abdication:
Missing Factorsin Tax PolicyAnalysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 1034-35 (1992); Herwig
J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate CapitalStructure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L. REv. 410, 411 n.8
(2000); Lee A. Sheppard, Dividend Integration:An Idea Whose Time Will Never Come, 98 TAX
NOTES 9, 9 (2003); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, the Proper Way to Eliminate
the CorporateTax, 27 TAX NOTES 637, 638-39 (1985); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of
Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 173-174 (1997).
123. Steven A. Bank, CorporateManagers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 167, 261 (2002).
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The Bush Administration assembled legislative majorities for two tax cut
acts 124 that each reduce revenues by hundreds of billions of dollars, but the
proposal for a nearly comprehensive integration proposal was eclipsed by other
tax cutting priorities. Instead, the Bush Administration had to settle for partial
relief from double taxation, and even that relief is scheduled to expire in
2008.125 This suggests that any comprehensive permanent scheme of corporate
tax integration is unlikely to survive the politics of the legislative process.
This is the first premise of the Laissez-Faire Approach. As a practical
matter, the idealized integrationist ideal is unattainable because it is
administratively not practicable. Any practical integration initiative will
achieve less than the full integrationist ideal, requires the layering of significant
additional legal and administrative complexity on the existing tax regime, and
is unlikely to rally the political support necessary for its survival in a crowded
arena of proposed tax legislation.
B. Leaky Double Taxation
The second major premise of the Laissez Faire Approach is the observation
that, notwithstanding the unlikelihood that Congress will adopt comprehensive
and permanent corporate tax integration, the excess tax burden generated by the
classical tax regime is ample incentive for taxpayers to seek alternative means
of escaping the excess burden of double taxation. Corporate tax revenues have
decreased fairly steadily as a share of total federal revenues, from 40% in fiscal
year 1940 to a range of 12% to less than 8% per fiscal year over the last
decade. 126 Much of that decline may be traced to phenomena that serve, at the
margin, to overcome or mitigate the excess tax burden.
Taxpayers have long had and used several important self-help tools to
mitigate the burden of double taxation. Closely held corporations, to the extent
that their shareholder-employees are taxed equivalently with respect to earnings
distributed as dividends, as with respect to compensation,127 can attempt to
minimize the corporate tax burden by removing earnings from corporate

124. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752.
125. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64.
126. EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 415, Table B-80 (2002).
127. Clark, supra note 16, at 106 (recognizing that dividends are often treated as ordinary
income); see also HOWARD E. ABRAMS & RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE

TAXATION 155-57 (5th ed. 2002) (describing the nature of dividends and the imposition of the
shareholder level tax on only distributed corporate profits).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss1/4

36

Polito: Advancing
to Corporate
Tax Integration:
A Laissez-Faire Approach
TAx INTEGRATION
TO CORPORATE
ADVANCING
2003]
solution as deductible compensation.

2

1

If a corporation's populations of

employees and shareholders do not sufficiently overlap to make the
compensation-bailout of earnings a viable tax strategy,' 29 other mechanisms are
available. A corporation can leverage itself: the greater its debt-to-equity ratio,
the more it removes its revenues from the ambit of the corporate tax and
reduces the double tax burden. 31 If double taxation cannot be avoided at the
entity level, it can be mitigated at the shareholder level. A corporation may
earnings"' or by attempting
generally reduce the excess tax burden by retaining
32
to "bail-out" earnings at capital gains rates.1

Businesses have also sought to qualify for pass-through treatment as
partnerships. Indeed, businesses have found it profitable to absorb fairly
128. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2003).
129. The separation of ownership and control in the Berle-Means corporation implies that
inflating employees' compensation will reduce corporate tax but at the expense of diverting
shareholder value. It may be that managerial compensation in such corporations is excessive, but
that excess is not tax motivated. As such, the IRS does not police for the reasonableness of
compensation, Id. § 162(a)(1), outside of the closely held corporation context. See, e.g., Edward
A. Zelinsky, Eberl's Independent Investors, and the Incoherence of the Reasonable
Compensation Rule, 92 TAX NOTES 555, 559 (2001); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Policy Case
for Denying Deductibility to Excessive Executive Compensation: Disguised Dividends,
Reasonable Compensation,and the Protectionofthe CorporateIncome Tax Base, 58 TAXNOTES
1123, 1124 (1993).

130. The real burden of an increased risk of bankruptcy is the real cost of increasing
leverage. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. Therefore, there are limits to the
usefulness ofthis technique. Nevertheless, policy makers do treat as significant the likelihood that
the tax advantage of debt financing has at various times produced significant inflation of debt
capitalization levels. See Leonard L. Silverstein, Impact of the Acquisition Indebtedness
Provisionsof the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on CorporateMergers, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 353,
355-56 (1970) (quoting Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLauren to the effect that overly
leveraged acquisitions raised a "serious concern over the severe human and economic dislocations
which are resulting from the current tax-propelled merger mania"); see also BITTKER & EUSTICE,
supra note 16, § 4.26[ 1]. A similar concern with excess debt led Congress to consider additional
restrictions on corporate leverage in the late 1980s. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
101STCONG., FEDERALINCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATEFINANCIAL STRUCTURES 1 (Comm.
Print 1989).
The desire to win debt classification also creates pressure on the distinction in tax law
between debt and equity. The result has been the baroque and largely unworkable body of law
governing that issue. See, e.g., Polito, Useful Fictions,supra note 5, at 777-82; Katherine Pratt,
The Debt-Equity Distinctionin a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1058-94 (2000).
131. See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
132. See Donald F. Brosnan, Spin-Offs Before and After the Tax Reform Act, 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 157, 157-62 (1990); Clark, supra note 16, at 110-11, 119-30; Ronald E. Lowe, Bailouts:
TheirRole in CorporatePlanning,30 TAX. L. REV. 357 (1975); Hugh Rowland, Jr., Section 306:

Its History and Functionas Bailout Preventer(Including Bailouts that May Never Occur), 39
TAX LAW. 121, 145, 151-52, 155 (1985); Daniel M. Schneider, Internal Revenue Code § 355
Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Study in the Regulation of Corporate Tax
Bailouts, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 567, 567-71 (1986).
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substantial attorney and other costs in the quest to qualify marginally as
partnerships eligible for pass-through treatment. 133 At the same time, state

legislatures have found it in their economic interests to promote pass-through
tax treatment for in-state businesses. Every state has done so through the

adoption of a limited liability company act.'34 A series of IRS Revenue Rulings
permitting the classification of limited liability companies as partnerships'

made it possible for businesses to receive the benefits of limited liability
without sacrificing the pass-through tax treatment of partnerships.
In the end, the Treasury ratified these actions by closely held businesses,
and allies of those businesses in state legislatures allowed virtually costless tax

integration for closely held businesses. Under the "check-the-box"
classification regulations, any noncorporate business entity is eligible to elect
treatment as a corporation or as a partnership for income tax purposes.' 36
Because many state statutes authorizing LLCs and related entities permit the
election of some, or all, of the four corporate characteristics 37 -limited

liability, free transferability of interests, centralized management, and
continuity of existence-the combination of the check-the-box regulations and
section 7704 effectively permits pass-through tax treatment for any

noncorporate business whose equity
interests are not publicly traded and for
38
some that are publicly traded.

In a number of specialized cases, Congress has yielded to pleas for escape
from double taxation. In one sense, the existence of the Subchapter K rules for
partnerships' is a congressionally approved escape hatch from double taxation. Congress could have long ago sought to reduce the evisceration of the

corporate tax base by imposing a uniform double tax on all businesses.140 It has

133. See Hobbs, supranote 63, at 498-518.
134. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIELS. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
TAx AND BUSINESS LAW, 1.01 [1] (1999).
135. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227; Rev. Rul. 936, 1993-1 C.B. 229; Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231; Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233; Rev.
Rul. 93-49, 1993-2 C. B. 308; Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-2 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-2 C.B.
312; Rev. Rul. 93-81, 1993-2 C.B. 314; Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-1 C.B. 312; Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-1
C.B. 314; Rev. Rul. 94-30, 1994-1 C.B. 316; Rev. Rul. 94-51, 1994-2 C.B. 407; Rev. Rul. 94-79,
1994-2, C.B. 409; and Rev. Rul. 95-9, 1995-3 I.R.B. 17.
136. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in
2001).
137. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 134, 1.01 [4].
138. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
139. See I.R.C. §§ 701-777, 6221-6234 (West 2003).
140. See Mortimer M. Caplin, Income Tax Pressureson the Form of Business Organization: Is it Time for a "DoingBusiness" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REV. 249,260-63 (1961); Susan Kalinka,
The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: ClassificationIssues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1083, 1175 (1992).
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not done so. On the contrary, it has created a number of additional mechanisms
for businesses to receive pass-through treatment in avoidance of double
taxation. It created the S corporation mechanism to grant pass-through
treatment to many closely held corporations, "' and it has periodically expanded
the availability of S corporation treatment. 4 2 Likewise, Congress has
effectively eliminated43 the double tax burden for a number of specialized
investment vehicles. 1

As in so many areas of the tax law, the double tax regime is actually a
hybrid system. Double taxation coexists with numerous mechanisms that allow
the benefits of integration to selected taxpayers or to aggressive taxpayers. The
coexistence of these conflicting paradigms is the source of ongoing tension

between taxpayer and fisc that engenders much of the existing regime's legal
and administrative complexity. As long as the double tax system remains in
place, the IRS sees itself as compelled to police for dividends disguised as
deductible compensation, interest, or as capital gains transactions.'

If

Congress imposes a penalty on ostensible attempts to escape shareholder level
taxation through the unreasonable retention of earnings,' 45 the IRS must scruti-

nize corporations that do retain those earnings. If Congress decides to deny
pass-through treatment to most publicly traded businesses,'" the IRS must

police that definitional boundary of pass-through eligibility.'47 If Congress
grants S corporation treatment only to corporations that satisfy a number of

141. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West 2003).
142. Robert E. Meale, Eligibility, Election and Termination Under the Subchapter S

Revision Act of 1982, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 93, 97-111 (1983) (describing eligibility
liberalizations in the 1982 revision of subchapter S); Lee A. Sheppard, Virtual Affiliation for S
Corporations, 62 TAX NOTES 661, 661 (1994) ("Every few years Congress is importuned by
accountants and other representatives of closely held business to 'reform' subchapter S, by which
is meant 'make it even more generous."'). As of this writing, the most recent systematic
liberalization of subchapter S was enacted in 1996. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-188, §§ 1301-1317, 110 Stat. 1755, 1777-87.
143. I.R.C. §§ 851-860 (West 2003) (alleviating double tax for regulated investment
companies and real estate investment trusts); Id. §§ 860A-860G (alleviating double tax for real
estate mortgage investment conduits); Id. §§ 860H-860L (alleviating double tax for financial asset
securitization investment trusts). An affirmative program of comprehensive corporate tax
integration would displace these specialized vehicles, but, as further described infra, the LaissezFaire Approach of advancing the integrationist agenda within the framework of the existing legal
regime counsels leaving these mechanisms in place, even as new integrationist steps are advanced.
144. See, e.g., Clark supra note 16, at 106-17 (describing the dividend and corporate veil
principles).
145. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 2003) (imposing accumulated earnings tax).
146. Id. § 7704.
147. Elective classification under the "check-the-box" regulations, see Treas. Reg. §§
301.7701-2, (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001), has largely eliminated the
IRS's policing obligations with respect to partnership classification for closely held businesses.
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detailed and complicated rules, 4 ' the IRS must police those rules. The same
may be said of the eligibility criteria for various specialized pass-through
regimes."'
In each of these cases, taxpayers will press to escape the double tax system
to the degree that the rewards are worth their efforts. The defenders of the fisc
must divine the extent to which Congress is willing to allow that escape. This
is no mean feat because Congress has clearly endorsed both thesis and
antithesis: double taxation and the escape from double taxation.
C. Laissez-FaireConditions
The interaction of these two premises is the genesis of the mandate for the
Laissez-Faire Approach. Full fiscal transparency is not achievable. At the
same time, some business enterprise earnings will always be subject to the
excess tax burden of double taxation. Other business earnings will escape
double taxation. It is impossible to realize fully the anti-ideal of double
taxation, because slippage at the margins is unavoidable. The boundary is, and
will remain, arbitrary, because it is defined by the extent to which taxpayers are
able to take advantage of the leaks in the double tax anti-ideal. Yet the IRS
bears significant burdens and the legal system grows in complexity while
attempting to plug the leaks in the double tax regime.
The Laissez-Faire Approach proposes an alternative. If integrationism is
the ideal, and if the realities of the political process, legal complexity, and
administrative burden are inescapable enemies of its full effectuation, the tax
law regime should nevertheless avoid operating at cross purposes. Complicated
and administratively burdensome, the legal and enforcement mechanisms that
serve to defend the double tax anti-ideal should be either marked for
elimination or simply disregarded, but only to the extent that those regimes
reinforce the double tax anti-ideal.' 50 At the same time, given that

148. I.R.C. § 1361 (West 2003) (defining qualifications for S corporation treatment).
149. See supra note 143.
150. In principle, the tension could also be largely resolved by perfecting the double tax
regime as the universal norm of business taxation. Such a regime would seek to impose the double
tax regime as comprehensively as possible on all business enterprises, notwithstanding the
problems of economic misallocations and equity that such a system would create. A
comprehensive double tax system would have fewer boundaries to police and, therefore, would
not generate a lot of the complexity and administrative burdens of the current system. It would
also exacerbate the current system's double taxation flaws, of which policy-makers must be aware
because they have allowed the progressive erosion of the corporate tax base. In addition, the
incentives for taxpayers and local government to create escape paths from the corporate tax will
remain. It is the existing system's dynamic interaction of taxpayer attack and fiscal defense that
largely creates the complexity that grows over time. See Clark supra note 16, at 94-96.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss1/4

40

to Corporate
Tax Integration:
A Laissez-Faire Approach
TAX INTEGRATION
TO CORPORATE
ADVANCING
2003]Polito: Advancing

comprehensive corporate tax integration is unlikely at best, and that the creation
of new regimes will not fully achieve the integrationist agenda in any case, the
Laissez-Faire Approach advances the integrationist agenda without the creation
of any significant new legal paradigms or regimes. Instead, it pursues
opportunities to advance the integrationist agenda by declining to defend the
escape hatches in the existing double tax regime.
The prescription of the Laissez-Faire Approach is neither for an active
program of integration nor is it for aimless drift. Rather, it is to take advantage
of taxpayers' natural tendency to minimize tax burdens by setting conditions
that encourage those tendencies to advance progress toward the integrationist
ideal. A number of relatively simple changes in tax law doctrinal principles
and enforcement regimes would facilitate this approach to corporate tax policy.
They qualify for inclusion in the Laissez-Faire Approach based on the
satisfaction of two conditions.
First, the Laissez-Faire Approach seeks to advance integrationism by selfhelp rather than by assuming the burden of an active integration program. As
such, elements in the Laissez-Faire Approach are designed to avoid, to the
greatest extent possible, the need to fashion new legal or enforcement regimes.
Instead, the elements of the Laissez-Faire Approach are designed principally
to eliminate or disregard existing legal and enforcement regimes. The regimes
marked for removal or disregard are those that serve to defend the double tax
anti-ideal.
Second, the Laissez-Faire Approach is not a program to facilitate avoidance
of income taxation entirely. The integrationist ideal is for all income to be
taxable at the level of the individual taxpayer, as if they conducted the
businesses directly without the intervention ofjuridical business organizations.
Accordingly, it avoids mechanisms that would allow income to escape the full
burden of the individual income tax. In essence, the Laissez-Faire Approach
facilitates corporate escape from double taxation so long as doing so preserves
at least one level of taxation.
Various elements advanced as part of the Laissez-Faire Approach can be
effected by (i) minor amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, (ii) by the
promulgation of Treasury regulations or Internal Revenue Service
administrative guidance, (iii) informal Internal Revenue Service enforcement
practice, or (iv) judicial action. This Article presents and assesses the
desirability of these proposed actions purely from the perspective of advancing
an integrationist agenda. It intentionally sets aside the issue of authority for
effecting its proposals without explicit legislation.
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The check-the-box regulations"' serve as a good example of the issue
intentionally bracketed for purposes of this discussion. From an integrationist
perspective, the check-the-box regulations are a clear advance because they
effectively allow pass-through treatment for any closely held business. The
promulgation of those regulations raised a nontrivial issue of whether the
Treasury had the authority to grant partnership tax classification to business
entities that are functionally indistinguishable from closely held corporations,
which would have been classified as "associations" taxable as corporations
under prior interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code. 52 This Article
remains intentionally agnostic with respect to issues of this variety,
acknowledging-but not addressing-the problem of authority in relation to
other norms present in legal discourse.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF INSIDE SHELTER

A threshold consideration for the Laissez-Faire Approach is whether to
reduce or eliminate the taxpayers' affirmative ability to use the taxable
corporation as a form of tax shelter. The disparity of tax rates imposed on
corporations and those imposed on their individual taxpayers makes this
possible. Consider a business enterprise with pretax earnings of E. Business
profits earned through a pass-through entity are subject to the full individual
level tax (p)as realized at the entity level, yielding after tax earnings of E(1 p). Those earned through a taxable corporation are subject to the corporate tax
rate (c) as earned, and a second tax rate (k) when distributed or realized as gain
on the sale of shares, yielding after-tax earnings E(J - c)(1 - k). Under what
circumstances is the tax burden on pass-through entities higher than on taxable
corporate entities? Equivalently, what conditions make the following statement
true?
E(1- p) < E(1 -c)(1- k)

151. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).
152. See STAFFOF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION 101 ST. CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 13-16 (Comm. Print 1997), reprinted in WILJAM
S. MCKEE ET AL., 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 3.08 (Cum. Supp.

1997). See also Hugh M. Dougan et al., 'Check-the-Box'-Looking Under the Lid, 75

TAX

NOTES 1141, 1143-44 (1997) (discussing the validity of the new Treasury regulations); Victor E.

Fleischer, Note, "If It Looks Like a Duck": Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective
Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 532-38 (1996) (discussing special deference given
to the Treasury).
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If c

p, the inequality never holds. The corporate entity always bears at least

as heavy a tax burden as a pass-through entity, even if the individual level tax
rate on corporate earnings is reduced to zero. On the other hand, if c < p, the

pass-through entity bears a heavier tax burden if k is sufficiently less than p.
As a historical matter, the maximum marginal income tax rate applicable
to individuals has exceeded that applicable to corporations throughout most of

the income tax's history.'53 In addition, k < p is always true. First, because the
54
shareholder-level tax can be deferred almost at will,' the effective tax rate on
dividends is lower than the tax rate on pass-through entity earnings even if the

nominal tax rate is identical. Second, the disparity is further increased to the
extent the retained earnings reflected in share value are subject to preferential

capital gains treatment,' 55 or avoid shareholder-level income tax entirely by the
step-up in basis at death.'56 Provided some corporations are subject to a
marginal tax rate that is lower than that applicable to their shareholders, there
will exist the possibility of creating an inside shelter by retaining earnings to
avoid the full impact of the progressive individual rate structure.
It is true that under the terms of the 2001 Tax Act and the 2003 Tax Act,
the maximum individual and corporate marginal income rates will be an
identical

35%. 57

Both the corporate and individual rate structures, however,

bear some degree of progressivity. Even if the new individual tax rates remain
fully effective,'

c <p will be true for at least some corporations. A significant

153. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
154. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3), (7) (West 2003).
155. Id. § l(h). The 2003 Tax Act makes the capital gains rate applicable temporarily to
dividend distributions. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10827, §§ 302-303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64.
156. I.R.C. § 1014 (West 2003). Although the 2001 Tax Act revokes the effect of § 1014
for property inherited after 2009, Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 541, 115 Stat. 38, 76, it allows a step-up in basis subject to a maximum
amount of basis increase per decedent. For domestic taxpayers the limits are quite high, $1.3
million per decedent, with an additional $3 million for transfers to surviving spouses, and both
figures are to be adjusted for inflation after 2010. Id. § 542, 115 Stat. at 76 (codified as I.R.C.
§ 1022). As a practical matter, therefore, the step-up in basis will remain fully in effect for the
vast majority of taxpayers, and will allow the step-up for a significant fraction of the assets of the
balance of taxpayers.
157. Under the terms of the 2001Tax Act, the maximum stated personal tax rate was
scheduled to be reduced to 35% by 2006. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41. The 2001 Tax Act has also scheduled the
repeal of deduction phase-outs that will be fully effective in 2010. Id. §§ 102-103, 115 Stat. at
44-45. The 2003 Tax Act accelerated the tax rate reduction. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 105, 117 Stat. 752, 755.
158. As of this writing, the provisions of the 2001 Tax Act remain subject to a sunset
provision that takes effect at the end of 2010. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
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minority of taxable corporations report annual income of less than $355,000,159

the corporate income level at which the Code fully phases out the benefit of the
corporate tax rates lower than 34%. 16
Even for corporations able to take advantage of the lower rates, it is true

that c p if shareholders are in the lower tax brackets. The inside tax shelter
of the corporation benefits only high income individuals, and, indeed, a high
percentage of smaller corporations' shareholding is concentrated among higher
" ' Thus,
tax rate individuals.16
a significant portion of corporations ostensibly
subject to a double tax serve to shelter income, because of the disparity of their
15% or 25% corporate income tax rates and their shareholders' significantly
higher individual tax rates. The general reduction of individual income tax
rates 11 will reduce the value of this inside shelter, but it will not eliminate it
entirely.
Moreover, even corporations with incomes above $355,000 are able to
provide some degree of shelter.163 The corporate income tax is functionally a
flat tax at the rate of 34% for corporations with taxable income between
$355,000 and $10,000,000.164 The existence of higher individual tax rates
provides for the possibility of deferral. Even with the reduction of the
maximum individual tax rate to 35%, there remains the possibility of inside
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 107, 117 Stat. 752, 755-56. The question of
whether to repeal the sunset provision remains an open political question, and bills to effect such
a repeal have been introduced in both Houses of Congress. H.R. 407, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003);
Contract With Investors, S. 96, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
159. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation's 1993 figures, 37% of taxable corporations report taxable income of less than $355,000 per year. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
104th Cong., IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 5, at n.8
(Comm. Print 1996). The Joint Committee also reports that 61% of all taxable corporations report
no taxable income. Id. To the extent that their revenue is fully accounted for as payments that are
taxable income to their recipients (even if paid as deductible salaries), this statistic is not
troublesome to a goal of a regime producing neither double taxation nor under-taxation of
business income. Corporate under-taxation is only an issue to the extent that the taxable
corporation is used to shelter income from higher personal tax rates.
160. I.R.C. § 1l(a)-(b) (West 2003).
161. John W. Lee, A PopulistPoliticalPerspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe:
"Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 908-09 (2000).
162. The 2001 Tax Act, in addition to creating a top individual tax rate of 35%, reduces the
36% bracket to 33%, the 31% bracket to 28%, and the 28% bracket to 25%. Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 42. In
addition, itreducedthe 15%bracketto 10%, effective200l. Id. § 101, 115 Stat. 38,41. See also
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 101-107, 117
Stat. 752, 753-56.
163. See Lee, supra, note 161, at 921-22.
164. I.R.C. § I l(a)-(b)(1)(D) (West 2003). A marginal rate of 35% applies above that
amount, and the benefit of the 34% rate is fully phased-out for corporations with taxable incomes
greater than $18,333,333. Id.
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shelter using 34% bracket corporations. For sufficiently long deferral periods
converting the nominal capital gains tax rate into a sufficiently low effective
capital gains tax rate, a 34% tax rate corporation may provide inside shelter to
shareholders in the 35% tax bracket.'6 5 Inside shelter is certainly available for
such a one-point spread in rates if the stock of the corporation retaining its
earnings changes hands only via the death of its holder (most easily arranged
for controlling shareholders of closely held corporations without a financial
need to pay regular dividends), because the stock is subject to an effective
66
capital gains rate of 0% as a result of the step-up in basis.' In the 34% case,
as in the case of lower tax bracket corporations, it is the disparity of rates that
67
converts the corporation into an effective shelter for retained earnings.'
Nevertheless, the value of inside shelter is proportionally greatest to
corporations that are able to report taxable income of less than $355,000.
Widely held corporations are unlikely to fall below this ceiling on a regular
basis. As such, inside shelter is most likely valuable in the case of closely held
businesses. 6 '

165. Inside shelter is available if(-p) < (1-c)(1-k), where p is individual income tax rate,
c is the corporate tax rate, and k is the effective capital gains tax rate. Givenp = .35 and c =.34,
k g .015 achieves effective inside shelter. The nominal capital gains tax rate can be converted into
an effective capital gains rate if the after-tax earnings, with respect to the investment of the
deferred tax, are equal to the difference between the nominal capital gains tax and the projected
effective capital gains tax, according to the following equation:
T
E(g - k) = gE(e' - 1)(I-g)
where is E is an amount of after-corporate-tax retained earnings, r is the after-corporate-tax rate
of return with respect to those earnings, Tis the period in years from the time the earnings accrue
until the taxpayer sells corporate stock at capital gains rates, and g is the nominal capital gains
rate. Given a maximum capital gains tax rate of.20, Id. § 1(h), and k =.01 5, one can resolve for
Tin terms of r as follows:
T = 0.768 - r.
Based on this equation, minimum deferral periods to achieve effective inside shelter are available
for various after-corporate-tax rates ofretum: for 2%-38.4 years, for 30/o-25.6 years, for 5%o- 15.4
years, for 100-/o7.7 years, and for 1501,5.1 years (subject to some rounding error). For a
maximum capital gains tax rate of 15%, the same resolution is as follows:
T = 0. 722 + r.
This produces the following minimum deferral periods: for 20/,36.1 years, for 30/-24.1 years,
for 50/o-14.4 years, for 100/o-7.2 years, and for 150/o-4.8 years (subject again to some rounding
error).
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. See Lee, supranote 161, at 903-21. Another sense in which taxable corporations have
served as tax shelters has been their ability to deduct the cost of shareholder-employee insurance
premiums while treating them as tax-exempt fringe benefits to the shareholder-employees. Those
deductions have been limited with respect to self-employed individuals, partners, and 2%
shareholders in S corporations, but that disadvantage has been phased-out. I.R.C. § 162(1) (West
2003).
168. See Lee, supra note 161, at 903-21.
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A.

The Case ForElimination

With the advent ofthe check-the-box regulations,' 69 elective tax integration
via pass-through treatment is available for all closely held enterprises, and even
some publicly traded enterprises. 7 o So long as the dual tax rate structure exists,
a system that allows enterprises to elect between separate corporate taxation
and the integration of full pass-through treatment will find some enterprises
electing the former for its benefits as a tax shelter. The existence of that form
of shelter has potential implications for both distributive equity and allocative
efficiency, although the former is likely to be the more significant issue. In
addition, there are other considerations, all of them tied up in some measure
with the politics of advancing the Laissez-Faire Approach, that militate in favor
of eliminating inside shelter.
To the extent that the schedule of individual income tax rates reflects an
implicit normative judgment regarding the best distribution of the tax burden,
the inside shelter-like any other shelter that is not universally
available-potentially undermines the validity of that implicit, normative
judgement. From the perspective of vertical equity, the normative acceptability
of the rate schedule is predicated on some set of assumptions about how that
rate schedule affects the progressivity of the imposition of the tax burden. The
existence of the inside shelter implies that the actual distribution of the tax
burden is less progressive than the nominal tax brackets indicate. Because the
inside shelter benefits some but not all taxpayers in any given income tax rate
bracket, it is not readily susceptible to assimilation into the process of setting
those brackets. As such, a valid set of tax distribution assumptions cannot be
created by resetting the nominal tax brackets to account for the inside shelter.
If horizontal equity is considered a significant concern, 1 ' it also makes the
inside shelter problematic. Inside shelter is only selectively available, chiefly
to those who participate in closely held enterprises. It is not available to many
service-oriented businesses, because the lower corporate brackets do not apply

169. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).
170. The check-the-box regulations allow an LLC or other noncorporate legal form to elect
partnership pass-through treatment even if it functionally possesses all of the legal characteristics

of a corporation. Id. On the other hand, most, but not all, publicly traded partnerships are treated
as taxable corporations. I.R.C. § 7704. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability
Company: A Catalyst Exposing the CorporateIntegration Question, 95 MICH. L. REv. 393,437

(1996).
171.

See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. As noted in connection with the

discussion of the double tax burden, the conclusory nature of the horizontal equity judgement
makes it inherently problematic.
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to personal service corporations.' If this selective availability is not a valid
predicate of disparate treatment for those who are otherwise in identical
73
situations, then the inside shelter violates the principal of horizontal equity.'
The entire discussion of distributive equity is further complicated to the extent
that the uncertainty about incidence of the corporate tax 7 4 shifts an indeterminate portion of the inside shelter benefit away from equity investors.
Inside shelter may also create issues of allocative efficiency. By definition,
inside shelter functions by the retention of earnings; therefore, it creates a bias
that may impede the optimal removal of free cash flow 75 from corporate solution. On the other hand, in the context of closely held enterprises, in which the
inside shelter is most valuable, the failure to distribute earnings may not
generate the same adverse value effects as it does in the publicly traded BerleMeans corporation context, and earnings retention seems unlikely to prevent
maximization of return for reinvestment of a closely held corporation's
earnings. It is possible that the bias in favor of corporate tax classification may
create needless administrative costs, but given the administrative complexity
of most forms of pass-through taxation, these do not seem likely to be great at
the margin. For enterprises organized before the advent of the check-the-box
regulations, 176 inside shelter created a bias in favor of corporate form over other
forms. Since then, however, the check-the-box regulations allow 77access to
'
inside shelter without respect to choice of legal form of enterprise.
Another set of points urging elimination is essentially a negative one. The
alleviation of the excess tax burden on corporate enterprise would result in a
revenue loss to the fisc. Reduction of inside shelter would recoup some
measure of that revenue loss. This recoupment has both a substantive policy
effect and political effect. From a policy perspective, it permits the pursuit of

172. I.R.C. § 1(b)(2) (West 2003). A personal service corporation is "a corporation the
principal activity of which is the performance of personal services" that "are substantially
performed by employee-owners." Id. §§ 269A(b), 441(i)(2). Activities that involve "the
performance of services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting,
actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting" are treated as personal service activities. Treas.
Reg. § 1.441-3(d)(1) (1987).
173. But see supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (discussing the necessarily conclu-

sory nature of this analysis).
174. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
176. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).
177. To the extent that pass-through treatment is unavailable to publicly traded enterprises,
I.R.C. § 7704(a) (West 2003), the inside shelter question cannot affect choice of entity. The
existence of the check-the-box regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (as amended in 2001),
effectively allows closely held enterprises, and a limited class of publicly traded enterprises,
I.R.C. § 7704(c), (g) (West 2003), to pursue inside shelter without effect upon the selection of an
entity's operating characteristics.
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the Laissez-Faire Approach without as great a requirement to increase the tax
burden elsewhere in the system or to cut funding for programs. Of course, a
conclusive judgment on this point depends upon knowing where the tax burden
would be shifted and which programs would be cut.
A purely political aspect arises because some of the proposals of the
Laissez-Faire Approach will require congressional approval. The attendant
political process in which revenue estimates are used to justify tax legislation'78
would undoubtedly be eased if the revenue costs of the Laissez-Faire Approach
were at least partly offset by the revenue gains of eliminating the inside shelter
benefit. In a more general manner as well, the political picture for the LaissezFaire Approach would be simplified if it incorporates reduction of inside shelter
benefits. Notwithstanding the clear superiority of the integration goal, the
cosmetics of legislating tax benefits to corporations might be problematic.
Simultaneous congressional action on inside shelter would ease those
cosmetics, because Congress could be portrayed as actually raising corporate
tax rates, rather than as eliminating corporate taxation. The end of inside shelter
would also serve as a defense against the inevitable, but untestable, argument
that tax integration serves solely to reduce progressivity.179
B.

The Case Against Elimination

At the same time, there are points to be made against eliminating the
benefit of inside shelter. A potential objection is that the so-called distortions
of inside shelter serve to mitigate the distortions otherwise created by the
existing income tax system. This is especially true in comparison to a regime
that imposes a lighter burden on capital income, such as a consumption tax
regime. Many serious minds have advanced thoughtful arguments, on both
distributive equity and allocative efficiency grounds, that serve to justify
advancing toward a consumption-tax paradigm. 80
' Further supporting this view

178. For discussions of the revenue estimation process and its effect on tax policy, see
Graetz, supra note 93, at 668-77; Alan J. Auerbach, Public Financein Theory and Practice,46
NAT'L TAX J. 519 (1993); Boris I. Bittker, The Erwin N GriswoldLecture, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
213 (1994); Ernil M. Sunley & Randall D. Weiss, The Revenue Estimating Process, 10 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 261 (1992).
179. In addition, at the margin, the affirmative case for the Laissez-Faire Approach is
strengthened by the elimination of inside shelter. That is, some elements of the Laissez-Faire
Approach are susceptible of possible abuse in the presence of inside shelter opportunities, and are
thereby strengthened by its elimination. While those instances do not appear to be of
overwhelming significance, they are noted as they arise.
180. See, e.g., David F. Bradford, The Casefor a PersonalConsumption Tax, in WHAT
SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); IRVING FISHER
& HERBERT FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION (1942); HARRY GRUBERT & T. SCOTT
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are the many economic studies that conclude that an optimal tax system would
not include a tax on capital.'
In terms of distributive equity, consumption tax proponents might see
inside shelter as a form of self-help correction to a tax system that excessively
burdens savers relative to consumers. From an allocative perspective, to the

extent that the income tax creates a bias against saving and capital formation,
the inside shelter serves to mitigate that bias, and the allocative benefits created
thereby might well be greater than the allocative distortions created. In the
context of a broader examination of the extent to which the so-called "income
tax" regime does or should incorporate elements of a consumption tax, these

points might be sufficient to justify the preservation of inside shelter. In the
absence of such a broader program, however, the benefits of inside shelter need
to be balanced carefully against the distortions it engenders.

NEWLON, TAXING CONSUMPTION INAGLOBAL ECONOMY (1997); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
ch. 30 (1651) (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991); INST. FOR FISCALSTUDIES, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978); Alfred Marshall, The Equitable
Distributionof Taxation (1917), in MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL 347, 350-51 (A.C. Pigou
ed., 1925); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. V, ch. I, § 4 (Laughlin
ed., 1884); LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX: A PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX (1997);
William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type Tax or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113 (1974); William D. Andrews, Fairnessand the PersonalIncome Tax: A Reply to
ProfessorWarren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of a Flat
Tax: Is It Unique?, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 283 (1997).
181. See Peter Diamond, Taxation andPublic Productionin a Growth Setting, in MODELS
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 215-35 (James A. Mirrlees & N.H. Stern eds., 1973); Anthony B.
Atkinson & Agnar Sandmo, Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings, 90 ECON. J. 529
(1980); Nicholas Bull, When All the Optimal Dynamic Taxes Are Zero, FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD WORKING PAPER SERIES #137; Christophe Chamley, Efficient Taxation in a Stylized
Model of Intertemporal GeneralEquilibrium, 26 INT'L. ECON. REV. 451 (1985); Christopher
Chamley, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives, 54
ECONOMETRICA 607 (1986); V.V. Chari, et al., Optimal FiscalPolicy in a Business Cycle Model,
102 J. POL. ECON. 617 (1994); Martin Feldstein, The Rate of Return Taxation, and Personal
Savings, 88 ECON. J. 482 (1978); Larry E. Jones, et al., On the Optimal Taxation of Capital
Income, 73 J. ECON. THEORY 93 (1997); Larry E. Jones, et al., Optimal Taxation in Models of
Endogenous Growth, 101 J. POL. ECON. 485 (1993); Kenneth L. Judd, Optimal Taxation and
Spending in General Competitive Growth Models, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1999); Kenneth L. Judd,
Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 59 (1985);
Kenneth L. Judd, The Impact of Tax Reform in Modern Dynamic Economies, in TRANSITION
COSTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 5-53 (K.A. Hassett & R.G. Hubbard eds., 2001); Robert
E. Lucas, Jr., Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review, 42 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 293
(1990).
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C. A Laissez-Faire ConsistentElimination Program

It is certainly possible to redress inside shelter in a manner consistent with
the methodology of the Laissez-Faire Approach. That task is easily
accomplished without creating any new legal regimes or significantly
reworking any of the existing regimes. The repeal of the lower corporate tax
rate brackets and converting the corporate tax into a flat tax at the same rate as

the highest rate individual tax bracket would effectively eliminate the inside
82
shelter benefit.1
Recent legislation has already begun to move the tax regime in this

direction by reducing the maximum individual tax bracket to the maximum
corporate bracket and generally reducing individual income tax rates. 83
' While
inside shelter could equally be advanced by raising the corporate tax rate to
meet the preexisting individual tax rates, the integrationist agenda does not

address the question of optimal tax rates as such. The Laissez-Faire Approach
ought to remain agnostic as to what the maximum individual rate should be,
and therefore, this Article brackets that issue as beyond its scope.
In isolation, these steps would face the objection that they increase the

scope of the excess tax burden of double taxation, but they do not exist in
isolation. Closely held enterprises and even some publicly traded enterprises are
able to elect pass-through treatment' 84 and eliminate the excess tax burden. 8

182. Taxable corporations have also served as tax shelters by deducting the cost of shareholder-employee insurance premiums while treating them as tax-exempt fringe benefits to the
shareholder-employees. Those deductions have been limited with respect to self-employed
individuals, partners, and 2 percent shareholders in S corporations, but that disadvantage has been
phased-out. I.R.C. § 162(1) (West 2003).
183. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-27, §§ 101-107, 117 Stat. 752, 753-56.
184. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001); I.R.C. § 7704 (West 2003). A
related question revolves around how to treat the conversion of existing taxable corporations into
partnerships. Under existing law the conversion is a taxable liquidation. See Id. §§ 331, 336. On
the one hand, if corporations have been used for inside shelter, an equity analysis mayjustify some
toll for the benefit of converting to full pass-through treatment. On the other hand, for some
corporations there will be a close question of whether the taxation of the deemed liquidation at
both corporate and shareholder levels of previously unrecognized gain would be greater than the
burden of losing the benefit of reduced tax brackets. As such, some closely held businesses may
remain in the corporate tax regime notwithstanding the elimination of the inside shelter benefit,
despite the allocative suboptomality of remaining subject to the excess tax burden. The empirical
resolution of that question is beyond the scope of this Article.
185. For closely held enterprises, the elimination of inside shelter could also be accomplished by mandating some form of pass-through tax treatment. Presumably that pass-through
treatment would be modeled on subchapter S or on subchapter K's treatment of partnerships. On
the one hand, pass-through treatment premised on subchapter S would require significant
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For other enterprises, the accentuation of the excess tax burden is illusory
because the essence of the Laissez-Faire Approach is to ensure the accessibility

of simple means of escaping that excess burden. Nevertheless, the arguments
against elimination of inside shelter serve as a reminder that the issue of inside
shelter may not be as pressing on its own merits as is that of double taxation.
In addition, a conclusion about remedying double taxation need not necessarily
imply a similar conclusion about remedying inside shelter.
V.

CORPORATE-LEVEL BOUNDARY POLICING ADJUSTMENTS

Significant mitigation of the excess burden of the double tax regime can be
achieved by the manner in which the corporate tax base is policed. The extent
to which stakeholders' participation in the corporate earnings stream is
deductible largely defines the extent of the double tax burden. A policy of
permissive deductibility at the corporate level for amounts taxable at the

stakeholder level contracts the scope of the double tax regime. Even a regime
that taxes dividends at a lower tax rate than other income of individual
taxpayers186 imposes a double tax on the return to corporate equity, but not on
corporate revenue streams deductible at the corporate level.

This Article focuses on two such deductibility issues. First, the extent to
which employee compensation is considered reasonable, and therefore
deductible, primarily affects closely held corporations. Second, the extent to
which capital stakes are characterized as debt affects deductibility as interest.

reworking of the existing subchapter S regime. Examples of necessary changes would be regimes
to allocate profit among multiple classes of stock and through multiple tiers of corporations, and
to settle the related but independent question of the timing and method for allocating loss among
multiple classes of stock and through multiple tiers of corporations. In addition, it would be
necessary to expand the catalog of shareholders permissible under the existing S corporation
regime, which is too restrictive to make it universal to all closely held corporations. See, e.g.,
Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder
IntegrationProposal,50 TAX L. REV. 265, 314-23 (1995) (showing the feasibility of increasing
the number of shareholders permitted under the S corporation rules). On the other hand,
mandatory pass-through treatment via the subchapter K model would impose administrative and
compliance burdens greater than those of subchapter C, as might also be the case under an
expanded subchapter S model. Given that either of these solutions imposes complications not
associated with tax bracket equalization, and that mandatory pass-through treatment would not
affect inside shelter among publicly traded corporations, mandating pass-through treatment is not
as consonant with the Laissez-Faire Approach as is equalizing the corporate and individual rates
and allowing closely held enterprises to elect whether to avoid double taxation via pass-through
treatment.
186. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302,
117 Stat. 752, 760-64.
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Given that closely held businesses have access to pass-through taxation, it is of
primary interest to publicly traded corporations.
A.

Minimizing Policingof Compensation'sReasonableness

Under existing law, employee compensation is deductible only to the extent

that it is reasonable. The IRS expends significant effort' 87 seeking to limit
corporate deductions to "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered," 88 perhaps to little useful
effect, given that taxpayers prevail in most of the litigated cases. 189 In these

cases, the IRS seeks primarily to recharacterize "unreasonable" compensation
paid

to

shareholder-employees

as

dividend

distributions. 9 '

Once

recharacterized in that manner, the payments generally remain taxable income
to the recipient, but are not deductible by the paying corporation.

187. See, for example, Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable CompensationRule, 19 VA.
TAX REv. 371, 372 n.4 (1999) stating:
The reasonable compensation issue ranks among the most frequently
litigated of all tax questions. General Accounting Office, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING ISSUES IN TAX DISPUTES OVER BUSINESS
EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS,

188.
189.
prevailing
190.

GAO/GGD-95- 232 (Sept. 26, 1995) (hereinafter

GAO Report). The General Accounting Office sampled Tax Court petitions
filed in 1993 involving Code § 162, having previously identified that section
as the most commonly cited in tax controversies. See id. at 1. Within the
sample, the reasonable compensation issue alone accounted for half of the
dollar value of the taxes in dispute. See id.at 2. The issue was also the third
most frequently disputed issue in the sample, ranking behind inadequate
documentation and just behind the status of an activity as a "trade or
business." See id. at 12. See also Richard K. Grigsby & David A. Reed,
How to Establishthat Full CompensationPaidto a Shareholder-Employee
is Deductible, 24 TAX'N ACCT. 210 (1980) (The reasonable compensation
issue "for many years has been one of the more frequently contested issues
raised by Internal Revenue Service agents."). For compendia of hundreds of
reasonable compensation cases, see generally Jacob Mertens, Jr., MERTENS
LAW OF FED. INCOME TAXATION §25E:O1-10.50 (1996); Gerald A. Kafka,
REASONABLE COMPENSATION, 390 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) (2d ed.
1993); Arthur J. Dixon, Planning Reasonable Compensation, 19 N.Y.U.
ANN. INST. FED. TAX'N 181 (1961); Max E. Meyer, Reasonableness of
Compensation-A TabularReview, 26 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. FED. TAX'N 1121
(1968); Crawford S. Halsey & Maurice E. Peloubet, FEDERAL TAXATION
AND UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION (1964). Id.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2003).
See, e.g., Hamill, supra note 170, at 415-18 (recognizing the IRS is unsuccessful in
over taxpayers more than 50 percent of the time); Lee, supra note 161, at 918-19.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1958).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss1/4

52

to Corporate
Tax Integration:
A Laissez-Faire Approach
2003]Polito: Advancing
TAX INTEGRATION
TO CORPORATE
ADVANCING

The reasonableness inquiry requires an examination of the shareholderemployee's purported compensation against what likely would have been the
compensation if negotiated at arm's length in the absence of the shareholding
relationship. That inquiry is necessarily a fact specific one. 9 ' Given the normal
reluctance of judges to second-guess business judgements,'92 the reasonable
compensation doctrine leaves shareholder-employees much flexibility for
maximizing the deductible amount of compensation. As a practical matter, it

seems likely that many taxable corporations are able to eliminate successfully
their corporate income tax entirely by passing earnings to shareholders as
deductible salaries.' 93 Others achieve further tax minimization by reducing

corporate earnings only enough to take advantage of the inside shelter of the
lower corporate tax brackets.194

From an integrationist perspective, however, the reasonable compensation
limitation on deductibility is largely a solution in search of a problem. The issue
ofreasonable compensation is effectively confined to closely held corporations,

whose shareholder-employees have little concern for equity markets' reactions
to dividend and compensation policies. These corporations are in a position to
eliminate or minimize dividend distributions in favor of exaggerated
compensation figures.' 95
As Professor Zelinsky has wisely observed, the very existence of the
reasonable compensation doctrine is anomalous under the existing regime, in
which policy makers have decided in favor of pass-through treatment as the
preferred tax treatment for closely held enterprises.' 96 So long as the
shareholder-employee is fully taxable with respect to the salary, allowing the
deduction at the corporate level is no worse than pass-through treatment. From

191. Case law presents a number of slightly different formulations of the test of reasonable
compensation. See, e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1998)
(applying the "independent investor test" to all five factors found in Elliotts); Owensby &
Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 n. 21 (5th Cir. 1987) (adding to those factors
found in Mayson and Elliotts, while noting that the factors found in both Mayson and Elliotts are
essentially the same); Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983)
(applying the "independent investor test" as one of the factors used to judge the reasonableness
of compensation, as well as reducing the number of factors found in Mayson from nine to five);
Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) (setting forth the initial
nine factors used in some manner by the majority of federal courts).
192. Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[J]udges
are not competent to decide what business executives are worth.").
193. Sixty-one percent of all taxable corporations report no taxable income. STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104th Cong., IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS OF REPLACING THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 5 n.8 (Comm. Print 1996).

194. See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
195. See Zelinsky, The Tax Policy Case, supra note 129, at 1124.
196. Zelinsky, Eberl's,supra note 129, at 559.
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an integrationist perspective, therefore, current enforcement practice is to that
extent pure waste. A principle of consistency should be sufficient to resolve
the compensation issue. So long as the recipient is fully taxable with respect
the allowance of a deduction to the corporation is
to the compensation,
7
unproblematic.

1

As a matter of administration it is possible to impose upon the deducting
corporation an obligation to document and report that the recipient is fully
taxable with respect to the compensation. The IRS would need to be able to
cross-reference recipients' returns to ensure that the compensation is being
reported, but the withholding tax' 98 and the W-4 regime is already in place for
this purpose. In any case in which consistency is assured, there remains no
justification to limit the corporate deduction to a "reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation."1 99
As a set of affirmative legislative proposals, the Laissez-Faire Approach
calls for congressional adoption of a statutory definition of reasonableness in
this context that makes all compensation reasonable if it is taxable to the
recipient. In the alternative, the same result is achieved by acquiescence in
administrative practice. The Laissez-Faire Approach recommends acquiescence
in administrative action to effect the same definitional modification to the
concept of a "reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation.""2 ' At
an even greater level of passivity, it recommends lack of concern for and
acquiescence in an enforcement practice of benign neglect that does not
question the reasonableness of compensation to the extent that the recipient
treats the compensation as taxable income.
To the extent that the benefit of inside shelter is eliminated, there is little
reason for closely held enterprises to elect to be treated as taxable corporations
rather than as pass-through entities. In those circumstances, the issue of
reasonable compensation is largely academic because the same single level of

197. The only issue addressed here is reasonableness for purposes of the corporate deduction. A policy of not challenging reasonableness for purposes of deductibility need not preclude
a challenge for other purposes. For example, in the S corporation context, the IRS may challenge
shareholder-employee compensation as set unreasonably low in order to evade the social security
taxes. See, e.g., Michael P. Watters & Daryl Burckel, Establishing Reasonableness of
Compensation Difficult in IRS Attacks, 8 AKRON TAX J. 147 (1991) (noting legislation that
reduces income taxes while social security taxes continue to increase).
198. I.R.C. §§ 3401-3406 (West 2003).
199. Id. § 162(a)(1).
200. Id. In theory this might be accomplished either by means of a regulation defining "reasonableness" in the manner suggested, or an IRS revenue ruling interpreting the term in that
manner, or an IRS revenue procedure propounding administrative practice based on that
interpretation of the term. This Article can remain agnostic on the validity of any such action. See
supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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tax applies to both compensation and earnings.2"' Under the Laissez-Faire
Approach, therefore, the issue may die of its own accord.
B. Police Debt Classificationas a Matter ofForm Only
A double tax regime identifies the corporate taxpayer with its equity capital
chiefly by allowing a deduction for interest but not dividends.2"2 In such a
regime, the definitional distinction between a debt security and an equity
security plays a central role in constructing the portions of the taxable
corporation's revenue stream subject to double tax's excess tax burden, and
expanding the scope of debt capital characterization at the margin removes
earnings from the ambit of the corporate income tax.20 3 Even a regime that
taxes dividends at the capital gains tax rate does not eliminate that disparity.204
Such a double tax regime necessarily devotes significant resources to defining
and defending the distinction between a debt security and an equity security.
From an integrationist perspective, however, this effort is largely
counterproductive. The removal of income from the corporate tax base is not
only justified, it is the desired goal, so long as it is conditioned on the
simultaneous inclusion in the security holder's gross income.2"' In so far as debt
classification determines the corporate-level deduction for interest amounts and
the taxation of security holders with respect to the yield they enjoy on their
investment, the prescription of the Laissez-Faire Approach is to accede largely
to the debt classification of securities that are sufficiently in debt form to allow
the administration of the existing tax regime for corporate debt. The
integrationist agenda does, however, impose a pair of significant conditions.
First, the use of debt characterization to shift taxable income from the
corporate tax base to the individual tax base requires a principle of consistent
characterization. The issuer and the holder of the instrument must be bound to

201. But see supra note 197 and accompanying text (regarding the issue of compensation
understated for purposes of the social security taxes).
202. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The CorporateInterest Deduction: A PolicyEvaluation,83

YALE L.J. 1585, 1603-10 (1974) (presenting a case for equating the corporation with both equity
and debt capital for tax purposes by repealing the deduction for corporate interest obligations).
203. See, e.g., Polito, Useful Fictions,supra note 5, at 770-74.
204. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302,
117 Stat. 760-64.
205. There is a different, but ultimately related, issue of reclassifying rental payments under
a lease as loan payments consisting of principal and interest. Given that the former are fully
deductible, I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (West 2003), but the latter are deductible only to the extent of
interest, Id. § 163, the former classification is sought by taxpayers. The Laissez-Faire Approach
would presumably take an attitude toward these payments that parallels the analysis of the debt-

or-equity question in its permissiveness.
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characterize a security in the same manner. The simplest, and most
administrable, mechanism is to make the corporate issuer's characterization
binding on all holders. If the issuer treats the security as debt, all holders must
be constrained to do the same, and the same would be true mutatis mutandis for
equity characterization. This condition goes beyond existing law, which makes
consistent treatment presumptive, but allows security-holding taxpayers to
adopt inconsistent treatment if supported by sufficient tax return disclosure.0 6
Second, consistency of timing, amounts of interest and original issue
discount, follows from the same premise. Corporate deductions must be
matched identically by investor inclusion both as to amount and timing. With
respect to interest paid in cash, ordinary income accounting principles ensure
the necessary consistency.2 7 With respect to time-value-of-money accrued but
not yet paid, the existing original issue discount (OID)205 regime is largely
sufficient to ensure the necessary consistency. Even for corporate securities
containing significant risk elements that place them fairly far along the
spectrum from pure debt toward pure equity, existing Treasury regulations
make it possible to apply the consistent interest accrual principle. Particularly
notable are OID regulations for variable rate debt instruments2"9 and contingent
payment debt instruments.2 10 One necessary modification is to make consistent
issuer-holder treatment absolute rather than presumptive. Existing regulations
for contingent payment debt instruments allow holders to adopt accrual
schedules that differ from those used by issuers.2 ' The Laissez-Faire
Approach's use of form-based debt classification to shift income from the
corporate to the individual tax base calls for the elimination of that
possibility.212
These conditions can be put in place by explicit legislation or regulation,
but in principle can also be achieved by acquiescence in administrative practice.
Given the need to track consistency across all holders, the latter no doubt

206. Id. § 385(c). Full elimination of taxpayers' capacity to take inconsistent positions is
not strictly necessary in theory but is probably necessary in practice. In principle, it should be
sufficient that consistent treatment be only a condition for acceding in form-based debt
classification. In practice, however, policing for consistent treatment by all security holders may
impose disproportionate administrative burdens on the fisc, especially in the case of widely held
securities.
207. Id. § 45 1(a).
208. Id. §§ 1271-1275.
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5(e) (as amended in 1996).
210. Id. § 1.1275-4 (as amended in 1999).
211. Id. § 1.1275-4(b)(4)(iv).
212. Consistency of treatment does not, however, necessarily preclude the integration of a
debt instrument with a hedging position into a synthetic noncontingent debt instrument for the
party taking such a hedge. See id., § 1.1275-6 (as amended in 1996).
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complicates the administration of the proposal. Here again, this Article remains
agnostic as to the authority to act administratively.
1. PotentialObjections and Responses Thereto

A potential objection that merits consideration is the possibility of
opportunistic use of the OID rules to manipulate the timing or extent of OD

accruals. A recently prominent example of such use is found in contingent
convertible debt instruments. Commentators have observed the manipulation
of the contingent payment debt instrument rules to accelerate or overstate
deductible OID. 1 3 For a double tax regime, this manipulation is problematic
because it serves to shelter a portion of corporate earnings from the corporate

level of the double tax.
From an integrationist perspective, however, the permissive use of debt

classification to shift income into the individual tax base makes this a nonissue.
At least for taxable security holders, every dollar deducted at the corporate level
is matched by a dollar of inclusion at the holder level, and it is the investorlevel tax rates that are treated as normative. As such, accelerated or even

exaggerated accrual of deductible OlD is simply irrelevant so long as identical
amounts are included in the security holders' taxable income.214
The response to the first objection raises a second, potentially more

significant objection. It is the treatment of nontaxable income recipients,
namely, domestic tax-exempt persons and foreign persons that benefit from a
partial or full exemption from United States taxation. Corporate earnings
shielded by an interest deduction for the corporation and exempt from taxation
at the investor level are not subject even to a single level of taxation. While this
issue exists even under the double tax regime, permissive debt classification

213. See William S. Dixon, Do Contingent Interest ConvertibleDebt Instruments Work as
Advertised? ProbablyNot, 15 J. TAX'N FIN. INST. 5 (2002); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths
About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55
TAx L. REV. 325, 355 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, ContingentInterest Rules Under Pressure,94
TAX NOTES 1256 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, Cutting Off Excess Interest Accrual on Contingent
Convertibles, 93 TAx NOTES 737 (2001); Lee A. Sheppard, The Untoward Consequences of
RequiringInterest Accrual, 91 TAx NOTES 564 (2001).
214. In principle, manipulation to delay or understate OID accruals might remain something
of an issue if inside shelter is not eliminated through the taxation of all corporate income at the
maximum individual tax rate. For corporations in a lower marginal tax bracket than their security
holders, the understatement would save more tax at the individual security holder level than the
cost of the reduced deduction at the corporate level. At the same time, however, taxpayers could
take more direct advantage of inside shelter through the use of equity securities. As such, the
Laissez-Faire Approach does not particularly emphasize the case for an anti-abuse regime
designed to police understatements of OID.
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could easily increase the amount of corporate earnings not subject to any
United States taxation at all.
It is possible, however, to limit the extent of this problem without
abandoning permissive debt classification. First, to the extent that the holderlevel exemption is premised on the portfolio-interest exemption,2" 5 the existing

conditions on its availability significantly restrict its expansion via permissive
debt classification. In particular, the portfolio-interest exemption is not
available for contingent interest, 216 thereby limiting its applicability to debt
instruments that appear sufficiently "debt-like."

Another safeguard, or at least the foundation of one, is found in the Internal
Revenue Code's earnings stripping limitation on interest deductions. 217 This
regime limits the corporate interest deductions for amounts paid or accrued to

nontaxable persons, but only to the extent that the corporation's debt-to-equity
ratio is higher than 1.5 to 1, the interest expense exceeds 50% of adjusted
taxable income, and a related person either holds the debt or guarantees the
debt.218 In light of permissive debt classification significantly increasing the
availability of interest deductions, it might be advisable to reduce the numerical
thresholds to sweep more into the deduction disallowance.21 9 In addition, it

might be advisable to eliminate this provision's limited applicability to related
persons.12 0 Further adjustments may be advisable to account for the issue of
nontaxable security holders. That caveat, however, should not detract from the
general proposition that, from an integrationist perspective, permissive debt

classification is a positive step.

215. I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (West 2003).
216. See id. §§ 871(h)(4), 881(c)(4).
217. Seeid. § 1630).
218. See id.
219. A number of such changes have been proposed independent of, but consistent with, the
Laissez-Faire Program. The George W. Bush Administration has proposed several of these
changes. First, the Administration's proposal would determine a corporation's maximum safe
harbor debt level as a series of debt-to-asset ratios for various distinct classes of assets.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 104-06 (2003). The safe harbor ratios would range from a

maximum of 98% for cash, cash equivalents, and securities to a low of 50% for intangible assets.
Id. Second, it would deny the deduction of "disqualified interest to the extent that the United
States members of a corporate group are more highly leveraged than the overall worldwide
corporate group." Id. Last, it would reduce "the limitation based on adjusted taxable income...
from 50 percent to 35 percent of adjusted taxable income." Id. See also H.R. 5095, 107th Cong.
§ 201 (2003) (including similar adjustments).
220. An important concern that must be considered, especially if the deduction disqualification applies outside ofthe related persons context, is its effect on financial businesses, for which
particularly high levels of leverage are the industry norm. The Administration's proposed debt-toasset determinations based on particular asset classes may serve significantly to ameliorate this
concern. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 219, at 105.
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Debt Form Crucial

The Laissez-Faire Approach's restriction to the use of existing legal
structures serves as an important limitation on the extent to which permissive
debt classification will advance the integrationist agenda. In the Laissez-Faire
Approach, debt classification must be limited to securities sufficiently in debt
form to allow the application of existing debt regimes. In particular, the
instrument, 222
application of the OD regime,"' even for a contingent payment
depends upon establishing a schedule of payments over a period that ends with
the maturity of the debt instrument.
Common stock, or an equivalent residual claim on a corporation's earnings,
cannot satisfy the need to adhere to debt form. First, conventional common
stock has no maturity date at which the investor's original capital will be
repaid. While it is possible to refinance existing securities as they mature, it
seems unlikely that a corporation, other than one with a preplanned termination,
will be able to commit itself to refinance its entire capitalization, even if the
commitment were for recapitalization in tranches based on staggered maturity
dates. As such, it seems likely that every corporation will have a "permanent"
component to its capital structure for which there is no expectation of a
payment analogous to the maturity of a debt instrument. This junior-most tier
of capital structure will not be able to avoid the form of equity.
With a bit of stretching, it is possible to minimize the depth of this bottom
tier of capital structure by issuing debt-form securities with extremely long
maturity periods; for example, of a century or more. Even if, in the extreme
case, it were possible to replace all residual common stock with long-term
securities, it is still unlikely that all of an enterprise's earnings could be
shielded from the double tax regime through debt classification. The OLD
regime depends upon a schedule ofpayments to debt holders, and no enterprise,
certainly lio publicly traded enterprise, would commit itself to payments of its
221
entire earnings stream.
Losses present a further complication and limitation. It is certainly possible
to have debt-form securities that bear some fraction of negative earnings by

221. I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (West 2003).
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (as amended in 1999).
223. Given substantial flotation costs for new issues of corporate debt or equity, satisfying
corporate capital needs primarily through the retention of earnings has distinct advantages.
Information asymmetries further advantage financing capital needs through the retention of

earnings. See Stewart C. Myers, The CapitalStructurePuzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575 (1984). In addition,
management self-interest may lead to excess retention of earnings. See supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text.
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offsetting their shares of losses against their future shares of profits.224 If
allocated losses reduce principal, however, under existing principles, it is
implausible to characterize such an instrument as being in debt-form, and the
existing OID regime depends upon a maturity date by which repayment of
principal is promised.
Given permissive debt classification under the Laissez-Faire Approach, a
corporation could certainly use long-term debt-form instruments for a large

portion of its capital structure that would otherwise take the form of common
stock. A corporation might issue a class of debt instruments with annual
payments of a substantial percentage of corporate earnings, adjusted to account

for claims by more senior security classes, for each year over a very long term.
These securities might also bear an equivalent share of losses limited by the
extent of allocated earnings. Permissive debt classification under the LaissezFaire Approach would allow such a debt-form security to shield a large fraction

of corporate earnings from the double tax regime,225 but not all of a

corporation's capital structure will be eligible in this way for debt classification.

As previously noted, any realistic corporation is likely to maintain the
capacity to retain indefinitely at least a portion of its earnings, and that residual

claim will be represented by securities for which it is not possible to generate
a schedule of payments. Moreover, there will need to be some class of security
holders whose exposure to losses implies no promise of return of their invested
capital. 26 These securities will also have no maturity. Some of a corporation's

capital structure will not be eligible for permissive debt classification. Even at
its most aggressive use, therefore, characterizing debt according to form is not
likely to eliminate fully the double tax burden, but it can serve as a useful step
to reduce that double tax burden.

224. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(b)(6) (as amended in 1999) (discussing similiar
adjustments).
225. Whether these securities have corporate voting rights is a matter of indifference for the
Laissez-Faire Approach.
226. Given that no corporate debt is fully free from the risk of nonpayment of principal, the
pertinent distinction is whether nonpayment of principal invokes creditors' remedies, as in the
case of prototypical debt, or no legal remedy at all, as in the case of prototypical equity. In the
case of closely held enterprises, many investors are largely indifferent to this distinction because
they hold overlapping debt and equity claims, and therefore, are unlikely to enforce creditors'
rights in any case. See Polito, UsefulFictions,supra note 5, at 780. Permissive debt classification
under the Laissez-Faire Approach is of less significance for closely held enterprises, given the
availability of pass-through taxation via subchapter K, than it is for publicly traded corporations.
For publicly traded corporations, permissive debt classification is likely to lead to an increased
use of "hybrid" debt instruments. See Polito, Useful Fictions,supranote 5, at 779. It seems likely
that any publicly traded corporation will have at least some class of securities for which loss of
invested capital does not invoke creditors' remedies.
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3.

Tax PreferenceItems

The treatment of various tax preferences is a significant issue worth noting
with permissive debt classification. While some integration
connection
in
proposals would require a shareholder-level tax on the distribution of these
earnings, others would allow for tax-exempt corporate income to be distributed
227
Pure integrationism treats
without triggering a shareholder-level tax.
,preferences as a distinct question from the integration question. It does not
address the wisdom of any particular tax benefit, but it does posit that taxpayers
ought to be equally eligible for preferences regardless of the legal form in
which their businesses are conducted. As such, an idealized pass-through
paradigm of integration would pass the benefit of tax-exemption and most other
tax preferences on to shareholders.228
Advancing integration through permissive debt classification resolves that
issue automatically, in a manner that is contrary to the ideal of pure
integrationism. Corporations may effectively deduct amounts classified as
interest and OLD only against gross income; that is, against amounts otherwise
taxable at the corporate level. The regime simply shifts income fully taxable at
the corporate level into the investor tax base by making it deductible against
amounts otherwise taxable at the corporate level. Corporate preference income
remains fully taxable at the investor level whether distributed as dividend or
interest. Some of the other elements of the Laissez-Faire Approach have the
contrary characteristic of passing through corporate-level preferences to
individual taxpayers. Whether to emphasize permissive debt characterization
or other aspects of the Laissez-Faire Approach will therefore depend, in part,
upon how this issue of preference items is resolved.

227. Compare TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 15-20, 63-65 (recommending against
the extension of integration benefits to tax preference items) with ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at
108-12 (proposing that the benefit of specified corporate tax exemptions and tax credits be passed
on to shareholders in integration). See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of Corporate
PreferenceItems Under an Integrated Tax System: A ComparativeAnalysis, 44 TAX LAW. 195
(1990) (analyzing the methods eight industrialized countries use to limit the pass-through of
preferences in integration).
228. See, e.g., CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?,
131-32 (1979) (arguing that investment tax credits should be passsed through to shareholders);
Harry M. Kitchen, Canada, in COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA AND JAPAN 341,
360 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1987); Polito, supra note 98, at 1036-37 (arguing that tax
preferences given to corporations should be retained "but only to the extent ... available to
taxpayers who do not avail themselves of the corporate form").
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4.

Consistentwith ExistingPlanningOpportunities

The use of permissive debt classification to advance the integrationist
agenda is very much consistent with other methods of using leverage as a form
of self-help integration. For example, Robert Scarborough has outlined the
manner in which a corporation can replace admitted equity with synthetic
equity created by issuing debt securities and separate derivative products based
on its own equity. To the extent that the existing tax regime does not compel
the integration of the separate debt and derivative securities, "[a] corporation
that substitutes debt and derivatives for equity will have effectively integrated
the corporate and investor-level taxes on the time-value return from capital
'
subject to the risks of its business."229
Likewise:
[T]he proliferation of trust-preferred securities and other
similar hybrid devices permit corporate managers to issue
dividends in the form of deductible interest payments. Under
the typical arrangement, the corporation forms a tax-exempt
subsidiary to issue preferred stock to the public. The
subsidiary then loans the proceeds of the stock issuance to its
parent corporation. This allows the parent to pay taxdeductible interest to the subsidiary, which in turn uses the
interest payments to fund the preferred dividend to
shareholders. The corporation receives a deduction and, in
many cases, the loans are not treated as debt on the
corporation's books because of the equity status of the
preferred shareholders. Shareholders are taxed on the
dividends received, but the effect is a do-it-yourself
integration of the corporate and shareholder income taxes.230
Other such self-help techniques no doubt already exist or are soon to be
uncovered by clever tax planning professionals.
From the perspective of the Laissez-Faire Approach, the tax regime should
quietly acquiesce in these uses of debt form to advance the integrationist
agenda. Aggressive enforcement action to counter these forms of self-help
integration is counterindicated from that perspective. Further, legislative
attempts to block these forms of self-help integration should be avoided.

229. Robert H. Scarborough, How Derivatives Use Affects Double Taxation of Corporate
Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 465, 529 (2002).
230. Steven A. Bank, Rethinking Double Taxation 's
Role in Dividend Policy: A Historical
Approach, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 521-22 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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VI.

INTERCORPORATE DIVIDENDS-EXPANDED DIVIDENDS-RECEIVED
DEDUCTION

31
Under existing law, the dividends-received deduction serves to ameliorate the phenomenon of the cascading tax, in which income tax is imposed on
corporate earnings in the corporation in which earned and again at each
corporate level through which the earnings pass as dividends before their
ultimate distribution to individuals. Given that the Laissez-Faire Approach is
premised on the defectiveness of a double tax regime, a mechanism that
prevents triple or higher multiples of taxation of the same income is
unobjectionable. Nevertheless, there are two aspects of the existing dividends
received deduction regime that are appropriate targets of adjustment.
The first is the limited availability of full dividends-received deduction.
Under section 243, the full amount of dividend received is deductible by a
parent corporation receiving the distribution from a subsidiary corporation
meeting the 80% share ownership requirements for membership in an affiliated
group.2 32 Dividends received from corporations that do not meet the 80%
233
subsidiary threshold are generally limited to 80% or 70% deductibility. From
3
the integrationist perspective, it is the possibility of inside shelter . of corporate
earnings that justifies denying the full dividends-received deduction to
distributions that move earnings among corporate entities but do not trigger a
235
this
shareholder-level tax. If the benefit of inside shelter is eliminated,
justification falls away. All taxable corporate income will have been subject
to taxation at the maximum individual rate, and further taxation of those
earnings as they move as dividend distributions within corporate form ought not
to trigger further taxation. As such, the Laissez-Faire Approach appropriately
includes an amendment to apply a 100% dividends-received deduction to all
cases governed by section 243.236
A second issue concerns the taxation of corporate sales of stock of other
corporations. Given that a portion of the value of any share of stock represents
its claim on accumulated earnings, the taxation of corporations for the full gain

231. I.R.C. § 243 (West 2003).
232. Id. §§ 243(a)(3), 243(b)(1). The 100% dividends-received deduction is also available
in the case of dividends received by a small business investment company. Id. § 243(a)(2).
233. Id. §§ 243(a)(1), 243(c).
234. See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
236. A conforming amendment would substitute 100% for 70% in the formula for deduction
of dividends received on preferred stock. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 244 (West 2003) (substituting 70%
for 100% deductions in the case ofpreferred qualifying dividends). These amendments would not
affect the limitation of the deduction to distributions out of U.S. source earnings subject to U.S.
taxation for distributions from foreign corporations. Id. § 245.
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recognized on the disposition of stock represents a cascading tax to the extent
of the claim on earnings. In principle, that portion of the disposition gain ought
not to be taxable to the selling corporation, even in a double tax regime.
Unfortunately, the complexity of allocating undistributed earnings among
corporate shares237 forecloses the possibility of a simple statutory remedy.
Taxpayers, however, have attempted a self-help resolution in the case of
a subsidiary sale. Consider the following scenario: Parentcorporationplans
to sell its wholly owned subsidiary corporation. Subsidiary corporation
declares a dividend for the entire balance of its earnings and profits account and
distributes the dividend in the form of a promissory note. Parentcorporation"s
basis in the note is its face value.238 Purchaser acquires not only the subsidiary
corporation's stock, but also the promissory note paying face value for the
note. If the dividends-received deduction applies, subsidiary corporation's
earnings have been transferred without further corporate taxation.
Even under a double tax regime, this is the appropriate result, but it does
not apply in every case. The scenario presented is a stylized description of the
facts of Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,3 9 in which the substance
over form doctrine served to recharacterize the dividend distribution as a
portion of the sales price subject to capital gains taxation. Whatever may be
said for or against the substance over form doctrine more generally, 240 its
application in this context is inappropriate. 241 For the Laissez-Faire Approach,
Waterman Steamship ought to be set aside.242

237. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
238. See I.R.C. § 301(d) (West 2003). Given that the note is about to be purchased at its
face value as part of the sale of subsidiary corporation, there is no reason in this context to
question whether its face value is also its fair market value.
239. 430 F.2d 1185, 1185-87 (5th Cir. 1970). A slight variation is one in which distributing
a note for the full amount of earnings and profits reduces the value of the stock enough to generate
a loss on the sale of the subsidiary. This loss ought not to be considered an artificial loss. The
earnings and profits portion of the stock value has already been subject to corporate level taxation.
The existence of an earnings and profits account greater than the excess of share value over basis
calls for an offsetting loss at the parent level in an idealized integrationist paradigm.
240. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, Review, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 863 (1982) ("several of the touchstone cases on form and substance in
taxation are flawed in principle and serve neither taxpayers nor the Treasury"); Polito, supra note
17, at 575 (arguing the relevant inquiry is how to reconcile the detailed rules adopted by Congress
instead of determining the true substance of the transaction).
241. See Charles I. Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions,85
YALE L.J. 861, 867-73 (1976) (arguing that the substance over form doctrine should not apply in
these circumstances because a dividend distribution lacks independent economic substance).
242. 430 F.2d at 1194 (following substance over form doctrine by holding that a declaration
and payment in the form of a promissory note by a subsidiary to its parent corporation constituted
part of the purchase price). It is clear that Congress could reverse Waterman Steamship
legislatively, and the Supreme Court has the authority to reject the principle for which it stands.
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VII. CAPITAL GAINS RATE BAILOUTS

For a regime in which double taxation of corporate earnings is normative,
the potential to bailout corporate earnings at capital gains rates is problematic.
From a double taxation perspective, all corporate earnings ought to be subject
both to corporate-level taxation and to shareholder taxation at the full ordinary
rates. The application of preferential capital gains rates to stock sales opens the
possibility of "disguising" earnings distributions as sale transactions. The
unsurprising offspring of this pairing is the rise of multiple tax regimes that
police against taxpayer schemes that "inappropriately" produce these capital
gains rate bailouts. 243 From an integrationist perspective, however, these
regimes are yet another set of solutions in search of a problem.
The 2003 Tax Act, at least until 2008, makes the capital gains tax rate the
norm for most dividend distributions. 2" A very similar result can be achieved
by setting aside the existing regimes designed to prevent capital gains rate
bailouts. From the Laissez-Faire Approach, setting aside those regimes is
useful regardless of the post-2008 fate of the 2003 Tax Act's dividend relief.
If the legislative majority is not available to extend the 2003 Tax Act, much the
same result can be achieved by eliminating these antibailout regimes. If these
antibailout regimes are successfully set aside before the expiration of dividend
relief under the 2003 Tax Act, the chances of that Act becoming permanent are
likely to rise. If the 2003 Tax Act is made permanent, these regimes are, from
an integrationist perspective, largely unnecessary and ought to be eliminated.
This analysis outlines the antibailout regimes that the Laissez-Faire Approach
marks for elimination regardless of what becomes of the 2003 Tax Act's sunset
provision.
A.

Stock Redemption CapitalGains Rate Bailouts

Consider first the simplest scenario: the corporate redemption of its own
whether
stock. Existing law sets forth elaborate and intricate tests to determine
24 5
such a redemption is to be treated as a stock sale or as a dividend. From an
integrationist perspective, there is no need to classify a redemption as a
dividend at all. If a corporation redeems its own stock for cash, there are three

It is not clear whether the Service has the authority to disregard it for future subsidiary sale cases.
Once again, however, this Article brackets the question of what mechanisms for achieving the
proposed action are legitimate. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
243. I.R.C. §§ 302, 304-306, 356(a)(2) (West 2003).
244. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64.
245. I.R.C. § 302 (West 2003).
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possible sources ofthe redemptionprice: (1) shareholder's invested capital; (2)
corporate earnings; or (3) third-party loans in excess of the first two.
Shareholders' invested capital ought not, in any case, to be subject to
shareholder level taxation. Even the existing dividend regime acknowledges
this and allows for the classification of some distributions as tax free return of
shareholder capital, which is all treated as after tax amounts. Existing stacking
rules for dividends insist that return of capital is recognized only to the extent
that corporate earnings and profits are exhausted.246 If a stock redemption is
treated as a sales transaction, the stacking is reversed. 247 Distributed cash is
applied first against the shareholder's basis in the stock and as gain from sale
only to the extent of the excess. From an integrationist perspective, however,
this second stacking convention is the better of the two. Capital return is taxpaid value, and from an integrationist perspective, corporate earnings and
profits are also tax-paid value.
If the redemption is funded out of earnings and profits, the amount
distributed has already been subject to corporate level taxation. From the
integrationist perspective, the imposition ofa shareholder-level tax, because the
amount paid exceeds shareholder basis, is an excess tax burden, even if it is
imposed at the capital gains rate. As such, there is no need to treat the
shareholder receipt as a dividend taxable at the full shareholder-level rate.248
Distributions of borrowed cash in excess of corporate earnings and
shareholders' invested capital represent amounts that have not been subject to
previous taxation at either corporate or shareholder level. To the extent that the
borrowing is in anticipation of future corporate realization of capital gains
amounts, the shareholder-level capital gains tax is, from an integrationist
perspective, a sufficient tax. The future corporate-level tax, however long
deferred, is an excess tax burden.
To the extent that the borrowing is in anticipation of corporate realization
of ordinary income, the shareholder-level capital gains tax is an undertax. At
some time, however, the corporation presumably will need to recognize the
ordinary income items, which will trigger full taxation at the corporate level at
that future time. Even if the debt-funded redemption is viewed as the proper

246. See id. § 301 (c) (treating distributions as shareholder basis reduction only to the extent
that distributions exceed current and accumulated earnings and profits).
247. See id. § 1001.
248. Allowing capital gains rate distribution of corporate preference rate income implies
the automatic partial pass-through of corporate preferences. If inside shelter is not fully
eliminated, the inside shelter will tend to mitigate the extent of the excess tax burden for
distributing after tax earnings at capital gains tax rates. In some cases, it is possible that the
benefit of inside shelter may exceed the cost of distribution at deferred capital gains rates.
Whether this shelter possibility should be eliminated entirely is no different than the question of
eliminating inside shelter in general. See supra Part IV.
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taxing moment, the integrationist still views a single level of taxation as the
ideal. In that sense, the additional deferral at the corporate level at least
partially offsets, in present value terms, the excess tax burden of imposing tax
at both corporate and shareholder levels. In some cases the additional deferral
will be a partial correction, and in other cases, an "excessive" correction. The
additional deferral will correct to the effect of a single level of tax only by
happenstance. Given the possibility of undercorrection in these cases and the

overtax in capital gains asset cases, the debt-funded redemption scenario should
not be problematic to the Laissez-Faire Approach.
Even under existing rules, many shareholders can themselves borrow
against the value of their shares without current recognition of income.249 Doing
so is a well-known technique for gaining access to liquidity without current
taxation." The ultimate need to repay out of tax-paid income will measure the
extent of deferral. To the extent that shareholder borrowing is a realistic
alternative, allowing the corporation to borrow in order to fund redemptions

249. See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952)
(concluding that a nonrecourse secured borrowing transaction is not a realization event and does
not increase the taxpayer's basis in the property securing the debt). Likewise, an early Treasury
Regulation provides that "[i] fbonds are issued by a corporation at their face value, the corporation
realizes no gain or loss." Treas. Reg. 62, Article 545 (1922). A further indication of the
longstanding nature of this principle is the early vintage of the doctrine that cancellation of debt
constitutes income, a doctrine premised on the assumption that the receipts of a cash borrowing
transaction are not subject to tax. For example, the same Treasury Regulation quoted above
provides that if "the corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a price less than the
issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value over the purchase price
is gain or income for the taxable year." Id. See also United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S.
1, 3 (1931) (holding that a corporation recognizes income to the extent that it repurchases its own
bonds for less than their issue price). See Polito, supra note 17, at 481-513 (setting forth an
extensive consideration of the issue of nontaxable borrowing transactions).
250. Promotional literature of the Private Client Services Group of Goldman, Sachs & Co.
indicates that:
This Group is routinely asked to make presentations for clients who own
concentrated stock positions on the innovative strategies that are available
to monetize, diversify or hedge a stock position without selling the stock and
incurring a taxable gain .... [and the] alternatives available to a client with
low basis stock, including the following:
-Borrow againstyour stock
-Exchanging the return of your stock for the return of a diversified portfolio
-Exchanging your stock for shares in a diversified fund
-Executing a short sale or a synthetic sale and reinvesting the proceeds in a
diversified portfolio
-Selling unregistered shares to Goldman Sachs
-Hedging your risk with over-the-counter options.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. Promotional Material (June 6, 1994) (on file with the author) (emphasis
added).
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that trigger capital gains taxation at the shareholder level would provide

significantly less deferral benefit than allowing nontaxable shareholder
borrowing against the value of their own shares.
From an integrationist perspective, capital gains treatment for cash
redemption transactions is, on balance, unproblematic in the sense that it is
nearer to the ideal than is dividend treatment of those transactions.2"' What
about redemptions in exchange for property? Existing law requires corporations to recognize gain with respect to appreciated property just as if the
property were sold for its fair market value. To obtain capital gains treatment
at the shareholder level, the corporation would need to trigger a recognition
event at the corporate level. As such, the existing mechanisms for converting
redemption transactions into dividends for tax purposes are not necessary. For
the Laissez-Faire Approach, section 302, which currently specifies which
corporate redemptions qualify for sale treatment, could be safely amended to
read that all stock redemptions are to be treated as stock sales.252
1.

Corollary Provisions

This modification safely allows for the outright repeal of provisions that
prevent attempts to bypass existing section 302. Section 303 allows limited
253
sale treatment for redemptions in connection with the settling of estate taxes.
The proposed amendment to section 302 would make it redundant. Section 304
subjects stock purchases through related corporations to the dividend
equivalence tests of section 302.254 With the elimination of those tests, it serves

251. It seems likely that many publicly traded corporations are already able to produce this
functional result via open market purchases of their own shares. Given the anonymity of modem
public markets, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish open market sales in which the
purchaser is the issuer from those in which the purchaser is a third party. As such, applying the
statutory tests for dividend-equivalence is not practicable, and these transactions are undoubtedly
treated as capital gains transactions. Professor Grullon has observed the increasing use of share
repurchases and the declining fraction of total earnings distributed as dividends. Nevertheless, his
data show large-scale simultaneous use of both. Grullon, supra note 33, at 29 (citing
COMPUSTAT, the Standard & Poor's database service, at http://www.compustat.com).
252. A partial reinstatement of the GeneralUtilities doctrine, see infra Part X, proposes to
premise lack of corporate level tax on a distribution of appreciated property only if it is subject
to a full dividend level tax at the shareholder level, which is sufficient tax from the integrationist
perspective. As such, under the limited GeneralUtilities reinstatement, corporations would likely
generally bypass the corporate level gain by triggering the shareholder-level taxable dividend.
Stock redemptions for appreciated property would be rare because, even if treated as capital gains
transactions for shareholders, they would be less tax effective to the corporation and, for that
reason, unproblematic to the tax law. As such, even the limited General Utilitiesreinstatement
should pose no obstacle to the proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 302.
253. I.R.C. § 303 (West 2003).
254. Id. § 304.
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no useful purpose. The same is true for section 306. The so-called preferred

stock bailout, 25 against which it is set, is simply irrelevant in a regime in which
common stock can be redeemed at capital gains rates. In the Laissez-Faire
Approach all three of these provisions should be repealed.
In addition, the modification of section 302 suggests a parallel adjustment
to the treatment of taxable boot consideration in otherwise tax-free corporate
reorganizations. The existing regime polices against reorganization boot

serving the same end as a dividend disguised as a stock redemption. Whether
a distribution of boot has the effect of a dividend distribution..6 is determined
by use of the dividend-redemption tests under existing section 302.257 From an
integrationist perspective, the bailout of corporate earnings at capital gains rates
is no more problematic than in the commonplace stock redemption

circumstance. The applicable provision2. 8 should be repealed. Even if it is not,
the proposed modification of section 302 may have the same effect by
abolishing the tests that serve to treat boot distributions as having the effect of

a dividend distribution.
2.

Liquidation-ReincorporationTransactions

As a corollary, the Laissez-Faire Approach counsels abolishing the "non'
itthe liquidation-reincorporation
and withperspective,
reorganization
divisive
the combination of a
the double taxation
doctrine. D From

255. In the classic preferred stock bailout, a corporation distributes a class of redeemable
non-voting preferred stock on a pro rata basis to its existing common stockholders. The
distribution itself is not taxable, Id. § 305(a), and the shareholders reallocate a fraction of their
basis from common stock to the preferred stock, Id. § 307(a). The shareholders sell the preferred
stock to a third party at par value, recognizing taxable gain at capital gains rates. The preferred
stock has no voting rights and its sale to the third party purchaser has no effect on corporate
control. Later, the stock is redeemed at par, but because the third party purchaser takes a basis in
the preferred stock equal to its par value, its taxable income is limited to the preferred stock
dividends. In effect, the original shareholders have received corporate earnings at capital gains
rates without losing any voting control of the corporation. See Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207
F.2d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 1953).
256. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (West 2003) (stating that if an exchange has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend it is taxable as such.
257. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 732-34 & nn. 5-6 (1989). In as much as Clark
adopted an interpretation of I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) less likely to produce dividend treatment than an
alternate interpretation available to the Court, see Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 286
(5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979), it advances the integrationist agenda and is
consistent with the Laissez-Faire Approach.
258. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (West 2003).
259. The repeal would be effected by repealing reference to I.R.C. § 354 in I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(D) and vice versa. In addition, the applicable definition of corporate control, I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(H)(i), would be subject to repeal as being redundant.
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liquidation and the reincorporation of the corporation's operating assets, minus
the former corporation's earnings, is problematic. This allows earnings to be
removed from the corporation at capital gains rates. The so-called "non-divisive
D reorganization" polices against this possibility. The liquidationreincorporation transaction is treated as a "tax-free" reorganization,26 in which
the unreincorporated assets are taxable boot that is normally taxable at ordinary
income tax rates.2 6 ' The proposed elimination of dividend treatment for boot in
reorganizations would effectively negate the effect of this regime, suggesting
in turn the outright abolition of the "non-divisive D reorganization." Removing
previously taxed earnings at capital gains rates is not problematic for the
Laissez-Faire Approach.262
B.

Changes in ProportionalOwnership

If all stock redemptions are treated as sales, it is possible for a corporation
selectively to redeem stock from shareholders who prefer additional cash at the
cost of triggering capital gains taxation.263 Even without more, such a program
would increase the proportionate ownership shares of nonredeeming
shareholders, without current taxation for shareholders increasing their
proportionate interests in the corporation's assets and earnings. The question
naturally following is whether that prospect should be seen as troubling for the
Laissez-Faire Approach.
From a double taxation perspective, tax-free increases in proportionate
equity can be seen as economic substitutes for the reinvestment of dividend
distributions. The fractionally increased share in the corporation can be
redeemed later or sold at capital gains tax rates. The double taxation
perspective finds this combination of tax treatments troubling because it allows
the possibility of reducing the ordinary, second-level tax rate on dividends to
capital gains taxation. It is for this reason that many stock dividends are treated
as ordinary taxable dividend distributions.264
For the full pass-through model of partnership taxation, selective
distributions by the partnership present a problem solely because income
character as ordinary and capital gains is passed through to partners. Each

260. Id. §§ 368(a)(1)(D), 354(b)(1).
261. See id. § 356.
262. See supra Part VII, section A.
263. See supra note 251 (discussing Professor Grullon's observations).
264. I.R.C. § 305(b)-(c) (West 2003). Moreover, the double taxation perspective treats a
transaction equivalent to the reinvestment of cash dividends as an appropriate circumstance to
impose the second level of tax on corporate earnings, even if every shareholder elects to receive
stock. See id. § 305(b)(1).
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partner is expected to share in both capital and ordinary income character
assets, and therefore, distributions that allow individual partners to avoid their
shares of ordinary income are problematic.265
For the Laissez-Faire Approach, however, these issues are not a concern.
The Laissez-Faire Approach accepts the double taxation of earnings in some
circumstances only because it seeks to avoid the complexity and burden of
establishing full integration. To the extent it is not able to eliminate the
shareholder-level second tax on earnings, it views that tax as excess tax burden.
As such, increases of proportional interests that convert ordinary dividends to
capital gains are not problematic. Moreover, the Laissez-Faire Approach is not
a partnership model full pass-through regime. Character of individual items is
accounted for at the corporate level;266 therefore, changes in shareholders'
economic claims on individual corporate assets pose no special problem.
Thus, for the Laissez-Faire Approach, capital gains taxation for selective
stock redemptions does not present any concerns with respect to the
nonredeeming shareholders. Redemptions for some shareholders never need
to result in taxation for nonredeeming shareholders.267 By extension, stock
dividends should never be taxable, regardless of how they affect proportionate
interests or whether they are optional in lieu of cash or property dividends.26
The existing Code's treatment of stock dividends may be limited to the general
rule of nontaxation for stock dividends.269
C. Spin-Off Transactions

A further target for reform under the Laissez-Faire Approach is the
nontaxable spin-off transaction. The prototypical spin-off transaction allows a
single corporate enterprise to be split into two or more corporate entities, either
by the distribution of the stock of one or more existing subsidiaries to
shareholders, or by the transfer of corporate assets to one or more newly formed
subsidiaries immediately before the distribution of the new subsidiary stock to

265. See id. § 751.
266. Existing law does provide for a corporate capital gains preference, but it is of minimal
significance, applying only to corporations with a marginal tax rate of more than 35%. See id.
§ 1201 (a). If the benefits of inside shelter are eliminated via the imposition of single corporate tax
rate, see supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text, there would be no capital gains preference
for corporate asset sales.
267. Contra I.R.C. § 305(c) (West 2003) (authorizing dividend taxation of nonredeeming
shareholders if redemptions for other shareholders are treated as dividends and the combined
effect is to alter proportionate interests).
268. Contraid. § 305(b), (c).
269. Id. § 305(a). This change would no doubt need to be effected by the Congressional
repeal of subsections (b) and (c) of section 305.
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shareholders.2 7 ° Under existing law, all of these transactions are nontaxable

transactions, where untaxed gain is preserved for subsequent taxation, 27' but
only if a number of specific conditions are satisfied.
Under a double-tax regime, a significant concern is that the spin-off
transaction will be used to isolate liquid assets or passive investments in a
separate corporate entity from the operating business as a preparatory step to
the disposition ofthe liquid-asset corporation's stock at capital gains rate. Such

a bailout technique would give shareholders access to the value of earnings and
profits at capital gains tax rates, which is problematic for a double-tax
perspective. Given, however, that the Laissez-Faire Approach has no objection
to the bailout of corporate earnings and profits at shareholders' capital gains tax
rates and seeks intentionally to facilitate that practice,272 limitations on spin-off
transactions are unnecessary to the extent that they serve to prevent that very
end. The first most obvious candidate is the requirement that the transaction not
be used principally as a device for the distribution of earnings.273 This

restriction is unnecessary from the integrationist perspective and should be
repealed.
A second candidate is the active-business requirement274 which requires,
in general, that both the corporation distributing stock and the controlled
corporation 27" be engaged (at the time of the distribution) in an active trade or
business that was not begun or purchased within the five years immediately
preceding the distribution. 276 The primary function of this provision is to
prevent the bailout of earnings and profits at capital gains rates. It does so by

270. In the former case, the transaction is a "pure" spin-off. In the latter case, it is termed
a "divisive D reorganization," see id. § 368(a)(1)(D). An alternative form is the "split-off' in
which the stock distribution is exchanged for existing stock and/or non-pro rata among existing
shareholders. A further alternative is the "split-up" in which stock of two or more subsidiaries is
distributed in exchange for all of the stock of the distributing corporation. The distributing
corporation thereby liquidates, and it is completely replaced by the corporations whose stock is
distributed. See id. § 355(a)(2); see also DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY S. LEHMAN, CORPORATE
INCOME TAXATION 647-49 (4th ed. 1994) (explaining the differences between "spin-offs," "splitoffs and split-ups"). For purposes of this Article, the term "spin-off' is used as a general term to
refer to all of these related transactions.
271. I.R.C. § 358(a)-(c) (West 2003) (allocating predistribution basis between stock retained in the distributing corporation and stock received in distributed corporation).
272. See supra Part VII, Section A.
273. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (West 2003).
274. Id. § 355(a)(1)(C).
275. The term "controlled corporation" refers to the corporation whose stock is distributed.
Id. § 355(a)(1)(A). The term is used in that sense throughout the discussion of spin-off
transactions.
276. Id. § 355(b). The requirement is also satisfied if the distributing corporation was purely
a holding company predistribution and each of the spun-off subsidiaries meets the active business
requirement. Id. § 355(b)(1)(B).
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preventing a corporation from converting earnings and profits into a distinct
business for the purpose of spinning-off the new business in a form that allows
its disposition at capital gains rates. In this regard, the provision is unnecessary
from the perspective of the Laissez-Faire Approach and should also be
repealed.277
Another set of issues relates to the two structures targeted at the use of a
spin-off as a step in a plan to dispose of control of either the distributing
corporation or the controlled corporation either in advance of the spin-off
distribution or after the spin-off distribution.27 8 These provisions are based on
the premise that, in a double tax regime, a disposition of a part of a
corporation's enterprise ought to trigger corporate-level taxation. For the
Laissez-Faire Approach, these provisions raise two distinct sets of questions:
timing of gain taxation and character of gain taxation.
The timing issue relates to whether the structured combination of a
nontaxable spin-off of assets and a disposition should terminate tax deferral at
the corporate level. The stock disposition leg of the transaction is either a
nontaxable reorganization279 or a taxable stock disposition, which is normally
taxable at capital gains rates. Given the integrationist paradigm of a single level
of tax at the tax rates that would apply to shareholders if they held the corporate
assets directly, it cannot be said that the full normative tax burden will have
been imposed in every case. In some cases, the tax will have been deferred
entirely, and in another set of cases stock representing claims on ordinaryincome assets will have been disposed of at capital gains rates. At some time,
however, the corporation will presumably need to dispose of the assets, which
will trigger full taxation at the corporate level at that future time.28 0
If this theory is true, the question is whether the use of the spin-off to
dispose of a portion of the corporate assets should end the deferral of the
corporate-level taxation. One view is that the disposition of the entire
corporation would not necessarily trigger corporate-level gain under the
existing regime, and therefore, the stock disposition of a portion of the
corporation is no more justifiable an occasion for a corporate-level realization.
Even if the spin-off-connected disposition is viewed as the proper taxing

277. Elimination of these requirements also suggests a significant liberalization of the
"business purpose" requirement. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (as amended in 1992).
278. I.R.C. § 355(d)-(e) (West 2003); see also BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 16,
§ 11.11 [2]-[3] (noting that the purpose of § 355(d) is to prevent "disguised corporate-level tax
free 'sales"' through the use of § 355 dividends).
279. I.R.C. § 368(a) (West 2003).
280. If appreciated assets are distributed via the limited reinstatement of the General
Utilities doctrine, the disposition will generate only a single level of tax, which is at the
shareholder level tax rates. See infra Part X. From an integrationist perspective, however, that tax
is a sufficient single tax.
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moment, the integrationist still views a single level of taxation as the ideal. In
that sense, the additional deferral at the corporate level at least partially offsets,
in present value terms, the excess tax burden of imposing tax at both corporate
and shareholder levels. The additional deferral will be a partial correction in
some cases and an "excessive" correction in other cases. The additional deferral
will be a correction that effects a single level of tax only by happenstance.
Given that the Laissez-Faire Approach addresses itself primarily to the
elimination or reduction of the excess corporate tax burden, and not to the
question of timing and deferral, the approach should remain agnostic as to this
question.
A potential problem of characterization arises out of the interaction of not
triggering corporate-level gain in these spin-off-connected dispositions and
eliminating the active business requirement for nontaxable spin-offs. Without
an active business requirement, it is conceivable that ordinary-income assets,
insufficient to constitute an active business, could be spun-off and sold without
triggering a full, ordinary rate tax.28 ' Even if a capital gains tax is triggered at
the shareholder level, it is possible that successive transfers of these assets
through stock sales could be used to defer full, ordinary rate taxation
indefinitely. Such a stratagem might come very near to the conversion of
ordinary income assets into capital gains assets. For this reason, it should be
consistent with the Laissez-Faire Approach's premises to retain the corporatelevel taxation for spin-off-connected dispositions if the active business
requirement is eliminated; or instead, to retain the latter and eliminate the
former. In the alternative, the existing recognition regimes for spin-offconnected dispositions could be modified to impose recognition of gain only
to the extent of the net appreciation for ordinary income assets effectively
disposed of in the spin-off- connected transaction.
D. The Foreign ShareholderProblem
A potential objection relates to the taxation of foreign taxpayers.
Dividends are United States source income if paid by United States
corporations or foreign corporations with substantial United States source
income."' Sale of corporate stock, however, is generally sourced to the
residence of the taxpayer.283 A permissive policy of allowing corporations to
convert dividends into stock sales could have the effect, therefore, of

281.
receivable
282.
283.

A corporation might use this technique to spin-off and sell assets such as accounts
or inventories.
I.R.C. § 861(a)(2) (West 2003).
Id. § 865.
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converting taxable United States source dividends into non-taxable foreignsource stock sale transactions.
A relatively simple correction to this problem would be to treat a stock sale
as generating United States source income if dividends distributed by the same
corporation would be United States source income. This resolution is
potentially subject to the criticism of being overbroad because it would impose
United States source income treatment on "legitimate" stock sales that would
generate foreign-source income under existing law. Public trading of stock,
however, could mitigate this problem. Closely held enterprises already have the
option of pass-through treatment,284 and the double tax regime is mandatory
only for publicly traded enterprises.28 As such, this sourcing rule would be
avoidable by all but publicly traded corporations. The liquidity and record
keeping of public trading mitigates the harshness of imposing United States
sourcing. Stockbrokers could be made responsible to withhold a tax on the
gain or the gross sales price if sellers fail to report basis numbers.
Nevertheless, it might be desirable to create a more narrowly focused
resolution. Characterization as United States source income might be targeted
to distributions from a corporation as part of a liquidation or in redemption of
its own stock or a related company's stock, but only if a dividend by the paying
corporation would be United States source income. Stock received in tax-free
distributions could be marked to generate United States source income on
disposition, or the tax-free character of the distribution could be limited to
distributions to shareholders subject to United States worldwide taxation. The
value of greater refinement needs to be balanced, however, against a concern
about reintroducing legal and administrative complications paralleling those
targeted for elimination under the Laissez-Faire Approach. Regardless of how
closely targeted these refinements should be, the problem of foreign
shareholders should not detract from the general proposition that, from an
integrationist perspective, permissive stock sale treatment for redemptions is a
positive step.
VIII.

FORMER COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION REGIME

Another issue that poses a problem for a double-taxation perspective, but
that was never a real problem for an integrationist, is the collapsible
corporation. Congress, however, has addressed this issue and
acted-temporarily at least-in a manner consistent with the Laissez-Faire
Approach. From the double-taxation perspective, a business operated in

284. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).

285. See I.R.C. § 7704 (West 2003).
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corporate form should generate operating profits taxable as ordinary income at
the corporate level and, by and large, dividends taxable as ordinary income at
the shareholder level. The combination of the historic General Utilities
doctrine286 and the treatment of liquidations, however, made it possible to
bypass this treatment. The shareholders of a liquidating corporation recognized
capital gains income on the surrender of their shares. The corporation
recognized no gain or loss on the liquidating distribution because of the
General Utilities doctrine, but the shareholders received a fair market value
basis in the property. Shareholders were then able to sell the distributed
property without recognizing further gain. In effect, the collapsing of the
corporation converted a double-level ordinary income rate tax regime into a
single-level capital gains rate regime.287
Congress responded with the collapsible corporation provision,28 which
reverses this result for:
[A] corporation formed or availed of principally for the
manufacture, construction, or production of property, for the
purchase of [ordinary income property or trade or business
property held for less than three years] ... or for the holding

of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of, with a view
to(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its
shareholders (whether in liquidation or otherwise), or
a distribution to its shareholders, before the
realization by the corporation manufacturing,
constructing, producing, or purchasing the property
of 2/3 of the taxable income to be derived from such
property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain
289
attributable to such property.
From the integrationist perspective of the Laissez-Faire Approach, however,
this provision is entirely unnecessary. Under existing law, the removal of assets
from the corporation, by liquidation or otherwise, triggers two levels of

286. See Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
287. See, e.g., KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 270, at 374-76 (discussing the use of a "collapsible" corporation as used prior to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.) An alternative
route to the same result was the disposition of the corporation's stock at capital gains tax rates,
permitting the liquidation of the corporation without further taxation. Id.
288. I.R.C. § 341 (West 2003).
289. Id. § 341(b)(1).
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taxation. The liquidation of the corporation results in the imposition of a
corporate-level tax on unrealized appreciation in assets290 and a capital gains
tax on the surrender of shareholders' stock.29' From an integrationist
perspective, this results in more than the ideal tax, which would be a single
level of tax. In short, the Laissez-Faire Approach counsels that Congress was

right to repeal the collapsible corporation rule29 2 and would have been right to
do so even if it had not acted to subject dividends temporarily to capital gains
tax rates.293 For the Laissez-Faire Approach, the only remaining objection is the
scheduled sunset of the repeal.294
IX. PENALTY TAX REGIMES

Concerns about retention of earnings within corporate solution are largely
nonexistent from an integrationist perspective. If inside shelter is fully
eliminated,295 the full normative tax, and perhaps more, will be borne by all

corporate earnings. As such, mechanisms designed to limit the use of corporate
retention of earnings to minimize double taxation would be wholly
the accumulated
unnecessary. The Laissez-Faire Approach counsels repeal 2of
97
296 and the personal holding company regime.
tax
earnings

Even if inside shelter is not fully eliminated, the progressive minimization
298
of its significance suggests at least modification of these penalty tax regimes.
Given that a single shareholder-rate level of tax is normative for the

integrationist agenda, the greatest penalty tax that can be justified for the

290. Id. § 336.
291. See id. § 331.
292. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302
(e)(4)(A), 117 Stat. 752, 763.
293. Id. § 303, 117 Stat. at 764. Under a limited reinstatement of the General Utilities
doctrine, assets could be removed from the corporation without corporate-level taxation only by
triggering a full ordinary-rate shareholder-level tax. See infra Part X. From the integrationist
perspective, that single level of taxation is sufficient.
294. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 303,
117 Stat. 752, 764.
295. See supra Part IV, section C.
296. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 2003).
297. Id. §§ 541-547. This discussion does not address regimes applicable to earnings
retained in a foreign corporation not subject to United States corporate income taxation and
subject to relatively low tax rates abroad, for whichjustifications unrelated to integrationism may
exist. Id. §§ 551-558 (providing for foreign personal holding company rules); Id. §§ 951-964
(providing for controlled foreign corporation rules); Id. § 1248 (regarding disposition of stock in
certain foreign corporations); Id. §§ 1291-1987 (providing for passive foreign investment
company rules). See Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1324-25 (discussing the regime for
international corporate taxation).
298. I.R.C. §§ 531, 541 (West 2003).
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inappropriate retention of earnings in corporate solution is a tax equal to the
benefit of the lower corporate tax brackets as compared to a flat rate corporate
tax imposed at the maximum individual income tax rate. As such, even if
inside shelter is not fully eliminated, the penalty taxes should be reduced
accordingly. In practice, this additional tax revenue may be so slight as not to
justify the administrative burden of retaining these regimes.
Further, in the absence of legislative correction of these regimes, the
Laissez-Faire Approach counsels leniency in the application of these penalty
tax regimes. Courts are urged to interpret these statutory regimes to minimize
their applicability. For the IRS, a practice of benign neglect with respect to the
policing of these regimes is consistent with the goals of the Laissez-Faire
Approach. Here again, this Article remains agnostic as to the authority to act
administratively or judicially in this manner.299
X.

LIMITED REINSTATEMENT OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE?

For a perspective that makes the double taxation of corporate earnings
normative, the General Utilities doctrine, 00 even in its most innocuous
manifestation, was both anomalous and troubling.3 ' 1In that case, a corporation
distributed appreciated assets as a dividend and recognized no gain. The
shareholders were taxed on the full value of the asset as dividend distribution 30 2
and, at least in the case of noncorporate taxpayers, took a basis in the assets

299. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
300. See Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
301. See, James B. Lewis, A Proposed New Treatmentfor CorporateDistribution and
Sales in Liquidation, in 3 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 1643 (Comm. Print 1959)
(critizing the GeneralUtilities doctrine and offering reform proposals); A.L.I. FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C, PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND
REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 102-19 (1982) (discussing cost-basis
transfers and proposing to revise the General Utilities decision by requiring corporations to
recognize gain or loss on any corporate distribution of assets to shareholders where basis does not
carry over); Clark, supra note 16, at 90, 152 (discussing the consequences of the GeneralUtilities
doctrine and suggesting reform of the doctrine); Bernard Wolfman, CorporateDistributionsof
AppreciatedProperty:The Case of Repeal ofthe General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 81, 87-88 (1985) (favoring repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine); George K. Yin,
General UtilitiesRepeal: Is Tax Reform Really Going to PassIt By? 31 TAX NOTES 1111, 1121
(1986) (rejecting arguments in favor of the General Utilities doctrine and concluding that
congressional tax reform in 1986 was improved by the repeal of the GeneralUtilities decision).
302. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 202-203. The text assumes sufficient earnings and
profits to classify the entire distribution as a dividend. See I.R.C. § 301(c) (West 2003).
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30 3
equal to their fair market value. Although the distribution was fully taxable
at the shareholder level as dividend, the fair market value basis granted in the
assets ensured that the appreciation would not be subject to a second level of
tax.
Given the capital gains tax rate applied to dividends under the 2003 Tax
30 4
the General Utilities doctrine could be seen as problematic even from
Act,
an integrationist perspective. If a corporation recognizes no gain on the
distribution of appreciated property, even ordinary income property, and
shareholders are taxed at capital gains rates; the reinstatement of General
Utilities would allow the conversion of ordinary income items into capital gains
rate property. From the integrationist perspective, the single-level shareholder
tax on corporate items should be taxed according to their characterization at the
corporate level, as is the case of the pass-through tax treatment of partners and
their partnerships.30 5 As such, blanket capital gains treatment for dividends
without corporate level taxation for distributions of appreciated assets are
difficult to justify in combination.
On the other hand, from the integrationist perspective, if the value of the
asset is taxable income to shareholders subject to ordinary income tax rates as
dividend, no corporate-level tax is indicated. As such, a limited reinstatement
of the General Utilities doctrine is advisable if the capital gains rate for
dividends is allowed to expire" or if the reinstatement is limited to the
distribution of assets that are capital gains assets in the corporation's hands.
If the capital gains rate is allowed to expire, this limited step would require
a minor amendment of section 31 (b) to provide that a corporate distribution
of appreciated property would trigger gain only to the extent that it is not
treated as a dividend distribution under section 301; that is, to the extent that
the dividend distribution exceeds the corporation's current and accumulated
earnings and profits. In the absence of that expiration, the distribution of
appreciated property would be limited to corporate capital gains property. This
minor step would allow corporations to act themselves to mitigate the excess
tax burden of the double tax regime without the need to create additional tax
regimes. At the same time, reinstating the GeneralUtilitiesdoctrine only to this
limited extent would prevent its use, in combination with the capital gains

303. GeneralUtilities, 296 U.S. at 202-203. Full market value basis was not available in

all cases to corporate distributees. TECHNICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE ACT OF 1988, S.
Rep. No. 100-445, at 61, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2320.

304. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302,
117 Stat. 752, 760-64.

305. I.R.C. § 702(b) (West 2003).
306. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 § 303, 117 Stat. at 764.
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preference," 7 to create a form of "corporate shelter" in which corporate
earnings would be subject to a lower tax burden than noncorporate earnings."'
A. PotentialObjections and Responses

A potential objection concerns the distribution of assets subject to debt in
excess of their basis. Under existing law, the taxable amount of a dividend
distributed in property is the fair market value of the property reduced by the
amount of debt to which the property is subject or that the shareholders
assume.30 9 At the same time, the shareholder's basis in the property is its fair

market value.3" 0 Therefore, in the absence of corporate-level recognition, an

amount of accrued gain equal to the excess of debt over basis would not be
taxed at all.

This problem can be avoided by careful drafting of the statutory language
to strictly limit General Utilitiesreinstatement to amounts treated as dividends

under section 301. The existing statutory definition of the amount distributed
reduces the value of the property by the excess of debt over basis.3 1' Careful
exclusion of that excess from the definition of the "distribution treated as a

dividend distribution under section 301" should serve to exclude that excess
from the benefit of a limited General Utilitiesreinstatement, which would be

the equivalent of reenacting the substance of section 311(c) as it existed
immediately before the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. 312 Under that provision, a corporation distributing
appreciated property recognized gain equal to the excess of debt over basis, but
not more than the excess of fair market value over basis if the shareholder did
not assume the debt to which the property was subject." 3

307. I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2003).
308. If this limited reinstatement of the General Utilities doctrine were pursued, § 355(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code would need to be amended to conform with that change.
309. Id. § 301(b).
310. Id. § 301(d).
311. Id. § 301(b)(2)(B).
312. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 63 1(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2272.
313. Former § 311 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code provided as follows:
(c) LIABILITY INEXCESS OF BASIS.-If(1) a corporation distributes property to a shareholder with respect to
its stock,
(2) such property is subject to a liability, or the shareholder assumes
a liability of the corporation in connection with the distribution, and
(3) the amount of such liability exceeds the adjusted basis (in the hands
of the distributing corporation) of such property, then gain shall be
recognized to the distributing corporation in an amount equal to such excess
as if the property distributed had been sold at the time of the distribution. In
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Another potential objection arises with respect to intercorporate
distributions of appreciated assets that are eligible for a dividends-received
deduction. 314 The effect of the dividends-received deduction is that the full
shareholder-level tax is deferred until the amounts involved are distributed out
of corporate solution entirely. At the same time, the recipient corporation takes
35
enabling it to dispose of the asset
a fair market value basis in the asset,
without incurring corporate-level tax. This possibility of removing the asset
from corporate solution without gain and without triggering shareholder-level
tax would convert the limited General Utilities reinstatement into a form of
inside tax shelter. This problem, however, can be corrected without any major
reworking of the code. Limiting the dividends-received deduction to
distributions of cash316 would be a simple enough matter.
B. Selective Distributions
Another potential objection concerns selective distribution strategies.
Corporations will distribute appreciated assets without recognizing corporatelevel gain and dispose of loss assets to use the losses against corporate
operating profits that would otherwise be subject to dividend taxation at the
shareholder level. Allowing this strategy is only problematic, however, if one
adopts a double taxation paradigm. From that perspective, loss assets should
offset gain assets at the corporate level, which would ensure the double taxation
of corporate earnings on distribution.
From an integration perspective this scenario is not problematic. An
integrationist perspective calls for each item of profit, gain, or loss to be
accounted for just once. In a full pass-through regime, all of these items are

the case of a distribution of property subject to a liability which is not
assumed by the shareholder, the amount of gain to be recognized under the
preceding sentence shall not exceed the excess, if any, of the fair market
value of such property over its adjusted basis.
I.R.C. § 311 (c). An alternative approach would be to repeal the rule reducing the amount of the
distribution by the associated debts assumed or to which the property is taken subject. Id.
§ 31 1(b)(2). In the context of this program, that repeal would in some cases increase the amount
subject to shareholder-level capital gains taxation, id. § 301(c)(3), and also increase the amount
subject to corporate-level taxation because of being excluded from the limited General Utilities
reinstatement.
314. See I.R.C. §§ 243-246 (West 2003). Under existing law, not all intercorporate
dividends are fully deductible by the recipient corporation. See, however, supra Part VI for a
proposal to increase the dividends received deduction to 100% of the dividend for all domestic
corporations.
315. I.R.C. § 301(d) (West 2003).
316. For these purposes, the distribution of the corporation's own promissory note should
be regarded as a distribution of cash. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
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netted against each other at the shareholder level. Whether the loss assets offset
gain assets or other profits is irrelevant because all items ought to be netted
against one another in calculating the amount subject to a single level of tax.
For appreciated assets, the limited reinstatement of the General Utilities
regime imposes the appropriate single level of tax at the shareholder level. The
use of losses accrued on other assets at the corporate level to offset other
corporate profits results in no less income subject to taxation than would be the
case in a pass-through regime, in which the entity would be entitled to
selectively recognize losses for use against operating profits and pass both
through to shareholders. The residual flexibility of selective recognition of
losses is an artifact of transactionalism's realization-predicated definition of
taxable income and not of the integrationist agenda.
C. PrenegotiatedSales Transactionsand Deemed Distributions
Under the historic GeneralUtilities regime, the sale of assets immediately
after their distribution created a troubling question of line drawing. If
distributed assets were subsequently sold by recipient shareholders in an
independent transaction, the subsequent sale did not affect the exemption of the
distribution itself from corporate-level tax.317 If, however, the sequence of
distribution and sale was recharacterized in economic substance to be a
disguised sale by the corporation in order to fund the distribution, tax was
imposed at both corporate and shareholder levels.318 This distinction was
thought necessary because the General Utilities doctrine was viewed as an
exception to the norm of double taxation.3 19
From the integrationist perspective, that distinction is counterproductive
and not necessary. The removal of assets from corporate solution, so long as
subject to an appropriate shareholder-level tax, ought not to trigger a corporatelevel tax even if the asset is immediately sold to a third party. The shareholderlevel tax is the sufficient taxation of the asset.
If prenegotiated sales by shareholders are recharacterized as corporate
sales, the recharacterization serves only to limit arbitrarily the benefit of this
limited General Utilities doctrine to circumstances in which shareholders are
able to hold the distributed assets usefully themselves or to negotiate
independent dispositions of the assets. In practice this limits the efficacy of the
restored General Utilities doctrine as an integration device, especially in the
317. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 455 (1950) (holding sale
by stockholders not taxable as a sale by the distributing corporation).
318. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (treating formal sale

by stockholders taxable as actual sale by corporation).
319. CumberlandPub. Serv. Co., 333 U.S. at 454-55.
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case of widely held corporations,32 ° whose shareholders would have difficulty

organizing a sale of the distributed assets in which they each hold small
interests.
Professor Wolfinan once objected to viewing the General Utilitiesdoctrine
as a partial-integration mechanism. He questioned whether:
[The General Utilities doctrine] [i]s .

.

. anything like the

partial integration system we would want if we set out to
create one? We have opportunities for some corporations
some of the time to avoid the corporate tax while others are
never able to do so. Can one call that a "system" of partial
integration or anything else? 32'

The answer to his objection is, in the integrationist perspective, not the full
elimination of the General Utilities doctrine, but the elimination of doctrines
that arbitrarily limit its availability as an integration device. Whatever may be
said of the substance over form doctrine more generally, its application in this
22
area is inappropriate. As such, its application in cases such as CourtHolding
ought to be set aside.323
A potential objection is the wasted transactional costs of inducing
corporations to negotiate asset sales to a point just short of consummation,
distribute assets, and cause the consummation of the sale in the form of a sale
by shareholders. This is indeed a real objection, but there is a simple response.
A mechanism ought to be created by which a corporation is deemed to have
distributed appreciated assets to shareholders (triggering dividend taxation for
the shareholders), and the shareholders are deemed to have returned the assets
to the corporation as capital contributions. The deemed distribution would
trigger the appropriate single-level shareholder tax. The shareholders' fair

320. This is the most significant case because the availability ofpass-through tax treatment
for closely held enterprises largely resolves the double-tax problem for those enterprises.
321. Wolfman, supra note 301, at 85. See also Yin, supra note 301, at 1114 ("[I]t is
difficult to see how the General Utilities doctrine can be seen as effecting a system of partial
integration.").
322. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334 (treating formal sale by stockholders taxable as
actual sale by corporation).
323. As in other cases, this Article brackets the question of which actors have the authority
to accomplish this result. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. Congress could clearly
accomplish this result legislatively, and the Supreme Court has the authority to reverse the
doctrine when an appropriate case presents itself (bracketing stare decisisconcerns for purposes
of this article). Whether the Service has the authority to set aside the substance over form doctrine
for these circumstances is an issue for another day.
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market value basis in the assets324 would ensure no further shareholder taxation
on the retransfer with or without the application of nonrecognition for asset
transfers by controlling shareholders.325 The transferred basis of the deemed
recontributed asset326 would ensure no second level of tax at the corporate level.
The net result is the appropriate one. The corporation disposes of the
appreciated asset triggering a single level of tax at the shareholder level.
The creation of such a mechanism should not create any significant
complication for the tax regime.327 Implementing the mechanism requires no
more record keeping, compliance, or administrative burden than does the
existing regime, where a distributing corporation is deemed to have sold an
asset for its fair market value3 28 or where a newly acquired 80% subsidiary
elects to be treated as having sold all of its assets for their fair market values. 2 9
In exchange for creating one more deemed transaction regime, the integration
benefits of General Utilities would be easily extended to all corporations
holding appreciated assets.
D. LiquidatingDistributions
Under the existing regime, in a nonsubsidiary liquidation a liquidating
corporation generally recognizes corporate level gain or loss with respect to all
of its assets,33 ° and the corporation's shareholders are treated as having
disposed of their shares in a taxable exchange.'
Thus, previously
unrecognized gain is subject to both a full corporate-level tax and a capital
gains rate tax at the shareholder level. From the integrationist perspective, this
is more than the ideal level of tax, which would be the full, individual level of
tax. 332

324. I.R.C. § 301(d) (West 2003).
325. Id. § 351.
326. Id. § 362(a).
327. Once again, this Article brackets the authority question implicit in this proposal. See
supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
328. I.R.C. § 311 (b) (West 2003).
329. Id. § 338.
330. Id. § 336.
331. Id. § 331.
332. In theory, the inside shelter created by corporate tax rates below the maximum individual tax rate could cause the combined tax to be less than the full, individual ordinary-tax rate, but
that possibility is remote. In particular, if c is the relevant marginal corporate tax rate, g is the
shareholder's capital gains tax rate, andp is the individual's marginal tax rate, then this possibility
exists only if (1-c)(-g) > (l-p), which implies that c < 1-[(1-p)/(1-g)]. Ifp = 35%, andg = 20%,
such inside shelter is available only for c < 18.75%, if g = 15%, inside shelter is available for c
< 23.53%. Thus, inside shelter for liquidations is only available for corporations whose marginal
corporate tax rate is significantly below the individual ordinary-tax rate. Moreover, a program of
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Under the Laissez-Faire Approach, corporations would likely attempt to
bypass this result through the formal structuring of liquidating distributions. In
anticipation of liquidation, the corporations would distribute appreciated assets
as dividends to the extent eligible for corporate nontaxability under the limited
GeneralUtilitiesreinstatement. Thereafter, they would distribute the remaining
assets as a formal liquidating distribution subject to the existing regime.
From the perspective of the Laissez-Faire Approach, this result is not
problematic. The treatment of the formal dividend distribution is the correct
treatment. For noncorporate shareholders, the limited reinstatement of General
Utilities would impose the appropriate single-level shareholder-rate tax. For
corporate shareholders, the repeal of the dividends-received deduction for
334
noncash dividends333 would also ensure at least a single level of tax. The

balance of the liquidating distribution would be subject to gain and loss
recognition at both corporate and shareholder levels. The excess tax burden it
represents is accepted only because of the Laissez-Faire Approach's limitation
to working within the existing regime. As such, the Laissez-Faire Approach
counsels that the Service should make no attempt to reclassify the formally
distinct dividend distribution as part of the corporate liquidation.
XI. REPEAL SECTION 7704?

The preceding proposals would have the effect of eliminating much, if not
most, of the excess burden of the double tax regime. Yet one seemingly
obvious and simple step has been reserved until now. Extension of the checkthe-box philosophy to publicly traded enterprises by the repeal of mandatory
corporate tax treatment of publicly traded partnerships33 presents perhaps the
most obvious element of the Laissez-Faire Approach. The check-the-box
regulations allow a noncorporate entity to elect partnership treatment even if it
has all four of the corporate characteristics.336 The limited liability company
laws of many jurisdictions allow those enterprises to adopt all of the
characteristics traditionally ascribed to corporations. 337 The elimination of this

systematically eliminating the benefit of inside shelter by repealing the lower corporate tax
brackets, see supraPart IV section C, would eliminate this possibility entirely.
333. See supra 314-16 and accompanying text.
334. Full dividend taxation for noncash intercorporate dividend distributions would also
imply the adequacy of the existing regime for subsidiary liquidations, in which neither the parent
nor the subsidiary recognizes gain or loss and the parent assumes the subsidiary's basis in the
assets. I.R.C. §§ 332, 334(b), 337 (West 2003). The proposed regime would create no incentive
to bypass the subsidiary liquidation regime in favor of a taxable dividend distribution.
335. Id. § 7704.
336. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3(as amended in 2001).
337. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 134, 1.01[4].
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mandatory corporate tax treatment via the repeal of section 7704 would allow

full pass-through treatment for businesses that are functionally publicly traded
corporations. As section 7704 stands in opposition to the very pass-through
model of partnership taxation that is the ultimate integrationist paradigm, the
case for its repeal is seemingly obvious.33 Yet there are serious justifications
for maintaining some hesitancy about taking that step, at least in an
unadulterated form.
Although the partnership model is the most nearly perfect form of
corporate tax integration, that model of integration is consistently rejected on
340
administrability grounds.339 The Internal Revenue Code's subchapter C,
which is applicable to taxable corporations, is easier to administer than the

Code's subchapter K341 and its related audit and adjustment provisions,3 42 which
are applicable to partnerships, especially in the case of widely held enterprises.

This is precisely because treating the enterprise as a distinct taxpayer from its
shareholders eliminates the problem of tracing enterprise-level tax events to

individualized investor tax consequences.343 On what basis, therefore, would
one advocate allowing corporations to elect a regime already dismissed as
unadministrable?
Before Congress enacted section 7704, a significant and growing number
of enterprises were organized as master limited partnerships-publicly traded

338. Oddly enough, the Treasury first proposed § 7704 in 1984, at the same time that it was
proposing partial integration in the form of a 50% dividend-paid deduction. See Hobbs,supranote
63, at 504. The logic may have been that, because they were proposing only partial integration for
corporations, the fisc needed to prevent do-it-yourself full integration. In 1986 the Treasury urged
the adoption of § 7704 because, in the absence of a decision to integrate fully, the Treasury felt
obliged to defend the corporate tax base. Id. at 505-06. The Treasury indicated that enterprises
engaged in equivalent activities ought not to face different tax rates. The Treasury's proposal did
not achieve this. To achieve equivalent treatment the Treasury ought to have replaced the
corporate tax with a uniform business activities tax or a fully integrated tax. Id. at 506.
The Treasury also objected to a proposal to allow do-it-yourself integration to the greatest
degree feasible. The Treasury seemed to believe that because the publicly traded partnership
structure was not available to existing corporations without a tax cost, it should not be available
to anyone. That reasoning would deny pass-through treatment for all new business entities because
it would be unavailable to existing C corporations. In any event, the combined effect of the
Laissez-Faire Approach should significantly reduce the Treasury's complaint. However, there is
the additional question of how the Treasury would have replaced the lost revenue. Id. at 507-08.
This is a problem of any integration program to which there are potential solutions. It does not
seem necessary to go into the solutions in this context because that is not necessary to resolve the
problem of organizing an integrationist program, which is what this Article addresses.
339. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
340. I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (West 2003).
341. Id. §§ 701-777.
342. Id. §§ 6221-6255.
343. Marvin F. Milich, MasterLimited Partnerships,20 REALEST. L.J. 54, 65-66 (1991).
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partnerships subject to full partnership tax treatment.3 " Even today, there
remain master limited partnerships-primarily engaged in real estate or natural
resources enterprises 34 -not subject to corporate tax treatment. 346 One might
safely presume that managers of these enterprises concluded that the benefit of
avoiding the excess burden of the double tax regime is greater than the
additional administrative cost incurred by the enterprises that elect partnership
over corporate tax treatment. Such an analysis does not serve by itself,
however, to justify the free election of partnership treatment by publicly traded
enterprises because the private decision makers' calculus of cost and benefit is
not complete.
First, it is not clear that the full benefits of pass-through treatment are
reflected in an enterprise's decision whether to elect pass-through treatment.
Because equity may not bear the full economic incidence of double tax burden,
it may not capture the full benefits pass-through treatment generates in terms
of allocative efficiency. Even if equity does capture the full benefit of such de
facto integration, the well-known agency problems of the Berle-Means
corporation may prevent its full consideration in the decision whether to elect
partnership treatment.347 On the other hand, a failure to elect pass-through
treatment may well create no more allocative distortions than exist in the
current regime and can be safely ignored.
A second, and more serious concern, is that an enterprise electing
partnership treatment is unlikely to bear the full incremental burden imposed
by the election of partnership treatment. It seems clear that the administration
of the partnership tax rules is more burdensome to fiscal authorities than the
administration of the corporate tax rules." This administrative concern was
one of the Treasury's justifications for the 1987"'9 adoption of section 7704.
Among the cited objections were:
(1) [T]he allocation of pre-contribution gain or loss to the
contributing partner under section 704(c); (2) determining

344. See Hobbs, supra note 63, at 502-05.
345. See I.R.C. § 7704(c)-(d) (West 2003). See also Hobbs, supra note 63, at 509 ("An

MLP is still taxed as a partnership if it derives ninety percent of its gross income from natural
resources or real estate." (citing I.R.C. § 7704(c) (1988))).
346. I.R.C. § 7704(c) (West 2003).
347. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. A rehearsal of those problems at this
juncture, however, would be a needless digression.
348. See William S. McKee, Master Limited Partnerships,260 PRAC. LAW INSTIT. 155,

175-79 (1987).
349. Hobbs, supra note 63, at 506-09, 507-08 n.471. "It is interesting to note that.., the
Treasury... had [previously] insisted that there were no difficulties in applying subchapter K to
large partnerships." Id. at 507-08 n.471.
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basis adjustments under sections 743(b) and 754; and (3)
whether there had been a constructive termination under
section 708(b) due to a turnover of fifty percent of partnership
interests."'

Other potential issues of administrability that might be considered are the
problem of special allocations of partnership items among partners,351 the
possibility of allocating partnership items through tiers of publicly traded
partnerships, and the addition of partnership-level liabilities to partners' bases
in their individual partnership interests. Each of these compel the handling of
a large number of discrete pieces of data with respect to each individual
partnership interest. In addition to the complexity of the tax accounting,
auditing is more cumbersome for a publicly traded partnership than for a
publicly traded corporation because of the need to trace each audit change to
individual investors.352 The enterprise's election to be treated as a partnership
imposes additional burdens on the fisc that existing law does not cause the
enterprise to internalize. As such, one could expect a more than optimal number
of enterprises electing full partnership treatment.
In principle, a simple and elegant solution to this problem is an excise tax.
Publicly traded enterprises, and perhaps even nonpublicly traded enterprises
with large numbers of equity investors, that elect partnership treatment would
be subject to an excise tax that compensates the fisc for the additional
administrative burden they impose upon the Treasury. The existing regime
imposes a 3.5% annual tax on the gross income of grandfathered publicly
traded partnerships,353 which is imposed as compensation for not reclassifying
them as corporations. In principle, that tax could be extended to all publicly
traded enterprises that elect partnership treatment.
Whether such a 3.5% excise tax would accurately compensate for the
excess cost imposed upon the fisc requires an accurate estimate of that cost.
Underestimation would result in too many publicly traded partnerships.
Overestimation would serve to reinforce the excess burden of the double tax

350. See Master Limited Partnerships:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Sec., Dep't of the Treasury).
351. I.R.C. § 704(b) (West 2003).
352. See McKee, supra, note 348 at 176. The streamlined "TEFRA Partnership Rules,"
I.R.C. §§ 6221-6234 (West 2003), and the further streamlined rules for "electing large
partnerships," id. §§ 6240-6255, serve to simplify the problem of tax administration for
partnerships with large numbers of members, but these rules do not eliminate the essential
problem of tracing audit changes to the individual partners responsible for additional tax, interest,
and penalty.
353. I.R.C. § 7704(g) (West 2003).
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regime, and a sufficiently high overestimate would have the same practical
effect as not repealing section 7704. Nevertheless, in the commonplace
absence of accurate empirical data, the 3.5% excise tax is probably areasonable
approximation. On the other hand, the creation of a new tax is contrary to the
spirit of the Laissez-Faire Approach. The Laissez-Faire Approach is to do no
more than strip away barriers that prevent or dissuade private enterprise from
creating a de facto integrated corporate income tax.
In the alternative, one might simply observe that the administrability issue
is primarily one of handling large amounts of data. In particular, great amounts
of data are necessary with respect to capital accounts and basis calculations
made individually for each partnership interest, even though with regard to
assets held by the partnership. 54 One solution is to hope that technology has
resolved, or will shortly resolve, the data handling issue. In the last generation,
the cost of computing capacity has shrunk by several orders of magnitude. "In
1980, a gigabyte of storage cost several hundred thousand dollars and occupied
a room. It now fits on a credit-card device that can be carried in your pocket."35
It remains an open question as to whether the declining cost of computer
technology is sufficient by itself to resolve the data handling component of the
administrability concern. The possibility is real enough that it cannot be
dismissed out of hand,356 but the creation of software sufficiently economical
in its creation and in its operation to justify the application of subchapter K to
publicly traded enterprises is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
If advances in data-processing technology are not a sufficient resolution,
it may be possible to simplify at least some components of subchapter K, at
least as it would apply to publicly traded partnerships, to minimize these
concerns. Full resolution of this issue is also beyond the scope of this Article,
and it will be addressed in a subsequent Article. It is worth noting here,
however, several points that must be borne in mind in creating a simplified
version of subchapter K for publicly traded corporations. First, simplifications
to subchapter K are likely to reduce its flexibility of application, and therefore,

354. See, e.g., id. § 704(c) (requiring special allocations to eliminate disparities between
book and tax capital accounts with respect to contributed property whose basis differs from its
value as of contribution); id. § 743(b) (permitting adjustment to basis of partnership property to
reflect gain or loss realized with respect to partnership interests upon a transfer occurring due to
the death of a partner, but only in so far as the basis calculation affects that particular partnership

interest).
355. PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: Civic ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND
THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 8 (W. Lance Bennett & Robert M. Ehtman eds., 2001), quoted in
Peter K. Yu, Bridging the DigitalDivide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 1, 29 (2002).
356. See Hearings,supra note 350, at 117-18 (statement of William S. McKee and Mark
K. Muller), 149-51 (statement of R. Donald Turlington); Milich, supranote 343, at 66.
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undermine its desirability. As such, the number of modifications should be
kept to a strict minimum, which creates an inherent tension between advancing
its administrability for publicly traded enterprises and preserving its flexibility.
Second, each distinction in subchapter K as it applies to closely held enterprises
compared to publicly traded enterprises places more stress on enforcing the
definition of public trading. To that extent, it is not fully consistent with the
spirit of the Laissez-Faire Approach, which counsels the reduction of the tax
barriers that require costly enforcement. Third, the other components of the
Laissez-Faire Approach grant ample opportunities to resolve the problem of the
double-tax regime with relative ease. Therefore, a modified subchapter K for
publicly traded enterprises is likely to affect fewer enterprises than would be
the case were it adopted in isolation, making it both less troubling and less
necessary.
XII. MERITS OF THE APPROACH

In considering the policy elements advanced by this Article, it is important
to bear in mind that they are intended neither to be a comprehensive catalogue
nor a single integrated enactment. It is not so much a comprehensive program
as an orientation for policy actions. The Laissez-Faire Approach is just thatan approach. Any policy or practice consistent with its conditions is a candidate
for inclusion.
For example, Robert Scarborough has outlined the manner in which
corporations are able to use combinations of debt instruments and stock options
to reduce the scope of double taxation." 7 In a similar vein, Professor Eustice
has observed the increase in aggressive corporate tax avoidance ("corporate tax
shelters") in recent years that, "[l]eft unchecked, [may lead to] a significant
erosion in the corporate tax base... , though not quite attaining, the potential
for do-it-yourself integration."3 To the extent that this is strictly true, such
aggressive corporate tax planning mitigates the excess tax burden of the
double-tax regime and is unobjectionable to the integrationist norm. The

Laissez-Faire Approach counsels acquiescence in any corporate tax planning
that has the effect of advancing the integrationist agenda.359 The Laissez-Faire

357. Scarborough, supra note 229, at 530-3 1.
358. James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55
TAX L. REV. 135, 139-40 (2002).
359. On the other hand, some such "corporate tax shelters" may go beyond the integrationist
goal of eliminating the excess tax burden of double taxation. The integrationist agenda and the
Laissez-Faire Approach make no defense of tax planning that allows income to escape the
equivalent of a single level individual income tax. Other agendas may make such a defense. For
example, a consumption tax agenda might counsel acquiescence in any practice that produces the
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Approach can no doubt be advanced by further refinement of the specific
proposals of this Article and, more important, by the advancing of other
elements that would promote the integrationist agenda.
Likewise, unlike other integration proposals, including the George W.
Bush Administration's original proposal,360 the approach presented herein is not
intended as a single policy enactment. Rather, the Laissez-Faire Approach is
intended to orient the progressive evolution of the tax regime toward the goal
of integrationism. The Laissez-Faire Approach can be completed entirely by
legislation, but Congress can also acquiesce in a number of positive steps taken
by other actors. It can be fulfilled all at once, but it is more likely to approach
the integrationist ideal in pieces, slowly, over much time.
The policy analysis advancing a catalogue of appropriate proposals allows
for the incremental advance of the integrationist agenda as conditions ripen for
individual pieces of legislation, regulatory initiatives, permissive enforcement
attitudes, and even judicial action. The extent of legitimate flexibility available
to noncongressional actors requires detailed examination that is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the example of the check-the-box
" ' which from the perspective of the Laissez-Faire Approach were
regulations,36
a wise regulatory choice, suggests that at least some flexibility is available.
There is widespread belief, premised on substantial evidence, that the
double-tax regime is suboptimal in comparison to an integrated tax regime for
corporate enterprise. Nevertheless, the problem of administrability prevents a

full integration program. Given that the best feasible outcome is partial
integration, that a comprehensive partial integration scheme is politically
unlikely, and that any practicable tax regime is necessarily an exercise in
resolving a second-best problem, the Laissez-Faire Approach fills a significant
gap in tax policy discussions. The existing regime is, and will remain, a hybrid
of a double-tax regime and an integrated regime, separated by arbitrary
boundaries. It is wasteful under these circumstances to expend legal and
administrative resources defending the double-tax anti-ideal. The Laissez-Faire
Approach accepts this reality and urges the progressive mitigation of the
double-tax regime by harnessing the taxpayers' own desire to minimize their
tax burden.

indefinite deferral of any taxation at all for economic accruals that remain invested in some
business enterprise. The Laissez-Faire Approach, however, is itself fully consistent with
aggressive policing for "corporate tax shelters" to the extent that they achieve greater tax
reduction than the goal of full corporate tax integration.
360. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 219, at 11-22.
361. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1999), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).
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